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7This study was written in 2000, and was funded by Sitra, the Finnish
National Fund for Research and Development. It describes how indus-
trial design is organized in manufacturing, and aims to find out means to
enhance the use of  design. It is primarily qualitative, based on a series of
case studies. Design is about to become an intensively researched area;
several book and studies appeared while we were writing this study
(Hendriks 1999; Joziasse 2000; Kelley 2001). We hope to contribute to
that emerging literature.
Koskinen and Järvinen are mainly responsible for this study. The contri-
butions of  other authors will will be credited separately. Various people
are responsible for various chapters in the study. In particular, we would
like to thank professors Juhani Salovaara and Pekka Korvenmaa for their
support. Chapter 10 is based on Tanja Kotro’s doctoral thesis, which will
be published in 2003. Regarding the Alessi case study she wishes to express
her gratitude to managing director dottore Alberto Alessi, design manager
Kristiina Lassus, product engineer Roberto Carosio and marketing
manager Silvano Gugglielmaggi for their co-operation. This chapter is
mainly based on the analysis of Alessi publications and PR-material and
observations she made while she visited the factory 15th – 22nd July 2000.
Therefore she wishes to remind that all the interpretations expressed in
this article are hers, and she alone is responsible for them.
The authors wish to thank Ms. Kirsi Valonen, for her contribution in the
field interview work during the summer and fall of  2000, Mr. Tomi Lonka
for the final layout of  this publication, as well as Ms. Katja Battarbee for
language revision. Above all, we would like to thank our interviewees.
In Arabia, Helsinki, May 6,
Juha Järvinen and Ilpo Koskinen
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9When professor Peter Behrens was hired by AEG in 1907, he not only
designed the typefaces of  the company, designed consumer goods and
investment goods, and rules for artistic aspects for production. He also
designed industrial and commercial buildings (some of  which are still in
their original use), pavilions for industrial fairs, villas for AEG management,
clubs, buildings commissioned by the German government, and interiors:
The range and scope of  Behrens’ activity for the AEG in Berlin
can be shown by citing a series of  almost randomly chosen
examples of  his work. He designed an exhibition from the pa-
vilion right down to the invitation card. This work involved
brochures and posters for the electrical appliances exhibited and
the appliances themselves, such as a dental drill, a humidifier,
and the casings for a whole series of  arc lamps and electric fans.
He also designed the factories in which these things were manu-
factured - for example, the highly complex factory for trans-
formers, resistors, and high-voltage equipment and the monu-
mental small-motor factory. He was responsible for the planning
of  the firm’s extensive housing estates and for the design of  two
boathouses, and he laid out a dignified roof  garden above the
factories at Humboldt-hain illustrations. Behrens’ designs for
the AEG are too numerous to itemize here. They extend from
simple box labels to a large–scale industrial town, and can be
found in every conceivable area of  the firm’s activity. With the
exception of  the electrical appliances, which as a result of  tech-
nical development and the pressure of  consumerism have be-
come collector’s items, many of  the relatively large number of
works that have survived are still serving their original purposes
today. This is true of  the advertising graphics and, in spite of  the
war, of  the factories... Behrens’s typefaces are still used in the
firm’s signet, and set a standard against which the firm’s present-
day graphic material finds it hard to compete. (Rogge 1984: 114)
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Although Behrens was trained in three-dimensional arts and architecture
(there was no training in industrial design then), his example shows that
issues such as product recognizability, loyalty, branding, trust in products,
and pleasure in products have been a concern for designers working in
industry for a century.
As Sony chairman Norio Ohga says, “The product itself  must
be good, but it must also make the customer think, ‘I’m glad I
bought it,’ ‘I’m glad I use it,’ ‘I’m glad I have it.’” (Kunkel 1999:
15).
Although design has been dubbed as the second vainest occupation right
next to marketing (Papanek 1970), it is also an occupation that makes the
world a better, a more beautiful, a safer, and a smoother place to live in.
Design also works interactively with socio-cultural phenomena, articulat-
ing into objects the broader parameters operative at a certain historical
moment. A good example is the famous Kilta ceramics table- and
kitchenware set from the early 1950s, produced by Arabia Ltd. and de-
signed by Kaj Franck.  The purist, minimalist appearance of  the objects
were in tune with the modernist design idiom and afterwards that feature
with the interconnectivity of  several pieces has been seen as its main
merit. But the ideas of  stackability, saving space and affordability echoed
the societal fluctuations of  post-war Finland and the emergence of  the
welfare state. The set matched the ideas of  standardization in architec-
ture and especially kitchen design and the effort to bring a modern apart-
ment also for the majority of  the population. This was to be achieved in
terms of  rational planning, cost and space efficiency. Also, these house-
holds were expected not to have domestic labor force. Hence the logis-
tics of  the preparation and serving of  the food had to work smoothly,
rapidly and with an equally efficient set of tools, that is, kitchen and table-
ware.
The artefactual, material culture inevitably guides our daily life at work
and leisure gives us the  most immediate and very tangible cultural frame.
The effects of  material culture are in general not clear to people and
evade explication because of  the anonymity and self-evident presence of
the artefact world around us. The important role design has in enhancing
Chapter 1
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the aesthetic and functional level of our environment is not generally
understood. Design which works via public transportation systems, rai-
sing their level of  efficiency, comfort and safety is only one example
where the returns from investment into design are clear.
On the level of  products and consumer commodities not only the func-
tionality but increasingly also the cultural signs and messages transmitted
via design  help to characterize the habits and  socio-cultural profile of
groups and individuals. In this way the immaterial, culture-based values
have become vital in design practice and the new product development it
serves. Also corporations have understood this: Philips is one good ex-
ample, the automotive industries another. If  the prophesies of  the New
Economy and the Experience Society are valid, increasing investments
into the cultural positioning of  products, systems and services becomes –
actually already is – a key asset in the competition on the global market.
Designers draw on not only arts and other forms of  elite culture, but on
popular culture as well. The sociologist Harvey Molotch tells that one
reason for why car design studios are often located in Los Angeles is that
it provides a street life that is a constant source of  ideas for designers.
Those in California auto design disagree among themselves on
what, if  anything, may be the basis for the region’s special design
role. For Hiroaki Ohba, executive vice president of  Toyota’s
Calty Design, the company’s Orange County location is particu-
larly stimulating, among other reasons because “Newport Beach
is a museum for automobiles and an idea place for the automo-
bile designer... We see many antique cars in Newport Beach.”
There are also “more exotic cars on the streets of  a place like
Newport Beach (Porsches, Ferraris), more, according to Ohba,
than one would find in Germany or Japan. The youth of  Cali-
fornia have for generations been great style experimenters. One
auto designer told me that the fashions on Melrose Avenue, a
1990s hot strip of boutiques and high-end junk shoppes for the
affluent young, influence car design. The shapes and colors of
jewelry, the textures and combinations of  outfits, all may end up
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in design details... Even if  not consciously inventorying “the
trends,” designers are alert to such messages from the streets and
shop windows. The GM California studio chef  says he likes to
take “a few of  our guys  and drive along the beach... to see what
people do on weekends with their vehicles.” The Chrysler vice
president for design explains his company’s presence in South-
ern California as taking “advantage of  the local culture there”
(Molotch 1996: 257 – 258).
This is “advanced design,” early concept creation, rather than “produc-
tion design,” which is done at later stages of  the production process
(Molotch 1996: 259).
Finally, design translates other sources of  culture into products as well.
The best example is perhaps the ergonomics movement. Applied sci-
ences like ergonomics have become a part and parcel of  design, as have
various branches of  the social sciences, philosophy and aesthetics. Many
innovations in computer modelling and applications in new materials are
more advanced in design than in other manufacturing occupations.
These innovations utilize cultural understanding often in a highly con-
scious manner. Culture can be an important source of  new ideas and
business. At best, it can articulate scientific, artistic and popular cultural
values in the marketplace in those products that people use in their lives.
In Weberian terms, design articulates substantial cultural values in an
ever-rationalizing world. It introduces content to our lives and thus en-
hances the quality of  our interactions with the material world - and in-
creasingly to services that accompany them.
Design as Reflexive Cultural Action in Modern Manufacturing
Design can be a cultural force in modern manufacturing as well, despite
its advanced technology, economy, and social organization. The hub of
activity in design is product design. Typically, when designers work only
in product design, they cannot affect conceptual and strategic decisions
Chapter 1
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except in those few cases in which their products have become hits. Nor-
mally, they work at the final end of  the product development process,
with little control over the frames from which they get their orientation
for their work. These orientations can be specifications, plans, guidelines,
or physical models. This is the typical use of  design in manufacturing
companies.
In those companies that have an established reputation in design, this is
the model from which designers try to get away. Thus, when Knut Yran
reorganized industrial design in Philips in 1966 – 1969, he established a
specific design track (CIDC), which he defended with vigor.
The organizational plan for CIDC specified a management pro-
cess with the design group, but did not identify a pattern of
linkage to other functions in the company, and there were still
frequent difficulties in relationships with the product divisions.
Their managers often continued to regard design as a large,
superficial addition to the process of  product development and
could still impose ideas upon product design, for example, in-
sistence on wood instead of  metal for housing. Proselytizing the
virtues of  design, no matter with how much conviction, was
clearly not enough to achieve a fundamental change of  attitude
in this respect. (Heskett 1989: 25)
Apparently, most manufacturing companies that buys the services of
industrial designers use design to create new concepts. In leading
corporations, designers not only provide the vision that engineers, prod-
uct planners and management need to develop a coherent product line.
Speaking of  Sony, Paul Kunkel notes that these concepts also make that
vision seem unavoidable by creating concept models that narrow the gap
between what can be and what will be. Because of  their sensitive nature,
most Sony concepts are rarely shown outside the company and are al-
most never published. The reason, says DC senior general manager John
Inaba, is simple: “Even ten-year-old ideas can have functional and aes-
thetic features that are useful to us today. At Sony, advanced concepts are
treated like fine wine. We can choose to drink them right away. Or we can
Industrial Design and Cultural Innovation in Economy
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put some of them away for the future and not push them into the market
too soon. The best ideas never go out of  style.”
The belief  in conceptual thinking is so strong at Sony that the
closets, shelves and hard discs at the Creative Center and Shibaura
Technical Center in Tokyo, the B&P Group in Atsugi, the Park
Ridge Design Center and offices in San Francisco, Singapore
and London are filled with drawings and models that may one
day become products that help to define the digital future. (Kunkel
1999: 178).
As mentioned above in the case of  Philips, various concepts are inte-
grated into more coherent wholes. There are several techniques for this.
Most companies build more or less natural models of  environments
(kitchen, offices, etc.) in which their products appear. Some companies
develop technology based on an evolutionary approach. Thus, at Sony, a
specific Sunrise/Sunset strategy guides product development at various
phases of  the life cycle of  a technology (Kunkel 1999: 26 – 29). Another
main tactic in manufacturing industry is technology brokering: designers
combine existing technologies in surprising ways (Hargadon and Sutton
1997).
In terms of  strategic influence, the key question is the strategic level and
access to major business processes such as financing, investments, mar-
keting, and key technology decisions. Typically in literature, designers are
on a less strong footing that engineers in the design process. However,
literature also suggests that in some companies, design is a major compo-
nent at a strategic level. This seems to be the case of  Sony, at which the
Design Center system creates a constant flow of  ideas and products based
on a model reminiscent of  the technology brokering model described by
Hardagon and Sutton (1987) at IDEO, a major American design
consultancy. Designers who are free to maintain contacts over divisions
and hierarchical levels can spot technologies that could be used in sur-
prising combinations.
Chapter 1
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“What makes Sony unique among high-tech firms is that the
designer often starts the process,” says DC/Park Ridge [Sony
Design center in New Jersey] veteran Rich Gioscia. “We don’t
wait for marketing or product planning to give us an assignment.
We’re proactive.” (Kunkel 1999: 136).
Also, at Sony, the Design Center has been a major route to senior corpo-
rate management. Thus, the current CEO of  the corporation, Nobuyuki
Idei, is a former head of  the Design Center (Kunkel 1999: 15). Because
of  this personal link, there is a close tie between Sony design philosophy
and its strategy (see Kunkel 1999: 195 – 199).  This was not the case in
the mid-1960s: the strategic role of  design is a more recent achievement
within the corporate structure (Kunkel 1999: 30). The Design Center
creates new realities and possibilities for the corporate management, and
thus creates possible futures. Design in Sony is dynamic rather than reac-
tive in nature.
In some major industrial companies, then, design is apparently used as a
strategic asset. Based on this preliminary investigation, the stratification
model is possible and thus suitable for benchmarking. However, there is
little information on how design works at a strategic level. At Olivetti,
these links are personal in nature (Kicherer 1990: 80), and at Philips, they
are organized through a variety of means ranging from design policy to
in-house conferences. This observation leads us to a main observation
that guides this study: what kinds of  reasons account for variations in the
strategic uses of design?
Design in Manufacturing: Research Design
The focus of  this study is to find out how designers can exercise their
cultural skills and understanding in manufacturing, and articulate culture
in products, whether material or immaterial. Designers know how to turn
cultural understanding into products. If  their work environment does not
Industrial Design and Cultural Innovation in Economy
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allow that, then their skills are underused. Their skills may disappear in the
organizational hierarchies, and in competition with other groups at the
workplace.
In terms of  the research question, the broadest possible formulation is in
Figure 1. Here design, the organization of  design in companies, is an
intervening variable that may either facilitate the transformation of  cul-
tural values into products, or temper that process. The key question that
arises from this is how to best organize design.
This book looks at variations in the organization of  design in the modern
economy. More specifically, it looks at how industrial design is organized
in manufacturing organizations within two industries, machine manufac-
turing and health care/medical equipment industries. Its primary focus is
in Finland, but current organizational practices in Finland are compared
to several international cases that serve as benchmarks in this study. We
will not analyze traditional arts and crafts industries, but industries that
are important and emerging in the Finnish economy.
Chapter 1
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Our basic assumption is that the more control  designers have over their
immediate work and the frames (for this term, see Chapter 2) that direct
their work, the better they are able to influence production, and promote
their  core values, whether these are based on applied sciences, or the art
world.  To understand how design has achieved an important position in
some companies, we will develop a model based on research in social
movements (see Chapters 2 and 3).
Concepts, Research Questions, and the Organization of  the Study
In this chapter, we have raised the question of  the relationship of  indus-
trial design to manufacturing organizations.  However, a conceptual note
is needed before proceed. This study focuses on industrial designers, not
on members of other design professions such as graphics designers or
furniture designers. All these design professions produce usable goods
with an eye on mass production. What distinguishes industrial designers
from other design fields is that they are not specialized, typically work
with investment goods, and their work remains anonymous. We will use
“industrial design” and “design” interchangeably. Wherever necessary, we
will use more exact terminology.
The main question in this study is how is design organized in those manu-
facturing organizations in which design is reputedly on good grounds?
Our assumption is that in companies known for their design prowess,
industrial designers are involved at higher levels of  decision-making. At
higher levels of  the model, design is involved in all major processes of
the firm, including market research and analysis, product development,
research, and management, which includes both operative and strategic
levels. The second question is how and why has design become impor-
tant in the companies studied? Where does the original impetus come
from, and how have designers pursued their cause successfully in compa-
nies studied? This question requires a historical analysis.
Third, the new economy model suggests that design can be organized as
a network rather than as an in-house activity. What is the prevailing mode
Industrial Design and Cultural Innovation in Economy
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of organization iof design n Finland, and how does the Finnish organiza-
tion compare to international companies? If there is an in-house organi-
zation at work, it may be organized in various ways, ranging from a series
of offices run by independent professional designers to a hierarchical
organization. Fourth, the economics and the traditions of  various branches
of  the industry vary along many dimensions. What comes to design, the
most important dividing line is between consumer products and busi-
ness-to-business products. Are there differences in how design is orga-
nized in business-to-business and consumer product manufacturing com-
panies?
Finally, to participate effectively in strategic design, designers need new
skills in organizational processes. Their old skills in concept creation,
modeling (including computer modeling), and ergonomics equip them
well for product design, but not necessarily for managerial jobs. What are
these new skills? Also, skills needed early in the process are apparently
different. How about skills in economy and strategy?
Chapters 2 and 3 lay the foundations for the study. Chapter 2 describes
the ways in which design is organized in the current economy, and builds
a benchmark for a later analysis. Chapter 3 develops a framework for
analyzing the process in which design has achieved certain position in
manufacturing organizations. Chapter 4 explains the data and methods.
The following six chapters are empirical chapters. Chapter 5 looks at the
organization of  design in our data. Chapter 6 details how design has
become a part of  company practice, while Chapter 7 looks at how long-
term relationships with consultants have emerged, and how they are or-
ganized. Chapter 8 compares different industries in our sample of  com-
panies, and looks at two advanced companies in detail. Chapter 9 ana-
lyzes some of the cultural forces that shape design. Chapter 10 tells the
story of  Alessi, an Italian designer company, and shows how a whole
manufacturing organization can be built around design.
Chapter 1
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To understand why industrial design has become important in manufac-
turing, and how it is organized in manufacturing organizations, we need
to contextualize it to the workplace and its developments in recent
economy. Piore and Sabel (1984) explain the main trends in production
by reference to “Fordism,” or (roughly) mass-production based on the
conveyor belt technology (this concept will be dealt with in more detail
later in this chapter). For them, Fordism arose first in the United States,
which had no guild traditions, not fixed tastes as in Europe, and which
faced a scarcity of skilled labor for decades at the end of the 19th cen-
tury. Simultaneously, government policies were needed to stabilize the
Fordist model, typically the welfare state that maintained demand for
mass-produced goods. The U.S. model slowly penetrated European econo-
mies as well. However, today, the conditions that gave rise to the fordist
model have grown increasingly problematic because of  at least three de-
velopments.
First, with the internationalization of  trade, Keynesian policies
can no longer effectively govern Fordist institutions, for policies
that maintain aggregate demand within a given nation often only
benefit foreign producers. The result saddles domestic firms
with massive, vertically integrated structures that are plagued by
excess capacity and falling market shares. This problem grows
more severe as markets for mass consumer goods approach the
point of saturation. Second, the ubiquity of mass production
has itself  stimulated increasing demand for quality goods through
which consumers can express their distance from the “vulgar”
world of  mass taste (Bourdieu 1984; Brubaker 1985). These
cultural dynamics, which are not easily squared with the logic of
mass production, begin to alter the ground on which production
stands. The third development stems from the widespread dif-
fusion of  sophisticated information technologies, which reduces
the barriers to entry into production of  quality “niche” com-
modities, rendering small-batch production increasingly profit-
able. These latter developments provide opportunities for small
producers using neocraft models to produce diversified quality
goods (Sorge and Streeck 1988). (Vallas 1999: 73).
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These three trends describe the context in which design works today.
There is wide agreement on the consequences of  this description for the
organization of  work. Although some reviews claim that these trends
have been exaggerated in theoretical literature (see Vallas 1999), the trend
is steadily towards “disorganized capitalism” (Lash and Urry 1987), and
organizations characterized by externalization of  strategically important
resources typically internalized previously. There is also a wide agree-
ment over the reasons for these changes.  For our purposes, it is enough
to recognize these changes, and describe their main features.
As one of  the production professions, industrial design has gone through
a set of  changes just as other professions involved in production. Its
place in the production process has changed, but how? In this chapter, we
analyze companies in terms of  how strongly and widely design is in-
volved in their decision-making, i.e. setting the premises that form the
context in which the production process takes place. These “decision
premises” (Cyert, Simon and Trow 1956; March and Simon 1958) are
those undeniable, or hard realities that guide work and thinking. We will
call these decision premises “frames” (Snow et al. 1986; their definition is
based on Goffman: for him, frames are elements which govern the way in
which events unfold and participants’ involvement in them (Goffman
1974: 10 – 11). Primarily, frames consist of  rules and resources, material
realities, equipment, organizational processes and strategies. Apparently,
a group that controls these aspects of the production process has the
ability to impose its own frames over others without force.
In a typical fordist model, this framing is sequential: decisions at one stage
are realities that are almost impossible to alter later, since the production
process is systematized. People later in the sequence can frame things
anew, and thus impact the decision premises of  parties further in the
sequence, but this power is limited. Generally, only few parties are able to
define the basic frames, and this takes place early in the sequence.
In a typical post-fordist production process, there is more flexibility in
reframing through means such as humanistic leadership styles, job en-
Chapter 2
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largement, job enrichment, and teamwork. Furthermore, organizational
models such as the learning organization and network models acknowl-
edge this autonomy, and even build on it. Still, there is a sequential model
at work  behind the apparent autonomy. Parties in such production sys-
tems have autonomy within certain limits, and they can enhance their
autonomy through a variety of  means (the best description is still
Mathewson 1931; see also Hodson 1993), but have little say over these
previous decisions. Various models of  organizing design co-exist in both
Fordist and post-Fordist organizational regimes. Next, we shall look at
the most typical variants of  organization in more detail.
Design in the Fordist Model
In the traditional linear model, design is understood mainly as an aes-
thetic exercise that typically takes place at the end of  the product devel-
opment process. In an influential description of  product development,
Ulrich and Eppinger (1995) describe design in following terms. For them,
industrial design means aesthetics, ergonomics, and user interface design.
Design engineering covers mechanical, electrical, software engineering,
and other similar specialties in the field) (Ulrich and Eppinger 1995: 3).
Design is an activity that takes place throughout product development.
In this model, industrial design extends over the whole product develop-
ment cycle. However, its tasks are mainly related to the aesthetics of
products. Also, and more importantly, what is left out from the image is
important. Design is situated firmly within product development only.
This view is restricts the influence of  design all too narrowly.
Apparently, this model describes the uses of  design in some companies,
but every company that utilizes design conforms to this model. For ex-
ample, whole industries deviate from this pattern in their stress on artistic
values and design. These industries, as the example furniture design shows,
are not necessarily small. In particular, present CAD/CAM technologies
and new forms of  3D software make it possible for designers to commu-
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nicate with engineering and marketing right from the beginning. The tradi-
tional linear model model may have eroded with these technologies that
enable communication between various parties in production right through
the process, but its efficiency is hard to deny.
In the traditional linear model model, design works within the bound-
aries set earlier in the process, and elsewhere in the organization. Framing
devices such as visions, strategies, and technologies come from upper
layers of the organization. Design is involved in product development,
but has little control over its direction. This is especially the case when
designers focus on the aesthetics of  products only.
The Design Management Model
Design may be more extensively involved in organizational activities. A
set of  designers, usually from graphics design, but also from other design
disciplines, including industrial design, are involved in designing the brand
identity of  companies. They design visual and observable aspects of  com-
panies such as logos, packages, style guides, product outlooks, and so
forth. The basic idea behind this activity, usually captured in the concept
of  “design management,” is that designers have the skills necessary to
construct unified images and product styles for companies (see Poikolainen
ym. 1994). With marketing, these are the most important element in brand-
Chapter 2
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ing. Designers involved in design management also may offer strategic
design services: they visualize strategy and communicate it.
Some companies utilize design in this way, but few use design solely for
these purposes. Usually, designers are involved in more traditional design
tasks. The main aim of  design management is to differentiate the com-
pany from its competitors in terms of  its products and activities, and to
make the company image consistent. Thus, design management creates a
corporate image that attracts customers and facilitates interactions with
them. Here Olins, a leading European consultant in corporate image de-
sign, suggests a number of  reasons for corporate identity programmes.
Jay Doblin, one of the most serious of the veteran design think-
ers, who started designing streamlined trains back in the 1930s
with Loewy recalls that the first major intentional corporate
identity was carried out for International Harvester in the early
1940s.
Organizations like International Harvestes and IBM in the United
States, Olivetti in Italy and London Transport in Britain got
involved in unified design programmes for a number of  reasons.
Of course they appreciated the benefits that unified design and
a distinctive house style wold bring in terms of  internal morale,
public recognition, higher standards of  performance, improved
recruitment and so on, but the individual executives who com-
missioned the design programmes were also convinced that
what they were doing would put them on the side of  the angels.
Good design meant doing good, raising visual standards every-
where, making the environment more agreeable. (Olins 1978:
153).
Design management focuses typically on packaging, logos, and all other
visual elements of  the firm that its members, as well as outsiders see and
use in construing their impression and in reasoning about the company.
Typically, design management also includes products and services, com-
munications, environments (physical), and behaviors (of the staff)
(Poikolainen et al. 1994: 40).
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The main tasks of design management are to contribute to corporate
strategic goals, to manage design resources, to manage the design pro-
cess, and to cultivate an information and idea network (Blaich 1993).
Design management, then, is about managing design activities in compa-
nies, not just the organization of  designers, even though they are the hub
of  activity in design management.
At the strategic level, the corporate identity ought to be defined in the
corporate vision. This vision says, what the company is, specifies the
corporate strategy and its capacity to reach the vision. Also, it ought to
specify what the company represents: its total performance based on the
corporate values and its visual identity to make the company understand-
able (Hytönen 1999: 124 – 130). In particular, such unified vision is im-
portant in consumer products.
Communicating a coherent corporate image an advertising and other vi-
sual communications is easier with a unified style. There is a specific
industry that specializes in designing corporation identities and corporate
images. A typical program that aims at building corporate image goes far
beyond redesigning the company logo. Research consists of  an analysis
of  the current image, as well as the desired image among key stakehold-
ers and customers. Research also means going through materials ranging
from papers and clothing to the architecture of  buildings. In more ambi-
tious programs, design becomes expensive and requires expertise from
several areas of  design ranging from architecture and interior design to
textile design (and even fashion design), and from graphics design to
design management. The change process may require long-term involve-
ment by the consultants (see Olins 1978; Poikolainen et al. 1994).
In this model, the designers’ control over the company still remains su-
perficial, but goes beyond mere aesthetics. To act efficiently in building
the corporate image, designers gain a say in many company activities.
They may not orient the company through their actions. However, they
are the architects of  the way in which the company presents itself  to
customers and other public. The public forms its impression of  the com-
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pany from tangible cues. To make them consistent, design management
has to operate on a wider mandate in the company than on product
design only.
Comprehensive Design Concepts: The Case of  Olivetti
In some large manufacturing companies, design has been used widely for
decades (for example, for Herman Miller and Philips, see Blaich and Blaich
1993; for Crown Equipment, Smith and Bidwell 1991; for Bahco Tools,
Svengren 1994; for Kenwood, Won Chung 1990). Perhaps the best de-
scription in literature is that of  Olivetti.
Adriano Olivetti, who followed his father Camillo, the founder of  the
company in managing Olivetti went as far as producing a regional devel-
opment plan for Valle d’Aosta and Ivrea. Under Adriano Olivetti, the
designers’ influence over the company affairs  went far beyond product
design.
These products were for Adriano only a means to a higher goal,
he was not only concerned with bringing products to mankind,
but with opening up the horizons of  a modern, industrial soci-
ety. The task of  advertising was to communicate this demand by
content and graphic design. Many artists and intellectuals com-
missioned by Adriano... also contributed to establishing adver-
tising graphics as an independent field apart from art... Adver-
tising was not an isolated instrument but part of  a comprehen-
sive design concept, with areas like architecture, product design,
advertising and shop design following a common direction.
(Kitcherer 1990: 32)
In advertising, Olivetti favored avant-garde, geometric figures, as well as
photography, collages, careful typography, and playful compositions. De-
sign also covered company architecture, company housing, as well as de-
signing pavilions, showrooms, shops, and other designs for fairs. Several
in-house newsletters and journals, distributed by an in-house publishing
house Comunità (established in 1946) published journals such as Comunità,
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Tecnica ad Organizzazione, and Notizie Olivetti, all designed in up-to-date
graphic style (Kitcherer 1990: 12 – 17).
Adriano Olivetti, aware of the dangers of repetition in industrial work,
sought to help the situation by redesigning equipment to ease the lives of
their users. Design promoted not just technical values, but cultural,
intellectual and artistic values as well. Its aesthetic style was also progressive:
it was modern and rational, apparently against the decorative aesthetics
prevalent at that time, much in the manner of  Behrens in AEG, and with
possible anti-fascist overtones in the thirties.
Designers hired by Olivetti were young, talented people, and they were
given extensive responsibilities. For example, the sculptor Marcello Nizzoli,
and the architect Ettore Sotsass undertook high risk tasks early on in
their careers (Kitcherer 1990: 17).
Between 1927 and 1960 an entire concept of  a corporate identity and a
corporate image was built up, long before this concept was introduced
into economic terminology. In contrast to another pioneer in this field,
the AEG company in Germany, Olivetti did not rely on a single designers
and his particular style, but on a number of  people with quite different
approaches, setting into motion a dynamic development of  the company
from all aspects. (Kitcherer 1990: 18).
In addition to tradition and decision-making concentrated on the veter-
ans, there were a series of  “red books” that coordinated design at Olivetti.
Coordinated by the department of  Corporate Identity and led by Hans
von Klier (in the 1980s), this red book specified logos, letterheads, colors,
and external and internal signs on company buildings and vehicles. The
corporate identity group also designs interiors and renovations of  com-
pany offices, and designs corporate systems for Olivetti dealers and exhi-
bitions (Kitcherer 1990: 113 – 116).
In a model like this, design impacts not only just product design and areas
covered today by the term “design management,” but it also has wider
implications over the company. Designers have a major say over most
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company activities. However, the influence takes largely place because of
the owner/manager, and is in this sense secondary.
The Designer Firm
Some organizations are devised to be dominated by designers. In this
case, designers set the basic frames for the company. Also, even when
they delegate work for other professions and groups, they have a veto
over everything in the firm. They are thus in the control of  the company.
Typically, these companies are designer-owned. With the exception of  a
few, usually small-scale enterprises, this kind of  designer-led organiza-
tion is clearly an exception in the modern economy. Outside traditional
crafts industries, this model is extremely rare, though there are industries
in which design has been a viable strategy for decades (such as furniture
industry or tableware).
A typical case is Woodnotes, a Finnish company with a turnover of  25
million FIM. Woodnotes produces items such as design carpets made
mainly of  paper and paper string. The original idea behind the company
came from the designer Ritva Puotila. Here, the managing director de-
scribes the position of  design in Woodnotes’ policy:
Have you had a design policy, or a process model for product
development?
We don’t have a model, we experiment a lot. If  we talk about
managing design, our hands are free to experiment all kinds of
things. There is no formal process. Things are largely based on
Ritva Puotila’s ways of  doing things. If  we hire more designers
in the future, it may be that we develop a model, but today, it is
based on Ritva’s way of  doing things. (Interview at Woodnotes,
29.11.2000)
Freelancers are hired for design tasks, but Ritva Puotila is always in charge
of  the artistic side of  the company. Woodnotes’s competitors such as
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Ruckstühl (Switzerland) and Paolo Lenti (Italy) in carpet business are houses
in which design and crafts-like quality is the main attraction in products.
Even distribution is through design companies and shops such as Ingo
Mauer, Alessi, and Cassini. In Woodnotes, all major activities are led by
design. Not only new products, but also new product lines (Woodnotes
has currently 7 product lines, carpets being the most important). Only
graphics design is externalized in Woodnotes - but is still in the profes-
sional designers’ control.
This organizational model is typical to traditional arts industries, as Chapter
10 shows. If  design is organized in this way, designers do not act in a
context created by other professions, but create the context in which they,
just as other professions, specialties and groups work. Designers define
the policies, draft the organization, make decisions concerning equip-
ment and technology, and new products. Designers’ values dominate and
direct the whole company. As the example of  Woodnotes shows, the
designers control extends in this model from idea generation to the man-
agement of  the distribution chain and the service in the outlets.
Benchmarking Design
When we map the relationship of  design to these different modes of
organizing, we get Figure 1. It shows what kinds of  activities designers
typically do in various manufacturing regimes in terms of  their control
these activities. It is only in the designer company in which designers are
able to exert their capacities in full: it is in this type of  organization that
design becomes a fully culturally reflexive agent. In other modes of  orga-
nizing design, designers have typically been less successful; they have to
take into account frames and decisions set by other groups. However, it is
important to note that Figure 1 is a preliminary mapping, not a result of
a study. They key question that arises from the figure is, how can design
in a typical manufacturing organization, still organized in a linear fash-
ion, reach its influence over product design into other areas of  activity.
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As this study shows, design is indeed organized in a variety of ways in
modern industry. Various factors, ranging from ownership and the
management’s perspective on art and design, accounts for the position of
designers in companies. Existing models are all partial for benchmarking
purposes. Consequently, it is better to approach the task in a different
way, ask how design activities are organized in terms of  a conceptual
model, and then elaborate this into an interpretive model of  design. This
conceptual model works first as an interpretive framework for empirical
study. Secondly, it serves as a benchmark for analysis.
The following figure captures the ways in which industrial design works
in the current post-fordist, non-linear model. This conceptual model is
designed to capture variation in the way in which industrial design is
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organized in the current manufacturing organizations. In our research de-
sign, it captures the explained variable, the position of industrial design in
manufacturing organizations. In organizations, design may be used at three
levels. In addition to product development, designers may participate in
creating product and service concepts for the company. They may also
be a part of  defining company strategy not only just through their
product-related work, but also through their conceptual designs and other
managerial activities.
We assume that these processes are ordered in the following sense. Con-
cept design can exists on the foundation of  product design, just as strate-
gic design assumes the existence of  a concept design practice. The com-
bination of product design and strategic design is implausible without a
concept design practice.
Product design
Product design processes are typically fairly short. They begin with a
design brief, and consist of  tasks typical to design: study, sketching, ren-
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dering, modelling, and communicating the model. The results are intended
for production. Designers control only issues arising from the design
work are controlled by designers. The reason for the briskness of  the
process is that part of  the work has been done previously. Product ideas
are largely specified already, and a good deal of  planning has been done
at a conceptual level.
Conceptual design
The first important step is conceptual design. It is by designing concepts
that industrial design goes beyond the linear processes. Conceptual de-
sign involves creating new product concepts, and deviates from tradi-
tional practices. Designers create new concepts that may end up in pro-
duction, but not necessarily. Rather, it is through these concepts that
manufacturing organizations probe their markets. Concepts aim several
years ahead. Typically, they capture developments for 2 – 3 years in the
future. Concepts are grounded in company strategy, which includes com-
petence creation in technology and markets, to name a few.
In this work, designers may even get involved in technological and mar-
ket research, and may open the frames set by other groups in the organi-
zation. Typically, in conceptual design, designers are involved early in R
& D processes, where frames are set for future products, and where
companies’ concept portfolios are crated and managed.
Strategic Design - Towards Culturally Reflective Production
In some companies, industrial designers are involved in strategic deci-
sion-making that coordinate not just the creation of  concepts but redirect
the whole organization as well. We follow Joziasse (2000), who has dis-
tinguished three types of  strategic design: analysis, choice, and imple-
mentation. If  designers are involved in these activities at strategic level, it
is possible to talk about strategic design.
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At a strategic level, designers are involved in setting strategies issues and
long-term frames for companies, not just for designers, but also for
other specialties. Strategy typically involves understanding processes and
decisions that lay the foundations for company direction for five years
into the future. If  designers are involved in strategy-making, they participate
in decisions of  new product lines and technologies, may be involved in
decisions about entering new markets, participate in creating key docu-
ments and policies that apply on an organization-wide basis on issues
such as logistics, subcontractor relations, personnel policy, and even strat-
egy. Ultimately, they may be centrally involved in such strategic issues as
the planning of  acquisitions, mergers, and cutbacks, if  these are related
to design.
In this model, traditional product design and conceptual design takes
place largely as in the previous, linear production models. In addition,
industrial designers participate in managing companies’ product portfolios
and product generations. In some firms, design has some kind of  a strategic
role. Speaking of  Nokia’s usability design, Korhonen notes that when a
product development decision has been made, the main features of a
product are set. The usability group has been accustomed to question
these specifications. Do the users really need all these features? Are there
other features that would sorely be needed? What kinds of experiences
does the user get from this kind of product? By turning the table around,
by asking these questions first and by doing product development decisions
then, we got into a model that came to be called as “strategic design”
(Korhonen 2000: 189).
Strategic design requires new kinds of  skills from designers. These skills
consists of  intimate knowledge of  marketing and marketing research, an
understanding of  the economics of  the organization, understanding its
politics, and understanding of  organizational behavior and theory. In prac-
tical terms, there must be a set of  designers who participate in strategic
management, and are involved in building company philosophy, includ-
ing its visions, values, and policies. They are able to make design a central
premise in the corporation. Through their work, design becomes one of
the “master frames” (see Snow and Benford 1992: 138 – 140; their allu-
sion is to Hughes 1984) that guide work in the company.
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Design as Culturally Reflexive Activity
Strategic design is a logical next step in making design a reflexive agent in
developing business. In this model, designers are reflexive agents in the
production process, not agents that work within the linear process (see
Giddens 1994: 86). They push the company to rethink its activities in
terms of  cultural values and constructs.
But flexible production is more than just knowledge intensive.
It is at the same time reflexive production. Thus is partly encap-
sulated in Sabel’s (1990) invocation of  the “reintegration of
conceptualization and execution”. It is reflexive production in
the sense that shorter product runs mean that employees must
make decisions more often on the best process suited for new
products. It is reflexive in the sense that much work must go into
the design of new products; these are typically long-cycle job-
tasks entailing a whole series of judgments and decisions be-
tween alternatives in regard to product quality and process
optimality. It is reflexive in regard to individualization... This
increase in reflexivity is registered in the notion of  “shopfloor
epistemology” or Lipietz’s (1992) discussion of  an increasingly
“reflexive habitus” in economic life. This sort of  reflexive eco-
nomic actor is no longer to such a great extent circumscribed by
the constraints of  “structure,” subject to the rules and resources
of  the shopfloor. Instead he/she operates at some distance from
these rules and resources; he/she makes decisions as to alterna-
tive rules and resources; and he/she finally is responsible for the
continuous transformation of  both shopfloor rules and (in pro-
cess and product) resources. (Lash and Urry 1994: 122).
This reflexive capacity is initially achieved at the conceptual design level
of the stratification model, but the strategic level is even more advanced
in this respect. In essence, it means that designers are able to reconceptualize
and redefine not just some product in development, but also the whole
system of production. Their potential reflexive influence is systemic rather
than restricted by the confines of  the existing organization, economy, and
technology. Apparently, this is primarily true of  designer-led companies.
However, it may also be true of some advanced manufacturing compa-
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nies provided that designers have achieved a major say in the production
processes.
In the strategic design model, industrial design is involved at an early
stage in product development, no matter whether we are dealing with an
evolutionary development or new product development process. Design-
ers collaborate with research and development, with engineering, and with
marketing, and are connected to the strategic management. Design activi-
ties can therefore change the course of  the company. Designers are not
bound by the pre-existing definitions the organization provides, but they
are free to question even some of  the most basic of  the company pre-
mises. They may even set these basic premises that are then worked out in
more detail by the organization.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen several variations in how design is orga-
nized in modern economy. The hub of  design activity is in product de-
sign, but designers do lots of  other things as well. We have found that
there is lots of  potential for making design a more enabling agent in
manufacturing. We can assume that design is a strategic asset in some
companies, and thus has become a cultural force in the manufacturing
economy. How and why is that possible? The next chapter analyzes litera-
ture from a group of  companies to see how these companies have man-
aged to combine design into their manufacturing activities.
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In the literature on post-fordism, the typical explanation for reliance on
design is based on competition. Competition pushes design forward in
those industries in which technology and marketing cannot provide a
competitive advantage at a reasonable cost. However, this explanation is
too rough to account for specific cases. Why is design chosen as a com-
petitive edge in favor of  other means such as technology, investing heavily
on marketing, or aggresive competition based on pushing prices down?
Also, as we shall see in this chapter, it appears that this process has not
been a rational one in any of  the most design-oriented manufacturing
companies. By “rational,” we mean a process in which a company defines
its objectives, studies alternative strategies to achieve them, weighs the
pros and cons of  these strategies, and then invests in the best strategy. In
contrast, it appears that a design-based strategy is the result of  a more
intuitive selection. Exogenous factors probably explain some variations
in design, but not the unique historical process in which design has be-
come a part of  the fabric of  organization.
More importantly, such perspectives do not pay attention to the work-
place realities faced by design. Even if  design is defined as a strategic
asset in companies, and is accepted at the headquarters, design has to win
its place at the workplace realities (see Abbott 1988), and vice versa: design
can be important even though its position is not recognized as such in the
company policy. Thus, it is better to look specifically at companies that
have adopted an design-intensive strategy, and try to generalize from them
rather than vice versa. Strategic choice is an essential feature in the deci-
sion to build on design. Next, we will look at why such decisions have
been made in some companies, what kinds of  processes underlie that
decision, and how various parties in the company have contributed to
that decision.
Two sets of  elaborations to the model are needed. First, there are differ-
ent ways to organize design in companies. In post-Fordist production
(see Amin 1997; Vallas 1999),  organizations typically externalize many
of  the materials, resources, machinery, and labor that were internalized in
the Fordist era, which stressed control over these strategically important
assets. Such movement is made possible first by new technology such as
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CNC-based machinery, digital design methods, and just-in-time manu-
facturing and logistics. It is secondly made possible by a movement away
from centralized organizational models, in which work was tied into one
place and into a regular rhythm. Firms do various things to refashion the
structure of  work, labor market, and the employment relation:
- They redraw the boundaries that distinguish different groups of  em-
ployees. Typically, core employees are internalized, while peripherical
employees are externalized.
- Typically, they privilege formal knowledge or professional employees
over manual skills. Employees with professional skills are quick in adapt-
ing of  new work methods in unforeseen situations, and can control so-
phisticated process technologies and control technologies.
- Increasingly, companies rely on outsourcing and subcontracting. This
may lead to the forming of  collaborative strategic alliances based on equal-
ity, but more often, these networks are dominated by a large company.
Again, professional employees in strategic positions win: they control
relationships in these networks.
- Because the market has reached the saturation point in many consumer
products in the industrialized nations, companies create diversity within
products and increasingly employ marketing strategies based on fads and
fashions.
Several features push organizations into more complex directions. In par-
ticular, organizations with a multi-division structure combining many fast-
paced changing technologies and markets across cultural boundaries de-
velop complex organizational problems (see Chapter 2 for a description
of  design in Philips, cf. Heskett 1989; Blaich and Blaich 1993). Appar-
ently, these changes affect design as well. The first part of  this chapter
traces these changes.
Secondly, as the argument of  reflexivity implies, industrial designers do
not act in a void when design is introduced into the company scene. They
act in the cultural scene, and shape it. Through their activities, they pro-
vide frames for managers for understanding design and for reasoning
about its possible relevance. In the last part of  this chapter, we situate
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design decisions into this larger cultural framework, which is largely shaped
by the actions of  designers and design-oriented companies.
The Stratification Model and Industrial Design: an Elaboration
This rough scheme has to be related to the stratification model, presented
in Chapter 2. The first specification deals with the notion of  the order of
the three processes outlined in the model. The second specification shows
that design, even when strategically important, can be based on tacit knowl-
edge and personalities rather than on a formal organization. The third
specification relates to the second one, and shows that the coordination
of  design can be based on consultancies rather than on an in-house orga-
nization.
Simultaneous Processes vs. Linear Organization of  Design Processes
In the most advanced companies, design processes take place simulta-
neously. They are not separate processes that take place in a linear fash-
ion. Designers typically work on tasks and processes that deal with even
layer.
About 10 years ago, Nokia changed the way in which it produces
its new phones. Before then, marketing did first its study, prod-
uct development designed the phone, production manufactured
it, and finally the public relations team presented it to the public.
Now all units are simultaneously involved in the process, includ-
ing subcontractors. “It’s been noted that this is a good thing.
Everyone knows that is the need in the marketplace, and can do
their part in a right way and quickly,” says Pekka Valjus [from
Salo, Nokia]. (Helsingin Sanomat 3.12.2000, E1).
This description is accurate, says one of  our informants from the Nokia
corporation. This simultaneity guarantees that production knows what it
is doing, and that strategic design is not purely dreaming, but connected
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to current technology and product platforms. Internet technology, mo-
bile communications and new forms of  employment and compensation
make such simultaneous organization possible.
Explicit Knowledge/Organization vs. Tacit Skills/Coordination Based on Person-
alities
It is also important to note that design can be strategically important even
without being so defined as such in company documents. Ultimately, de-
sign is a community of  practitioners who act together, and maintain cer-
tain realities through their actions together with other specialties. They
maintain their distinctive perspectives through stories (see Orr 1996),
visual culture (Gedenryd 1998; Henderson 1999) and through their ma-
terial work. These perspectives articulate viewpoints that differ from the
viewpoints maintained by other professions and the organization. This
perspective is largely a matter of  tacit knowledge that is transmitted in
the everyday practices of  design rather than in terms of  concepts or theo-
ries.
There may be a design policy even though it has not been written down
or formalized in terms of  a separate design organization. Even if  it were
written down, it would in all likelihood be different in practice. In fact,
there are various ways to organize design in companies. From the outset,
the organizational charts of  Olivetti and Philips look surprisingly similar
(for Philips, see Chart 1). Both connect a hierarchical design organization
to top management, and the key links between these are the design man-
agers in charge of  design, and the corporate-level head of  design. How-
ever, that is where the similarities end. There are important differences in
the way in which design functions in these companies. In brief, Philips
has a formal organization, while Olivetti’s design is best described as
“Italian drama.”
The Philips organization is shown in Chart 1. In 1984, their design policy
consisted of four main elements (Heskett 1989: 43). First, the aim of the
CID was to develop  the corporate visual image to connect products to
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product systems and packaging. Secondly, meeting the users’ expecta-
tions to “satisfy the expectations and sensibilities of the ultimate users of
Philips products” became a main priority in design. Third, meeting pro-
duction and marketing requirements was to be a design guideline: design-
ers should integrate these concerns to their work. Finally, designers’activities
included continuous defining of  product design quality in qualitative terms
by developing criteria and dialogue to increase understanding of these
aspects in the organization.
In contrast, “Italian drama” characterizes design at Olivetti (Kicherer 1990:
77). There is a respect for strong personalities and personal relationships,
respect for freedom in contacts, friendships, and work as pleasure rather
than a burden.
- continuity and chaos, defined by Olivetti philosophy and interpreted by
in-house designers such as Bellini and Sotsass (Kicherer 1990: 68)
- continuity of  staff: long-term relationships dominate the design process
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(Kicherer 1990: 70)
- corporate image was developed in a personalistic fashion by Renzo
Zorzi until his retirement in 1987, he combined in his work his apprecia-
tion for culture with anything that had something to do with Olivetti’s
external image, ranging from product design, graphics, and advertising to
architecture, gift design, cultural activities, publishing, art exhibitions and
design events (Kicherer 1989: 70)
- a combination of  in-house designers with independent consultants makes
it possible for Olivetti designers to pursue higher cultural goals.
Design at Olivetti is largely self-organized: design is led by external se-
nior consultants working on long-term relationships with Olivetti, in an
idiosyncratic manner. Olivetti constantly hires young designers and lets
them develop for long periods of  time. Design commitment at the top
level of the corporation is based on personal, particular relationships
(Kicherer 1990: 80)
Organizing Design: In-House Design or Networking with Consultants
Another important elaboration deals with networking. Design can also be
strategically important even when it is not internalized in the company
hierarchy. Design may be organized in different ways at all levels. The
model captures the way in which designers are involved in key organiza-
tional processes. It does not say how industrial design is organized in
companies. As we have seen, the way in which design is organized varies
as well. Typically, there is a group of  designers near the company head-
quarters, often in a separate design unit. In addition, there are designers
who work in production, wherever that is located.
One key connection is between in-house staff  designers and consultants.
In particular, in product design, there may be competition between in-
house designers and consultancies. Hiring criteria for these designers vary
according to several dimensions.
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- typically, routine tasks are allocated to in-house design, while outsiders
are involved in producing fresh ideas
- tasks that require strategically important knowledge are allocated to in-
house staff, if  possible
- flagship products are allocated to star designers/companies, regardless
of where they are
- depending on skill requirements, various commissioning models are
possible (in-house designers may lack some skills)
In conceptual design, as well as in strategic design, the situation changes.
In larger manufacturing companies in particular, confidentiality is a pri-
ority. At strategic levels, companies increase their control over informa-
tion and strategy making by allocating them to in-house staff, who hires
consultants for lower-level design processes. Only long-term consultants
are able to get to know strategies, and even influence them, but in all
likelihood, this is rare. In SME’s, consultancies may even be strategy mak-
ers, because of  lack of  internal resources.
This reasoning fits some cases. At Philips, outside consultants are hired
primarily for bringing fresh perspectives not tied to the structures of  the
company (Blaich and Blaich 1993: 143-148). Consultants offer a way of
avoiding the strong ties phenomenon (Granovetter 1975). In other cases,
this reasoning does not work. Thus, Olivetti’s “in-house designers” con-
sist of  some of  the best known designers in the whole world, including
Ettore Sotsass, Mario Bellini, Michele De Lucchi and George Sowden.
They are independent consultants, who are able to pursue their societal
ends through their broad involvement in the cultural world. At Olivetti,
they direct and reinterpret Olivetti philosophy for younger designers. Thus,
at the end of  1980s, Olivetti’s Corporate Image department, which for-
mally led design in Olivetti, consisted of  nine offices of  design and the
office of  cultural activities led by Paolo Viti. With the exception of  Viti’s
organization, all other nine offices were directed by external designers
working on a freelance, yet continual and long term basis.
The issue of  networking is important for a variety of  reasons. On the
benefits of  networking writers typically point out the following kinds of
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advantages in a network-based organization. Organizational costs for
companies are minimized and less risky (see Sparke 1988: 166). Contacts
and information flow better in an open network than in a closed one
(such as hierarchy) (Granovetter 1983). Also, the loss of  continuity is not
necessarily a risk for companies and consultants, provided that their rela-
tionship is long enough to make trust and mutual understanding central
elements in the relationship. Manufacturing companies and consultant
designers may even align their technologies (such as professional soft-
ware) and that way form stable design alliances (Bruce and Jevnaker 1997)
that work on a long-term basis.
Often, a design consultancy may have only one or two main customers,
and because it has to invest heavily in keeping its technology up to date
with these clients, here is a dependency relationship, which is balanced by
the fact that in such a deep alliance, the consultancy learns the strategic
secrets of  the client. Ultimately, this relationship may be so tight that it is
totally analogous to in-house staff. Problems with trust inherent in ex-
change relationships are minimized, if  this state of  affairs is limited. Com-
pensation methods in such relationships vary from royalties in the tradi-
tional arts and crafts industries to more typical project contracts, occa-
sionally even yearly contracts to certain companies (as in Philips).
The designers in the inner circle are responsible for what is
referred to as “in-house design.” Olivetti provides these direc-
tors of  the design offices with office space, equipment and
administrative staff... Their contracts are on a yearly basis as
consultancies rather than on a project by project basis. Therefore
they are involved in all kinds of  design matters with different
departments and people. (Kicherer 1990: 73 – 74).
Kicherer’s description fits well the existing wisdom concerning outsourcing
of  services and network models of  organization. If  there is no need to
keep in-house staff, such commitments are avoided.
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Design and Culture: How Designers Shape Design
Design does not exist in a void. Managers and other parties in design
construe their understanding of  design and its possible necessity from a
variety of  sources, and only some of  these are related to their personal
interactions with designers. What are these sources?
Some cues can be found from existing  studies. For instance, designers at
Olivetti continued to lead their lives in Milan, designing for the art scene
and writing their philosophies for the public.
But there are other reasons beyond control for such an organi-
zation of design. These are related to the cultural heart of design.
Olivetti subcontracted design as early as in the 1930s, and has
continued this policy until its reorganization in the 1990s. The
reason for this policy was Adriano Olivetti, who deliberately
attempted to win the most interesting personalities from art,
architecture, engineering and science, as well as from the intellec-
tual scene. Olivetti became a kind of cultural centre and experi-
mental workshop, similar to the Bauhaus. The first step in this
direction was undertaken by Adriano from his offices in Milan.
In 1931 he opened the “Ufficio di tecnica e organiz-zazione,”
which he managed personally, and in 1934 the office for
advertising under the management of Renato Zveteremich. Milan
offered better access to the design world than the more provincial
Ivrea and Adriano felt he could build up contacts, make an
impression and personally set up and develop a new kind of
advertising and product development from there...
He gradually gathered together a group of talented people in-
cluding painters, graphic designers and poets, intentionally look-
ing for people involved in the latest ideas in art and design with
a large network of contacts which could be beneficial for the
company. Through freelance contracts, he was able to get these
people to work together without taking them away from the art
scene. This procedure consequently proved to be an important
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instrument for bringing the contemporary cultural trend actively
into the company and enabling the company itself to make a
contribution. One of the early central figures was Renato
Zveteremisch who Adriano appointed as manager of the new
department. He had many contacts and brought people like
Schawinsky, Persico, Nizzoli, Munari, Veronesi and others into
contact with Olivetti. (Kicherer 1990: 17, 25).
This policy has continued until De Benedetti’s reign (Kicherer 1990: 83).
The art world in the cities –galleries, designer shops, the literary world –
is an essential tool for designers just as for any other creative occupation
(see Becker 1982). This strategy keeps designers informed of  cultural
change. Isolation from the art scene, either geographically or
organizationally, is bound to be self-defeating and discouraging for top
designers. It would be difficult to keep the best talent in routine
organizational jobs in which organizational ways and categories have to
be respected, especially if  the company had wide-ranging cultural policy.
Designers receive wide-ranging experience in all kinds of design
fields, including furniture, architecture, consumer goods and
graphics, and come to understand their particularities with re-
gard to materials, aesthetics, design trends, manufacturing re-
quirements and markets. (Kicherer 1990: 74).
Importantly, this policy keeps these men actively involved in the cultural
world, where they think of change as a civilization-wide process instead
of being pushed into company categories and company-created visions
of the world. Thus, the best-known Olivetti designers are not only
superstars of the design world, but above all, major thinkers whose
influence spreads not just in terms of  their designs, but also in terms of
their written interpretations of civilization. Thus, designers such as Bellini
and Sottsass make company active, they are agents in a game that change
the rules of the game. Through their extra-organizational activities, these
people define taste – it is their products, lectures and writings that people
use to define good design, which provides further control for designers
in their work.
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Similarly, we have seen how the German press paid attention to Behrens’
work in at  AEG not just in the industrial sections, but also in the cultural
pages, making AEG products known and accessible to a wide non-spe-
cialist audience. Furthermore, designers like Louis Kalff  have been active
in setting up and running professional associations for design. These as-
sociations have been active in promoting design into the  public realm
and into public policy. Of  course, designers have been active in schools.
Finally, some designs become ”icons” that define he future of  the mar-
ketplace: the Sony Walkman is perhaps the best-known example of  such
a product. Thus, much of the publicity that has grown around design
lately (Woodham 1997: 154 – 163), just as much of  professional activity
and policy making in design, has been at least partially influenced by de-
signers in their respective countries.
In many ways, then, designers have created the environment from which
outsiders get their tools for understanding of design. These tools are the
basis for frames used in making sense of design, and in defining possible
interest in design. Designers have created an understanding of what de-
sign can offer. At least in some conditions, design comes before strategy:
when the strategy is formulated, its elements to it are sought from ideas
and arguments formulated by the design world, whose discourse thus
indirectly influences company policies. It is from this pre-existing public
discourse from which managers and decision-makers can create their
vision of  design and its possibilities.
These activities have served as structuring forces in the field in many
ways. In their basic statement of  an institutional perspective on organiza-
tions, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) ask reasons for why organizations are
so similar in many ways, and trace the reason to just those isomorphisms,
generalized perspectives, that guide activities across organizational fields
and subfields, defined as a series of  organizations that are dependent on
each other somehow.
Freeman... suggests that older, larger organizations reach a point
where they can dominate their environments rather than adjust
to them... Organizational respond to an environment that con-
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sists of other organizations responding to their environment,
which consists of organizations responding to an environment
of  organization’s responses (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 149).
The most important structuring forces that make organizations and their
actions ”isomorphic” (i.e. similar) are coercive (i.e. policy and legal frame-
works), mimetic (i.e. companies mimicking successful practices from each
other), and normative reasons (i.e. professionalization and the
professionalization of  management). When organizations respond to these
outside forces, they become similar unless they deliberately distance them-
selves from these sources of  isomorphism.
However, there are variations in the conditions of  industries. For instance,
traditional smoke stack industries, well protected by trade barriers until
the late 1980s, have been able to maintain their linear working practices.
Since investments in these industries are large, investment goods for them
are expensive, and workers are trained to use machinery with consider-
able investments, also the value of  design is defined in these industries
differently from consumer goods or from giftware industries. In the lat-
ter, changing consumer tastes and preferences are crucial for success, if
we believe recent sociological literature (see Featherstone 1994).
Thus, when investments in design have been made, the initial interest to
design comes to be based on these isomorphic forces as they are under-
stood from various industry traditions. If  we do not pay any attention to
this specific, historically construed public discourse of  design, we miss
an essential feature in understanding design. In particular, this perspec-
tive makes it possible to see how design is structured across industries
and countries over relatively short periods of  time.
Conclusions
The issue of  framing is crucial in how designers are able to articulate
their visions in production. In a more traditional industrial organization,
designers’ chances of impacting production are limited: the organiza-
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tional model minimizes the involvement of  design in production. We
have seen first that industrial design can be a strategic asset in companies
even though it is not written into company policies, and even when it is
based on a network rather than on a standing organization. We have also
seen how designers have come to get a central position in some manu-
facturing companies. In companies studied in this chapter, designers are
able to participate in the framing processes, and are not tied to concepts,
categories, and practices handed down to them by other parties at the
workplace.
There is little information on several other aspects of  importance. For
example, a few mentions of  ”headhunting” aside, the literature does not
reveal how designers were recruited in the first place (a factor ultimately
important for any movement, see Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980).
Also, information about the larger economics or cultural trends is lack-
ing. For example, we cannot but speculate about the relationship of  eco-
nomic cycles for design. Apparently, there are two situations favorable to
the establishing of  design as an activity in companies. In good economic
times, there is loose money in companies to experiment with. In harsh
economic climate, previous practices are in disfavor, and new ones are
sought after. Similarly, there is little information on changes in the cul-
tural environment. What happens if  products are clearly and visibly out
of  touch with customer taste? Or, are there institutionalization processes
of  the sort described by Powell and DiMaggio (1991) at work: when
company A in industry q invests in design, and gets good results, which
are attributed to design, do others follow in the same industry?
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This chapter describes the research design, data, and methods used in this
study. It also gives a basic description of  the industries we have studied.
Since this is a benchmarking study, we will also introduce the notion of
benchmarking. After describing data, we will detail the inference made
possible by a benchmarking study.
Why Primarily a Qualitative Study
Our inference is mostly based on qualitative data. There is surprisingly
little existing research on the organization of  design that would have
been useful for us from the outset. Also, we wanted to avoid working
with analogies such as environmental management, or marketing. For
example, environmental management is a recent addition to companies,
but so strongly supported by the public opinion, law-makers, and policy-
makers that its institutionalization (see Heiskanen 2000) is smoother than
the institutionalization of  design. Marketing has a long history in com-
pany agenda, and as a profession, it is more than ten times the size of
design (in fiscal terms, the ratio is even higher).
This choice gave us little material to work on initially. After a search
process in libraries and data bases (whether in Finland or overseas), we
found enough good-quality cases to build a stratification model (Chapter
2), and a model of  its development in companies (Chapter 3). The scar-
city of  data guided our study towards an increasingly qualitative study. In
situations with little previous research and much expected variation, it
makes sense to proceed in an inductive way rather than theoretically -
which would risk loosing the phenomenon.
Our qualitative method was somewhat formal, for the following reason.
We worked in a design school context that is filled with deep knowledge
and rich intuitions about the profession. We wanted to control these pro-
fessional understandings and make them a resource in our study, not vice
versa.
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- Professional understanding was the ultimate basis of our study in the
earlier stages, as well as in building the stratification model. Apparently,
the best touch to the Finnish reality is in the heads of  competent design-
ers, not in research literature.
- However, we elaborated this model theoretically with ideas drawn from
the new economy literature (in particular, the ideas of  networking and
tacit knowledge)
- Finally, empirical analysis followed the standard logic of  qualitative re-
search: it was based on research questions, the notion of  benchmarking,
and analytic induction. These are explained below.
The crucial thing is that in order to prevent professional understanding
from taking over, we tested out research hypothesis deliberately in a quali-
tative fashion. In fact, our initial understanding was refuted by our data:
the stratification model clearly is too rigorous to describe design practice
in companies. For example, contrary to professional wisdom, we found
that design has little control over strategic decisions in the studied com-
panies.
Research Design in Benchmarking
Benchmarking means a study in which researchers search for best current
practices in some business area to be able to improve practices in compa-
nies or policies being benchmarked (see Karlöf  and Östblom 1993).
Through studying best practices, benchmarking, if  successful, affects the
content of  action, quality, and the way in which competence is developed
in companies. Typically, benchmarking utilizes quantitative information
provided by accounting, however, this was not possible in our study. Con-
sequently, we use the term to denote a research design which seeks a set
of  companies with a highly organized and efficient design, and compare
a set of  Finnish companies to them. This comparison is qualitative in
nature.
Typically, for a benchmarking study, researchers select a company or an
industry, identify a set of  companies good enough to be learned from,
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either from under the same corporate umbrella or from the same indus-
try. In a more challenging case, benchmarks are found from other indus-
tries (see Karlöf  and Östblom 1993: 67 – 73). The “benchmarked” com-
panies provide descriptions of  first rate business practices that are hope-
fully transferrable to improve the current practices in the original set of
companies. In selecting benchmarks, there is no need to stick to obvious
cases (in Scandinavian context, an obvious comparison might be Nokia
and Ericsson). Benchmarks can be far-out as well, as long as compari-
sons are not made between apples and oranges. Comparability has to be
maintained in order to make sure that results are transferrable without
too many risks.
Our international benchmarks also consist of  cases found from litera-
ture. An extensive literature review gave us two histories of  design in
companies (Heskett 1989; Kitcherer 1990) that were detailed enough to
be used as data. One history was sufficiently detailed for our purposes
(Kunkel 1999), although it was not detailed enough in conceptual terms
and in historical detail to provide information for all our questions. Sev-
eral other company histories were screened for information, but these
were found wanting in detail, riddled with anachronism, too distant in
time, or too focused on individual designers. Companies screened in-
clude such multinational industry giants as IBM, Braun, Coca-Cola,
Herman Miller, Bahco, and a series of  Finnish companies (see Heskett
1997: 140 – 142; Bayley 1986; Blaich and Blaich 1993; Svengren 1994;
won Chung 1990; for Finland, see review by Järvinen 2000). Evidence
from these companies proved to be anecdotal, focused on individual de-
signers, or graphic rather than industrial design.
Industry and Network Selection
For this study, two industries were selected. The first one was medical
equipment/health care, and the second machinery. In addition, we stud-
ied a few companies in electronics/IT, which is converging technologi-
cally with both of  these industries. The reason for the choice of  these
industries is that both of  them are important in the Finnish economy.
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- The medical equipment/health care industry is known for its long his-
tory of  design, and growth potential due to demographics. The aging
population and the rapidly advancing medical science also constantly set
new requirements for designers especially in the high-tech area, where
products are becoming smaller and personal, and where interaction with
products is their crucial component.
- In addition to electronics and paper, the machine industry has been the
backbone of  Finnish industry throughout the second half  of  the 20th
century. Also, and importantly, it is known to be a difficult area for de-
signers. In this industry, design is still largely seen if  not as an unneces-
sary activity, in any case something that is clearly secondary to engineer-
ing. Also, this sector is growing. It is also important in terms of  industrial
employment.
This selection of  industries thus locates two areas in which industrial
design services are already used, but could be still enhanced more. The
fact that these two industries were chosen also makes it possible to com-
pare the current practices in them, and perhaps even suggest how prac-
tices could be transferred between them.
The medical equipment/health care products industry is much smaller in
size than the machine industry. According to the member list of  the most
important industry associations in the former areas, only about 20 com-
panies are working in the medical equipment/health care sector. If  we
count industrial concerns as one organization, the number becomes even
smaller, since the concern Instrumentarium owns, or has a dominant
holding, in many smaller companies. Still, the annual turnover of  this
industry per employee, as well as its research and development invest-
ments, are high enough to make this industry important for the economy
as a whole.
In contrast, the machine industry is large, and consists of  more than 4000
companies. Furthermore, it breaks down into several industries, from
mining and metallurgy to shipyards, and from appliances to paper ma-
chine manufacturing. Increasingly, it is connected to the information tech-
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nology cluster, which centers around Nokia (Ollus et al. 1999: 105 – 112;
Ali-Yrkkö ym. 2000: esp. 20 – 33). The annual exports of  the electronics
industry were over 50 billion FIM in 1997 (Ollus et al. 1999: 103).
Obviously, these industries are different in many other ways as well. The
medical equipment/health care industry is typically hi-tech, invests heavily
in research, and is heavily reliant on network models of  organization.
Typically, design work in this sector is outsourced, as well. The machine
industry, which has a long history, has characterstically been organized in
a Fordist manner. It is typically blue-collar, unionized, and characterized
by technological and bureaucratic control (Edwards 1979). In such con-
text, we assumed, design is typically an internalized activity, which works
within the limits set by technology and bureaucracy. However, this proved
not to be the case.
As expected, the network issue proved to be important in the medical
equipment/health care industry. Contrary to expectations, it proved to be
important for machinery as well. With only one major exception (Valmet),
design in the machine industry is based on a network. Thus, in addition to
studying companies in these industries, we studied their design networks
as well. To this end, we interviewed design consultancies used by
companies in our sample whenever possible. This was easy enough to do
in Finland. First, the Finnish design consultancy industry is small. There
are only 60 – 70 consultancies as members in TKO, The Finnish Association
of  Industrial Designers. Most of  these consultancies are small one or
two-person offices that do not offer a significant amount of  services.
Secondly, most companies use the services of  a handful of  design
consultancies. To get a fairly good description of  the Finnish network,
we only had to interview 6 consultancies. In cases outside of  Finland, we
interviewed design consultancies (N=3) if  it was possible to arrange a
meeting during the visit to interview the company.
Finally, we studied a series of  deviant cases to find out the limits of  our
interpretation. These cases were handpicked from two industries: elec-
tronics/IT in the consumer products sector, and from designer-led in-
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dustries. Two companies from each category were interviewed. In the
first category, we interviewed designers in two multinationals, Nokia and
Polar Electro (also, Kone could be located in this category: Kone defines
itself  more as a service company more than an elevator company these
days). In the latter category, we interviewed designers and managers at
Woodnotes, a Finnish company that specializes on using paper in elabo-
rate designs, and Alessi, an Italian company that is responsible for some
of  the best-known designer goods of  the 1990s.
Company selection
After selecting the industries, the Finnish cases were chosen by industrial
designers and professors Juhani Salovaara and Raimo Nikkanen, both
long-term members of  the profession. In addition, we asked suggestions
from our designer interviewees using a “snowball” method of  sampling
(Biernacki 1979). As background information for them, we compiled a
list of  companies in these industries. These lists were based on industry
associations’ member lists.
International cases were selected using a more complex procedure. First,
we sought for industries that are known for their design intensity. Sec-
ondly, a research assistant collected data from these companies from in-
dustry journals – where design prizes are listed – and from the WWW.
Third, then the researchers compiled a preliminary list of candidate com-
panies. This list consisted of  more than 50 companies, and included a
range of  companies from these industries.
Apple Powerbook
Philips Medical Systems Netherlands
TekScan
Linde AG
Crown Equipment
Tresu Production A/S
Table 1. Examples of Companies Studied for Sampling
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The next problem was to choose the appropriate benchmarks from this
list. We presented this list, which was largely based on competitors of
Finnish companies, and on the most powerful companies in the two
industries, to Finnish respondents. We asked them to name their design
benchmarks, i.e. companies they follow in terms of  design. Our
interviewees listed a set of  companies that were then contacted. These
companies, we figured, served as better benchmarks than competitors,
especially in areas in which Finnish companies are leading the way.
If  our list and the respondents’ suggestions matched, the choice was
obvious. In cases in which they diverged, we gave priority to the
interviewees’ suggestions: they are the industry experts. Thus, in our in-
terview with Polar Electro, companies such as Nike, Casio and Sony were
discarded. According to the designers at Polar, they are vast industrial
empires that do not compete with the specialized market niche in which
Polar is at the moment.
Medical equipment/health care
Datex/Ohmeda (Finland)
Polar Electro (Finland)
Planmeca (Finland)
Sirona Dental Systems (Italy)
Machinery and electronics
Valmet/Metso (Finland)
Rocla (Finland)
PCE Engineering (Finland)
Crown Equipment (USA)
TGW (Austria)
Deviant cases
Nokia (Finland)
Woodnotes (Finland)
Kone Corporation (Finland)
Alessi (Italy)
Table 2. The Final List of Companies
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In addition, 7 industrial design consultancies were studied, one of them
American, one Austrian and the rest in Finland.
This procedure matches the rationale behind benchmarking better than
selecting competitors, and also offers a way to avoid problems with con-
fidentiality. For instance, we got from Valmet the names of  press ma-
chine manufacturers rather than paper machine manufacturers. Given the
technological requirements, this was an obvious choice which, however,
was hardly apparent before a Valmet respondent named the company and
explained the reason for this interest. In some cases, no external bench-
marks were named. For instance, in PC Engineering, which builds inte-
grated production lines for factories and industrial corporations, no ex-
ternal benchmarks were named.
Interviews
In the early summer of  2000, we contacted companies in the final list to
arrange a series of  interviews with them. We suspected a denial rate of
about 50%, and contacted 22 companies in order to book interviews.
Due to the timing of  vacation, we started with Finnish companies and
continued with international cases. All but few Finnish interviews were
completed, before July. International companies, which proved to be largely
German, Swedish, and American, were contacted in June.
There were four international denials due to reasons varying from reor-
ganization of  the company and vacation time to the decision as not to
participate. In addition, we did not get responses to our requests from
five companies, one in the machine industry, four in the medical equip-
ment/health care industry.
Interviews were conducted in the summer months and in September. In
each company, we contacted members from the management and from
the three specialties of  industrial design, marketing management, and
production management. The aim of  this procedure was to control for
professional bias. All selected interviewees had a minimum of  three years
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of  working experience in the firm, and at least some managerial respon-
sibilities. The only exceptions to these rules were designers, who were not
necessarily in managerial positions. Among designers, we mainly sought
to find people who had a long perspective on the history of  the firm.
The key criteria in selecting interviewees was their knowledgeability of
design issues in their respective firms.
These interviews were semi-structured and typically lasted from 30 min-
utes to two hours. To structure them, three interview guides were used:
one for client companies, one for consultancies, and one for deviant cases.
In addition, the Alessi case was interviewed separately in another on-
going study (see Appendix 1 and 2 ). The guide was designed to ensure
that all relevant questions are covered and to make interaction smooth in
the interview situation. It does not reproduce research questions: it is the
researchers’ task to translate answers into statements for analysis. In each
interview, the list of  questions was completed. The interview guide
worked well in other respects as well. Our test questions at the end of
each interview (see the Appendices) did not produce any significant addi-
tions to the list.
In the very first interviews, it also became apparent that to understand
the organization of  design, we had to interview design consultants as
well. Design is extensively outsourced, especially in Finland. These inter-
views also make it possible for us to study how the connection of the
client and the consultancy function and develop in a design network.
In all, we studied 14 companies and 8 design consultancies, as repre-
sented in Table 2. We interviewed 53 people, 27 of  whom were design-
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ers. Figure 1 breaks up the interviewees by industry, and Figure 2 by their
profession.
Inference
Chapter 4
Figure 1. Interviewees by industry (N=53)
Figure 2. Interviewees by profession (N=27)
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The inference of this study was built in the following fashion. The basic
outline of  the study grew from research questions (see the end of  Chap-
ter 1), but other practices were involved as well.
Inference in Benchmarking
In its basic outline, this is a benchmarking study (Karlöf  and Östblom
1993). As such, its inference is simpler than in a typical empirical study
that aims to describe, and possibly explain some phenomenon. First, we
built a benchmark from companies that are the best users of  design ac-
cording to literature. This benchmark, called “the stratification model of
industrial design,” is described in Chapter 2. We compared other compa-
nies against this yardstick. As already mentioned, this procedure gives us
an idea of  best practices.
- If  the best practices are at certain level, but our data is not, then there is
room for improvement partly by means of  policy, partly by companies
themselves. Even if  our data would suggest that there is no one best way
of  organizing design, the mere existence of  better practices stimulates to
search for better ways.
- Furthermore, benchmarks can point out some transferrable features or,
minimally, a direction to be followed. In fact, this is the case with our
data. As Chapter 6 shows, the pro-design culture has emerged in the best
design-oriented companies over a long period of time.
- Finally, these benchmarks may show some limitations. For example, it is
impossible to jump into the design practice of  Philips at once. The prac-
tice and the problems of  Philips are typical to a capital-rich, global indus-
trial concern which operates from a small country. Because of  its history
and a lack of  a dominant host country, its design tends to break into a
series of  localized products. Fighting this tendency has been a main con-
cern for Philips’ design management. These conditions may not be unique
to Philips, but are limiting enough to make extrapolation from Philips a
cautious matter.
At best, this practice, in which the benchmark serves as a yardstick, lo-
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cates gaps in the current practices and suggests ways to improve current
practices in Finland, and produces a result that is sensitive to differences
between industries.
However, as Chapters 2 and 3 showed, there are several ways to organize
design, and certainly no single best practice. There are many types of
paths that companies have followed in building design practices.
In each empirical chapter, as well as Chapter 3 that grounded these chap-
ters, we followed loosely analytic induction. Analytic induction proceeds
from data to concepts. Accordingly, the first step is to find an initial model
from the data. Typically, this is an observation that is then elaborated with
additional data. If  it appears that some observation might describe the
whole data, or most of  it, then it is treated as a hypothesis to be first
tested and then elaborated (see Seale 1999).
For example, this procedure resulted in the notion of  “coincidental” be-
ginnings of design in companies (see Chapter 6), which led us to build an
initial model for how design becomes a part of company activities (Chapter
3). For purposes of  benchmarking, we built this model with literature on
some of the best-known design-oriented manufacturing companies in
the world. Chapter 6 compares this model to what was found in inter-
views. Chapter 7 elaborates this model by concentrating on design con-
sultants, who match this model only partially.
A similar procedure also structured the inference in each empirical chap-
ter. For example, in Chapter 5, the basic hypothesis came from the strati-
fication model: we assumed that it holds among more advanced users of
design. A preliminary test of this hypothesis showed that this is not so
(Figure 1 in Chapter 5). This gave us an opportunity to describe the best
practices in our data, and led to the question of the process in which
design has emerged and become a stable part of the functioning of the
firm (Chapters 6 – 7).
65
Data and Methods
Industry comparisons and the use of  negative cases
Finally, our data allows some industry comparisons. One of  the threads
that has run through all previous chapters is the difference between con-
sumer products and business-to-business products. We have constantly
seen how design is increasingly an essential element in consumer prod-
ucts. Design is important for their success in several ways, and the de-
signers’ mandate – to paraphrase Everett Hughes (1984) – broadens. In
business-to-business products, designers primarily work on “hard” as-
pects of  design, such as product design and ergonomics. In consumer
products, their mandate may include marketing, packaging, and branding,
which are all-important for success in consumer markets, fashioned by a
multitude of  tastes.
Our research design allows an initial examination of  this assumption. For
example, we studied design in two companies that build entire produc-
tion lines and services for industrial installations (PCE Engineering and
TGW). These are hard-line investment goods in which fashion and pack-
aging play little role. This is also the case with a few other companies that
are specialized in producing machinery (Valmet, Rocla), but fashion and
packaging do matter to a few other sampled companies in which prod-
ucts interact with lay users, and service is an important component of  the
product (Planmeca, Sirona, Datex-Ohmeda, Crown Equipment). Finally,
it is still more important for consumer products. For instance, Polar Electro
is in a market niche in which hi-tech products have increasingly become
fashion products. Chapter 8 begins with this comparison.
The basis for weighing business-to-business industries is in the structure
of  the Finnish industrial design profession. The profession largely works
in the business-to-business sector. It is only lately that industrial design-
ers have begun to work on electronical and information technology con-
sumer products.
This bias was controlled by studying a series of  cases from more con-
sumer-oriented industries and companies. These are our “deviant” cases
in the sense of analytic induction (see Seale 1999: 140 – 158). The results
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from deviant cases are compared to results from the main cases in Chap-
ter 8. The aim is to test whether our basic results and inference describes
design in the negative cases as well, and if  it does not, why is that so.
Negative cases are aids to sluggish imagination, to paraphrase Garfinkel
(1967).
This logic is taken to its extreme in Chapter 10, which focuses on the
designer company Alessi. The result that designer companies are design-
led, of  course, is obvious. Furthermore, their practices can hardly be
transferred to other industries. It is very difficult to see how large-scale
manufacturing, with vast capital investments in technology and organiza-
tion, could follow a royalty-based model of  a design firm in which all
aspects of  production are ultimately up to the whim of  the designers.
Still, this model can give us useful clues about the best organization of
design, and thus sensitize us to what is taking place in other companies.
The Alessi case performs this function in the study.
Reliability and Validity – On Generalizing the Results
As previous chapters have already shown, benchmarks are difficult to
build for a skilled practice that has evolved in more advanced companies
for a long time. It appears that each company is unique with respect to
design. Also, it is clear that there is no one best way to benchmark whole
industries. The number of  companies to be interviewed for such a study
would be too large.
However, some features stood out as central for companies with an well-
developed design practice. For example, to be proactive, design has to
be strategically important, and it has to be based on an internal organization,
or a long-term network relationship with a set of  design consultancies.
The stratification model was built to this end. The second problem is not
a major one in a benchmarking study. The question is whether the prac-
tices typical to some industries are transferrable to other industries, not
whether we have described correctly the current practice in each industry.
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Data and Methods
Several other issues are involved in our study. First, as in any study based
primarily on qualitative data, the results can be generalized only with
difficulty. Several issues are involved here. First, the best descriptions in
literature are from the 1980s (Philips, Olivetti), i.e. from times before the
current digital boom in economy. The Sony case, however, describes this
period as well, and does not threaten either the benchmark, or the idea of
a design organization. Secondly, it is apparent that there is cultural varia-
tion in best practices, as the comparison between Olivetti and other cases
has shown. However, in its basic outline, Olivetti is not a real deviant case:
although based on “Italian drama,” Olivetti has an organization, no matter
how centered on powerful personalities.
What comes to the selection of  companies, we have been selective from
the beginning. From the Finnish scene, we chose the best cases we could
find, based on expert judgment. The selected companies represent cur-
rent best practice in the two industries. In particular, the medical equip-
ment industry is well covered. A similar logic applies to design
consultancies. The Finnish industry is small, and its major consultancies
have a lion’s share of  the business. Since they appeared again and again in
our interviews, it was easy enough to focus on them. Furthermore, they
represent the best Finnish practice. Work is subcontracted to smaller
consultancies as well, but they are, with few exceptions, specialized in
product design rather than in concept or strategic design. The list of
international benchmarks involved in this study is small, but gives an idea
of  companies that win professional prizes. With the exception of  Crown
Equipment, these cases are not necessarily the best companies in busi-
ness. However, they provide us with a clue as to how design is organized
in companies that have not served as design industry myths in the man-
ner of  Olivetti or Philips. Primarily, these interviews make the bench-
mark built from the literature more realistic.
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This chapter examines the ways in which design is organized in the orga-
nizations we have studied. We analyse our data using the stratification
model presented in Chapter 2. Here we situate the companies into that
model, and outline a picture of  typical uses of  design. We see first whether
and how design is integrated into company policy. There are various pos-
sibilities, as our literature benchmarks show. We saw earlier how design
has been methodically built into the Philips practices. On the other hand,
we also learned how design at Olivetti is based on an “Italian drama”: an
outwardly chaotic process in which organization maximizes the freedom
of  its well-tried and trusted designers. Secondly, we compare the results
to our benchmarking cases. Thirdly, we relate these findings to our knowl-
edge of  organizational arrangements to see how design is affected by
them.
A few expectations can be drawn from literature to guide the following
analysis. If  it is the case that aesthetics plays a major role in products, as
several sociologists have maintained (see Featherstone 1994; Lury 1997),
the value of  design ought to have emerged, and design should be a nor-
mal practice in companies. Similar arguments apply to companies in in-
vestment goods. For instance, if  the value of  ergonomics has increased
in the machine industry, industrial designers, who are trained in ergo-
nomics, ought to benefit. If  this is the case, and if  companies in our
sample base their strategy on design even partially, design ought to be a
strategic force, and have a voice in articulating company strategy and in
evaluating strategic choices. In general, we can expect that companies in
our sample populate the two upper layers in the stratification model pre-
sented in Chapter 2.
This is the general expectation that we study in this chapter. Chapters 6
and 7 elaborate the results of  this chapter further by studying the alloca-
tion of  various design functions to in-house designers and consultancies.
Chapter 6 studies the process through which design has become inte-
grated into company practices in our benchmarking cases. Chapter 7 then
looks at the uses of  consultancies in these companies. We show that
design is, with few exceptions, largely outsourced, and study the implica-
tions of  that finding. Chapter 8 looks at variations between industries.
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Design Policies in the Companies
One of  the best ways to make design a strategic asset in any company is
to give it a high priority in the strategic documents and mission state-
ments. If  such statements are accompanied by design manuals and guide-
lines, design has the strongest possible sponsorship it can get. Is this the
case?
One of  the main questions presented during the research interviews was
whether the company has a design policy and if  so, how it is utilized.
Most interviewees presumed first the company they work for has a de-
sign policy.
The interviewee first agreed that the company has a policy, “a
mechanical way of  fitting design into the process of  product
development” in the way “this is the way design will be or... this
style will be,” as he describes it. However, if  there is an actual
policy, he does not know, he retorts. But, in his opinion, they (the
management in design) have built the “process from the begin-
ning to the very end.” (Industrial Designer, machine manufac-
turing industry)
This quotation was quite a typical answer and consequently, no policies
were revealed or presented on paper, these excluding one actually printed
design manual.
Design is strategically significant (in the company). Design poli-
cies are documented in the product design manual. It contains
design policies as well as written statements, what design means
for us in practice. (Director, Marketing and sales, machine manu-
facturing industry )
It is noteworthy that the notion policy was a in some cases a matter of
complications, while it seemed that not all interviewees had either under-
stood the question or the notion itself.
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There is no ‘Written Statement’ as our policy, because the com-
pany does not manufacture “trend design.” Visually expressed,
our design is mostly conservative, but in our design there is
plasticity as well. (Industrial designer, Medical equipment indus-
try)
The company’s design orientation is not unambiguously deter-
mined, as policies are; in other words, colors and forms. Possibly
this is because we have worked with the same designer all the
time. This forcibly affects that the various designs in our prod-
ucts resemble the designs seen in our previous products. (Mar-
keting Communication Manager, machine manufacturing in-
dustry)
With very few exceptions, no policies were specified or analyzed in any
greater detail. The policies or models described are merely explained as
guidelines for using certain ways of  design, commonly agreed ways of
adding color, graphics or similar details.
Our design policy is, above all, form language, a coherent visual
appearance. It has developed in the course of  time. We fit all new
products to visually match our previous products. In other words,
it is possible to distinguish our products from their design (thru
design and colors). Later on, we have been using the same
consultancy, as they know this business. (Product Development
manager, machine manufacturing industry)
These decisions determine the physical appearance of  the product line.
But they are not complete or “real,” particular design policies, in the form
of  statements containing long-term or comprehensive plans about the
holistic use of  industrial design in the product development processes.
Mostly policies were presented or emphasized as notions existing “some-
where,” but not written down.
It (policy) exists, in a way, but it is not written down.” (Manager,
Technical Department, machine manufacturing industry)
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...Both interviewees ascertain, that there indeed is a certain de-
sign policy in the company, but this is not a collection of  strict
regulations, but above all, guidelines.
There are also contradictions and controversial opinions. For example,
not all agreed policies are needed at all and the way of  writing instruc-
tions for obvious actions would make the design process stiff  and unreal.
The interviewee would like to think that the firm he works for
has a design policy but he admits that “they don’t use it because
it is like writing down the process of  ‘tying your shoe’- when you
read the instructions for how to tie your shoe, it is so unreal and
so stiff.” He says that (the company) is “more about living it and
breathing it rather than ‘paperizing’ it. (Design director, ma-
chine-manufacturing industry )
Another company opinion about strict policies was to actually un-policying
them. In this case it is thought, that strict ruling of  the design processes
via “paperizing” and policing is not favored in the fear of  paralysing the
creativity in the respective product development processes.
The actual forms a product has bears no connections or is not inter-
twined into the “policy,” that is for example, “a way of  adding colors,” or
using certain forms, which were also regarded as policy. Generally speak-
ing, a coloring scheme or a certain detail can be classified as a policy, if
there are no other determined guidelines maintaining the coherency of
the line of  products.
It is not officially written down. However, we have a kind of
design policy. We have decided to use, if  not always the same
designer, but at least same range of  chosen forms and colors.
(Marketing director, machine manufacturing industry)
Numerous similarly inclined comments by the personnel interviewed in
different companies support this conclusion and also illustrate the pre-
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vailing confusion in actually understanding the meaning of  the concep-
tion. Thus, one generalization from this would be:
While certain company regulations understood as “design poli-
cies” affect and direct the processes industrial designers are
involved in, there is a reason to doubt that the “policies” are
more likely unwritten oral contracts (“do´s” and “dont´s”) be-
tween managemental views and each participant in the product
development processes.
It must be noted that this conclusion is valid only when the previously
mentioned product development processes are in question. It is not the
intention here to juxtapose or relate industrial design to other, manage-
ment oriented policy issues. It is entirely possible to maintain successful
business without a strict, written design policy, but with a more refined
product development process and corporate identity. However, lacking
all these three components obviously makes business activities unstable.
The Stratification Model:
The Positioning Of  Design In The Companies Examined
As the case of  Olivetti (Chapters 2 and 3) shows, design may exert an
impact into the key strategic and product-related decisions in companies
even when it is not written into the key policy documents in manufactur-
ing organizations. Thus, a better test for whether design is integrated to
key activities in companies is provided by the stratification model of
design presented in Chapter 2. Here, the model is elaborated by position-
ing enterprises over the three levels of  the diagram to illustrate the level
and approximate position of  industrial design in the companies.
There is substantial variation between the levels at which the companies
examined utilize design in their new product development processes. These
differences are distinguished according to the depth of influence design
has when implemented in the organization. It is noteworthy to compare
the model presented here with the table shown in Chapter 6, which lists
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the number of  designers and design consultants in firms. It is important
to note that the values presented should be considered as estimates, whereas
the model is not intended to present criticism against any enterprise. The
positioning is merely giving an evaluative overview of  the present posi-
tion in which the companies are when the exploitation of  industrial de-
sign is considered.
The Product Design Level
Designers work actively in product design in all the studied companies.
However, in some companies, this is all they do; designers are not in-
volved in design management, conceptual design, or strategic design.  On
the Product design level, there are two companies, namely the Finnish
PCE and Austrian TGW. Both companies produce machinery. PCE pro-
duces concrete-slab casting equipment, while TGW manufactures mate-
rial handling equipment. Both have utilized the services of  industrial
design consultancies creditably in realizing their products. However, while
designers have participated in the product development processes, the
all-inclusive use of  design in the product development prevails in this
Figure 1. Companies in the Stratification Model
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stage. Usually a lot of the preliminary technical work has been done pre-
viously, there has already been a certain conception how the new product
should look like or technological restrictions have dictated the appear-
ance. Only after these decisions have consultants have been called in to
accomplish their part. Says a CEO of  a machine-manufacturing com-
pany:
We decided a long time ago that when we make changes to the
machinery, we consult designers - no matter what machine we
are dealing with. Designers are involved in the process from the
very beginning.
Do designers participate in research, marketing and advertising?
No, their role is in the background... Designers are not involved
in the technical decision-making process. What comes to the
shape of  the machine, they present their own opinion. Of  course,
they have no decision-making power. They present their alterna-
tives, and tell their opinion about the best solution. We have the
final decision in the process. (CEO, machine manufacturing
industry)
Both of these companies have cooperated with design consultancies on
the product design level. PCE has co-operated with several industrial
design consultancies, whereas TGW’s experience is currently limited to
one. In both companies industrial design is considered as powerful means
in differentiating products from rival ones and further plans of
collaboration with design consultancies have emerged.
The Conceptual Design Level
The majority of  companies examined in the research belong to the con-
ceptual design level. This is to say, they all have lots of  experience utiliz-
ing industrial design and implementing design processes into the product
development scheme. In-house industrial designers are employed in all
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of  the companies, while all have long-term contracts with design
consultancies as well. In these companies design clearly exceeds and goes
beyond the linear design process. Designers casually work in concept
design together with research and development and participate in mar-
keting activities to some extent. These companies use conceptual design
to explore the possibilities in the near future markets. Furthermore, detail
design and components from these concepts may be used in the present
design work as well. Products manufactured in these companies are mainly
investment goods, except Polar’s, but are all often seen in public; espe-
cially dental equipment and elevators are substantially more close to the
consumer than e.g. material handling devices, often concealed in ware-
houses and stores. This makes an interesting comparison, as design is
widely described in the advertisement materials of  all the companies.
The tasks of  designers at Kone are quite limited. Previously, they
worked exclusively with user interfaces and product design. The
crucial thing in making lifts is always structural validity. It is only
after this that you can approach aesthetic factors and
requirements...Design came to Kone in early 1980s. It has be-
come “visionarized”: today, there are visions of  how design can
enhance the differentiation of  Kone from competitors. On the
other hand, our competitors have understood this as well. For
example, Porsche Design has been involved in designing lifts.
Before the 1980s, Kone products are machinery products, there
was scarcely any design in them.
A good design project helps the company in many ways: it
differentiates our products, improves the functionality and er-
gonomics of  the lift, enhances the company identity, and positions
products to the market segments better. In such positioning,
design is a powerful factor. (Designer, machine manufacturing
industry).
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The Strategic Level
The companies are placed at the strategic level that operate design in
highly organized form. These companies have their own design depart-
ment that is fully implemented in the company organization. Continuous
co-operation with design has been recognized as strategically important,
design is the core competence in the enterprise, and designers often oc-
cupy key roles in new product development and decision making. Posi-
tioned at the strategic level are various organizationally and operationally
dissimilar companies: for example, Woodnotes and Nokia both acknowl-
edge design as a strategically important asset. While Woodnotes has only
one designer, namely the founder, textile artist Ritva Puotila, Nokia em-
ploys apparently hundreds of  designers worldwide. And whereas Alessi
(see Chapter 10) is famous for the exceptionally stylish high-end con-
sumer product design, Crown Corporation in the U.S. concentrates en-
tirely on electric motor-fork lift trucks. This only shows the fact that it is
possible to implement design successfully in almost any area of  manu-
facturing. At Woodnotes, design is in an especially strategic role, as, ac-
cording to the company website, “Woodnotes is a design and marketing
company whose strengths lie in artistic design and technological skills.”
This is the ultimate model, as design and innovation are primary issues in
the company, and the company is actually “built around” design.
In a sense, we are like any other large company. When we are
talking about markets that are as large as ours, it means that any
new product results from a huge investment in resources. They
require so much resources that the decision about what kind of
product we make is in the hands of  top management. This is also
true of  design. We have first noticed, then admitted, and then we
have been able to use design as a competitive factor. For that
reason, design has a large impact on decision making. Even
though technological development is fast, it is still possible to...
make our product better than our competitors products with
technology. However, standardization benefits all, and in that
respect, we are approaching a situation in which products are
technologically on a par. This means that design becomes a
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differentiating factor and then a competitive factor (Design
manager, Consumer products)
Design is a part of  the agenda-setting process in the company, although
the ultimate decision is in the hands of  top management. Says a manager
from Nokia:
We have our own company for this kind of  applied research,
NRC. Then we have these predesign processes and conceptual
design processes at NMP, what comes to the products of   NMP,
or in the network side in Net, or NVO... For all these layers, there
are separate processes... It is clear that in smaller organizations,
there exists a similar model, but... because we are so large, we are
in a lucky situation since we have separate organizations or
functions that take care of  various parts of  those processes.
It is important to remember that Nokia is an exceptional case in many
ways in our sample. Due to its size, Nokia can afford to have separate
organizations for various design tasks. Also, since it works in global mar-
kets, and its strategy stresses globalism, the amount of  knowledge and
skills required from its designers justifies layering design, and the alloca-
tion of  various design functions into separate organizations. Also, such
organization means that in product development processes, these tasks
are run simultaneously: feedback from product design can alter strategic
working. In this sense the design processes are integrated.
Industrial Design in a Multi-Divisional Corporations:
The Case of  Valmet (Metso Paper)
The stratification model needs an elaboration, which concerns corpora-
tions that operate in several industries and markets simultaneously. In
this case, it is possible that a corporation has established a design reputa-
tion in one business area only, and is lagging in others. Such situation may
be based on several reasons. For example, from company is typically based
on mergers of  acquisitions. Thus, when a plant of  a small company is
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bought by a larger corporation, it inherits much of its material assets, and
immaterial assets such as know-how and personnel as well. Sometimes, it
is better to think of  rapidly growing corporation as a set of  small, fairly
independent businesses that are coordinated by the headquarters only to
some extent. In such situation, the company faces a challenge of  internal
benchmarking: it has a best practice that could be transferred within the
corporate umbrella.
The best example of  such situation is the Metso corporation, which builds
paper machines, equipment for mining and mineral processing, automa-
tion systems and, through its ventures organization, automobiles and
engineering consulting services.
Industrial designers have been involved in product development in Metso
for almost three decades. Much of  their work has taken place in one
business area only, namely the manufacturing of  paper machines in Metso
Paper (previously Valmet). In this area, Metso has construed a long-stand-
ing relationship to a network of  consultancies, and one consultancy has
become their key strategic partner.
In other business areas, the role of  design has been much less important.
In terms of  industrial design, Metso’s main challenge is making design a
standard operating procedure across the whole corporation. One of  the
key questions is product harmonization, which enhances trust in com-
pany in the eyes of  customers and stock holders, and minimized manu-
facturing costs. For example, as each plant does not have different prac-
tices and technologies, purchasing becomes more cost-efficient. Also, as
users learn the logic of  Metso machines, they get committed to its prod-
ucts.
In an umbrella-like corporate organizational environment, it difficult to
set this particular enterprise into either concept design or strategic design
category. The importance of  design varies from one business area to
another. In contrast, in companies like Nokia that have one main product
line, it is easier to make design a company-wide continuous practice or, in
want of  a better term, a culture, instead of  a series of  discrete invest-
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ments. However, companies that have already been successful in design
in one business area, have a model for transferring design into other
operational areas. Also, the likelihood that there are design champions
and would-be sponsors of  design, is increased.
Conclusion
We have examined how industrial design is utilized in the business-to-
business context. As we have shown, industrial design is a novelty in
many areas of  manufacturing. First, we presented results how design
policies are conceived in the subject companies. We suggested that while
policies were widely discussed and orally presented in the companies, the
actual understanding of  policies was vague. It seemed that most of  the
issues presented as policies were merely commonly agreed unwritten guide-
lines between the management and the product development stage.
We assumed that companies in our sample ought to be located at the two
upper layers of  the stratification model (they were benchmarks).
- In machine manufacturing, this proved not to be the case: here, design
takes place in the realm of  product design. Conceptual issues are in the
hands of  engineers, and strategic decisions regarding design are in the
hands of  management.
- In medical equipment and in consumer products, designers do concep-
tual work as well.
- Only in some companies, designers participate in strategic design. These
companies can be from any industry.
Thus, our expectation proved to be only partially true. This situation,
however, is not unique, as Joziasse (2000) has shown. In his study, design
takes its cues from strategy, but that at strategic level, design under-per-
forms the business and operational strategy levels. Corporate strategy
remains in the jurisdiction of  top management. In this sense, designers in
our data work within frames set by others.
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Ultimately, a design-oriented strategy is a matter of  management deci-
sion. As the case of  Metso (Valmet) shows, design can be made a strate-
gic factor even in paper machine manufacturing. As the case of  Metso
also shows, it may be difficult to make design a culture, a self-evident part
of  the functioning of  the corporation, not just a practice in one area of
the corporation. Largely, this is a difficulty faced by companies that oper-
ate in multiple business areas and in multiple markets. It is easier to make
design a pervasive practice in companies with only a few main product
lines.
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Industrial design is a recent activity among product development activi-
ties. If  compared to other areas of  product development and innovation,
it has a short history. Whereas european engineering design can be dated
back to the 16th century where it has its roots in the renaissance-era achieve-
ments, industrial design only saw daylight in the beginning of  the 20th
century, being more or less one of  the fruits of  rapidly expanding indus-
trialization and production of  consumer goods. In the beginning most
persons working in the field of  design were not originally educated as
industrial designers, but as engineers, architects, and artisans.
Generally speaking, pioneering industrial designers such as Peter Behrens
have had to break through various scholarly barriers and clear with their
work and theories obstacles of  prejudice when trying to convince skep-
tics about the nature and advantages of  industrial design. The educa-
tional work is still an issue. Apparently, it will take several more years to
convince especially the heavy industry of  the fact that industrial design is
serious business. This proposition also closely connects us with our main
questions in this chapter.
Based on literature benchmarking in Chapter 3, we explore the following
issues in this chapter. First, in all benchmarks, design has become a part
of  company practice over a long period of  time. As a practice in the
company, design is one among many competing practices. The change of
frame was a social movement rather than a rational choice by the man-
agement (Zald and Berger 1978). Is this the case in our data as well?
Secondly, the role of  management interest in design is crucial for its suc-
cess: it is trough interaction with management that designers are able to
fuse their ideas about the company into its practices. Does this judge-
ment hold? Third, a crucial step in making design a force to be reckoned
with is the setting up of  a stable design organization, even if  it would be
amorphous, as in Olivetti (Kitcherer 1990). How do companies in our
sample fare in this respect?
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Design had not arrived in any of  the studied companies as a result of  a
rational, carefully researched decision. Rather, interest in design has re-
sulted from accidental beginnings that have given rise to a design culture.
Implementing industrial design into the company infrastructure is also
greatly dependent on the visions, decisions and conclusions drawn at the
managemental level. Later on, in practice, there is need for design infra-
structures, studio rooms, departments, buildings, facilities; these require
time and resources, and make design an inevitable part of  the working
practices and frames of  the company. The question is, how are those
design visions and interests generated? Is it possible to determine the
essence, that makes a CEO to start thinking in a design-oriented way,
making him or her the design visionnaire? How significant is the influ-
ence of  early visions, or the significance of  artistic hobbies when design
histories are considered? In the following section we examine closer how
design work has begun in firms.
Coincidences in the Design History of  Companies
It is significant to understand the particular details in the starting points
design has had in the firm’s past. It enables us to determine how the
general awareness of  design has increased in the firm and how this aware-
ness has actually triggered the design adaptation process. In this light,
sifting through the facts provided by the interviewees would have been
straightforward. But, as Lorenz (1990) describes, the “changeover” pro-
cess varies widely. In many companies design professionals have had to
struggle for years before being  taken seriously. In other companies de-
sign has been quickly adopted in use because of  momentous occurrences
such as failures in the marketing strategies, or to stimulate new product
development, or because of  the new CEO. Often these three factors go
hand in hand. (Lorenz 1990: 77) Our evidence supports Lorenz’s conclu-
sions as well.
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Often design in the firms surveyed has had coincidental beginnings. For
example, all company cases researched in Finland verify some of  our
assumptions about randomness of  the starting point of  design. These
assumptions already emerged earlier during preliminary conversations in
our team. While one of  the main questions presented to the interviewees
was “What is the design history of  your company (or of  your client com-
pany)?” it was quite surprising to notice after the interviews that the sup-
posed contingency was an actual issue. This was clearly illustrated in the
interview material, as for example in the following:
At that time no one, not even the designers, were able to deter-
mine, what the designer should do in the company. The picture
was only beginning to emerge. However, we had opportunities
and we had abilities, so to begin with, we just started to work with
these. After some time things began to take their initial shape.
(Industrial designer, machine manufacturing industry)
It should be remarked, that some of  the interviewees could describe their
company design histories, mention persons who have had their effect in
the overall development of  industrial design in the firm and so on, but no
accurate figures or dates were recorded. The “Big Picture” remains un-
clear.
The interviewee has worked for the client company already dur-
ing the seventies and eighties, he has merely been involved in the
so-called re-design. The contact between the designer and the
client company was established somewhat ambiguously, “with
the help of  wife’s cousin.” The interviewee worked in the field
of  a dental unit design, however having his position as designer
at Salora as well. But, as he recalls, design was too much of  a
“novel issue” for the client. As a result very few dental clinics
were equipped with prototypical treatment stations and design
co-operation between the consultant and the client faded. The
situation was stable but the close relationship prevailed. “We
worked now and then.” (Industrial designer, consultant)
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While the previous comment is from the medical high-tech manufactur-
ing industry, the following, and rather similar quotation is from an inter-
viewee working in the machine manufacturing industry.
I really have no recollection whose idea it was to include design
in our product development process in ‘87 or ‘88. At that time...
we began to use the service of  a design consultancy, while de-
veloping our casting machine. We had an industrial designer
working with us and eventually the product was well received at
the fair in 1989. During the mid-nineties, when the development
of  our new line of  machinery products was in progress, we
contracted an industrial designer as well. Indeed, we changed the
consultancy; however during product development processes,
updating machinery and equipment, we work with industrial
designer. (Managing Director, machine manufacturing industry)
From the personnel interviewed working in in-house operations, only
seventeen persons out of  forty-four could specify the decade when indus-
trial design was adopted into use. With this we mean the period when
design could have been considered having had a significant effects on the
product development process.
In all, according to the evidence provided by the interviewees there sel-
dom seems to be any specific occasion or date. Even rational reasons for
introducing design in the products, such as safety or environmental fac-
tors have appeared slightly accidentally.
Apart from coloring, the design in machine industry was prac-
tically nonexistent during the seventies. Work safety gained more
foothold in the mid-eighties, but probably only in North America
and in the Nordic countries. Then came environmental require-
ments, and primarily because of  this machinery was later on
equipped with enclosed cabins. In the developing countries no
one cares about these, while in the Nordic countries it is impos-
sible to get anyone climb on a machine without a properly pro-
tected cabin. It is the same with dust, design was needed to help
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in solving the problem. (Marketing communication manager,
machine manufacturing industry)
In the light of  the evidence it seems that there is no distinctive model to
illustrate the particular moment when design actually “entered” a com-
pany. This is not to claim the decisions made in the companies to begin
using design have somehow been haphazard. Merely, after sifting the rather
metaphorical expressions of  the interviewee “reminiscences” it must be
concluded that it is difficult to unambiguously determine and present any
typical pattern of  how design as a resource has accessed the companies
examined.
“The Silent Design Phenomenon”
Designers do not enter into an empty workplace. Instead, they face other
professions and occupations, as well as management structures in their
new organizations. In our benchmarking companies, these existing par-
ties have been constructive towards design in the early stages of  this new
activity. In fact, they have been doing “silent design” by themselves be-
fore the arrival of  trained professionals, who have thus entered  an agree-
able territory.
These companies have had a need for design in their immediate past but
no design department. It seems that those enterprises have had to rely on
a phenomenon called “silent design.” It is a process in which marketing,
production and other staff contribute to design decisions or do design
part-time. (Walsh 2000: 76) In those companies, before the design func-
tion had been properly established or consultants contacted, people par-
ticipating in design decisions are perhaps talented people, but without
formal qualifications. For example, one interviewee described his early
participation in the company’s design affairs as “practicing quackery.”
The interviewee claimed he had understood the benefits of
design already earlier in his career. He then worked in design as
quack, practicing “design quackery, without proper education.”
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Before the company had any in-house designers, design was
assigned to external consultancies. (Product development man-
ager, medical technology industry)
The relationship with the (client) company has been fantastic. The initial
contact to the company was just a phone call- (the consultancy) offered
its services. The response was that the company was interested in design.
The company invited the consultancy to introduce themselves. After that
initial introduction, they started a project together. (Industrial designer,
consultant)
Referring to the latter quotation above, in one case the decision to use
design consultancy was made after single phone call from a design
consultancy that was seeking new assignments. This story differs from
the others told, as it took place only one-and-a half  years ago and the
resulting co-operation between the consultancy and the company was the
first time for the company in question.
Situations Conductive to Design: Company in Crisis
The evidence presents models how design has first been recognized. In
all the companies examined, design has had rather obscure origins. In
one interview the person being interviewed boldly stated how design
“suddenly occurred,” (to one’s mind or) to the company. Another inter-
viewee told how “there was some kind of  crisis” in the company which
practically activated the management to consider how the situation could
be improved.
I’ve been working in the company for twenty years now. I began
my career as a product designer. From the very beginning I have
been involved with design and designers. The company in its
infancy was small, employing only about a hundred people. Then
came the period of  depression; I proceeded and ended up lead-
ing the product development sector. Meanwhile some kind of
crisis happened in the company, and subsequently the invest-
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ments into the product development have been increasing since
‘93 – ‘94. (Product development manager, machine manufactur-
ing industry)
The client explicitly changed their business policy during the
years of  depression, when the company was actually near bank-
ruptcy and a petition was being prepared. However, new prod-
ucts incorporating design, attracted potential customers and even
competitors had to re-evaluate the situation. Exports flourished
once again. Both the range of  products and production was
rationalized. Design work was orientated to facilitate this via
modularity, emphasizing a wider range of  possible variations
from similar components. (Industrial Designer, Consultant for
the company in the previous quotation)
When in crisis, company management seeks new opportunities and fresh
starts to compete in the marketplace. Design can provide such a fresh
start, and thus get a chance - especially when it is deemed a cheaper
strategy than engineering or marketing. Fresh starts are justified in crisis
situations.
In this case it could be speculated what would have happened if  design
had not been accepted or it had had no impact? But, initially it was this
crisis that resulted in the utilization of  industrial design. In this particular
case design consultancies were employed and design was vigorously uti-
lized in improving the company’s main products, thus resulting in a new
economic growth. Successful differentiation via design started a new era
in the firm and nowadays design is considered  one of  the key assets in
the company.
The Importance of  Managers as Design Champions
In a company willing to be successful in design today, consciousness for
design must begin at the managerial level. Design cannot make an effec-
tive contribution in any company unless there is strong understanding
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and support at the highest levels of management. (Heskett 1991: 153)
Hence, it is interesting to notice that in the otherwise random-like design
scene the question “what effects has a personal relationship to art and design at the
managerial level had in a company,” is raised. With this we mean the key
personnel originated awareness of  different areas of  arts and understanding
the possibilities and advantages “concealed” in industrial design. On the
other hand this can be seen as bearing a close relationship to the way of
thinking and understanding industrial design as art, but it is fine art that
has actually had its effects in some companies, leading to the path to-
wards industrial design.
There are numerous examples in the literature of  how the sense of  de-
sign has affected companies. To mention one, the famed designs of  Olivetti
grew from the vision of  Adriano Olivetti, who saw design as both an
expression and a medium for obtaining unity between living and working
life, and by placing the emphasis on contemporary design thus making
the utilization of  latest achievements in engineering possible. Further-
more, he understood how visually enjoyable design can inspire people’s
intellectual and artistic values (Kitcherer 1990: 16). Adriano was a “de-
sign champion” (Blaich and Blaich 1993: 126). With good justification,
Olins notes that
There is an inescapable similarity between Adriano Olivetti, the
prince-patron of  all that is best in modern Italian design, and
Lorenzo di Medici, the patron of the Florentine masters of the
Reneissance. (Olins 1978: 153).
Adriano’s commitment to design has been continued by Renzo Zorzi and
Bruno Visentini and, later, by De Benedetti (Kitcherer 1990: 80).
A similar direction is found in the vision Masaru Ibuka, the founder of
Sony, already when writing the founding prospectus of  the company in
1946. He wrote, among other objectives, how the aim of  the company is
to “apply advanced technology to the life of  the general public and thus
bring untold pleasures and untold benefits.” (Kunkel 1999: 14) It is doubt-
ful whether these visions, today so well known all over the world as Sony
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products, would have been materialized without the extraordinary design
work that resulted from Ibuka’s initial vision. While Sony had to revise
the design department organization three times during 1978-85, the
management’s deep understanding of  design as a key factor to Sony’s
success has continued trough decades. (Lorenz 1990: 78: Kunkel 1999:
14; for AEG, see Rogge 1984: 110, Buddensieg 1984: 49).
Or, let us take an example among companies in our research, the open-
minded and design-oriented managing directors in one machine manu-
facturing company. In this particular case the orientation toward design
issues began already a decade before design was utilized in the company,
as the founder of  the company had been deeply interested in aviation and
design. An engineer from the firm in question described their present
managemental attitude towards design issues:
The attitude towards the design begins from the top. The top
management is not only interested in design in the products, but
also in the buildings - the company facilities. All that belongs to
the  corporate identity. You can see this attitude in the products.
(Director, product development department, machine
manufacturing industry)
This example shows how thoughts from the past can connect to the present,
linking the thoughts of  the founder and the attitudes and perspectives of
present management, and resulting in a closely-knitted managemental
“attitude model” to assist design procedures. Design has become a cul-
ture: a framework that is a natural part of  the whole frame of  mind of
the company. The designers’ frame gets a responsive, although demand-
ing, audience from the top management an others in the company in such
cases.
The positive attitude towards aesthetics and design in this particular ma-
chinery-manufacturing plant is also notable in the company’s headquar-
ters building. Its wind tunnel-on-the top-design is both architecturally
bold and interesting. Such details surely highlight the overall corporate
image of  the company and enhance the company’s holistic design views
to clients as well to passers-by. In fact, the building in question bears a
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curious resemblance to AEG´s famous Turbine-manufacturing plant,
designed by the “first non-technical specialist” Peter Behrens in 1907 (Zaccai
1995: 7). This importance is further illustrated by Lorenz, who, using as
an example the headquarters of  the American machine company John
Deere in Moline, Illinois, designed by the famed Finnish architect Eero
Saarinen, writes how “the functionality of  the company’s products should
be in perfect balance with the overall image of  the company, including
the company buildings.” (Lorenz 1990: 101).
A second and an even more illustrative example is from still farther away
in the past. In one interview we were told what happened in the fifties.
An engineer had turned down an art scholarship in favor of  a manufac-
turing career. Art-loving, but frustrated  as an artist, he unleashed his
ambitions on machine manufacturing. The story tells how he
...believed that the engineering needed to be more of  a refined
art. One day in 1959 Deane Richardson came to Crown and
agreed to do a project for 500 dollars- the product won a design
award. That was everything that the lead engineer, Tom Bidwell,
wanted at that time. So, Tom Bidwell grew on the company, the
design grew on the company, success grew on the company
through design; one after the other towards what it is today.
(Design director, machine manufacturing industry)
This was the utmost beginning in the company’s design history. It started
the continuous usage of  industrial design in the product development
process (This “incidental” story is also described in a case by Freeze
1991). Interconnected with the management’s serious interests and re-
spectively, hobby in both fine arts and design the previous incident in-
deed was the starting shot, creating, what the interviewee describes as
design culture in the following quotation.
One of  the best ways for design to excel is to create the culture.
It is easier to do one successful design in a culture that is not used
to a good design process, it is much more difficult to create a
design culture because it takes a long time to achieve and to get
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the organization breathe that... With that (design culture) you will
get more consistently recognizable design. (Design director,
machine manufacturing industry)
These individuals believed in design and they understood what design is
all about. Their visions were based on a strong, at the time quite unpreju-
diced belief  in the positive effects of  good styling. The engineer in question
was acquainted with real industrial design matters as well. Also, the
importance of the relationship the company had later with a design
consultancy the company must not be underestimated. And again, the
first account is a narrative about a visionnaire, who acquired his inspira-
tion from the art world and applied it to manufacturing and technology,
bringing two different spheres of  practice and knowledge together.
Organizing Design: In-House Organization vs. Networking
A deep commitment to design is a matter of  long history and often re-
sults from coincidental beginnings, as we have called them. It is also
largely dependent on managerial interest in design. These features of
design support the literature based picture created in Chapters 2 and 3
(Sony, AEG, Philips, Olivetti). Still, these literature benchmarks prompt
one more question: what is the role of  a possible design organization in
companies? When design becomes a standard part of  company practice,
investments are made to design in some form or another (in materials,
machinery, software, people). Also, as design becomes standard practice,
companies become committed to design indirectly: when some functions
are taken up by designers, other professions lose these skills. Dependency
on design develops.
Such a situation is conductive to building an in-house organization for
design. However, as Chapter 3 argued, such organization does more than
just stabilize an existing fact. For instance, it can do internal marketing
for design effectively, organize design competitions within the firm, and
maintain internal publicity that further promotes the cause of  design in
company. In particular, this was the case with Philips - even Olivetti was
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not found to be a negative case, no matter how amorphous its design
organization appeared to be in the first instance. Such internalization pro-
vides designers with a long-term vision on the company, and enables
many kinds of  organizational learning. Thus, setting up a separate orga-
nization for design can be regarded as a sign of  strategic commitment to
design.
However, this is not the only possible path. There are consultancies from
which design can be bought (for IDEO, see Kelley 2001). Relying on
them provides a series of  obvious benefits for companies willing to in-
vest on design. For example, in terms of  costs, consultancies are paid
only for the work they do. When times are bad, they can be used with in
a more flexible manner than an in-house organization. Also, in creative
areas of  business, freedom to change designer means better possibilities
to get fresh ideas. This organization provides benefits for designers as
well. Remember the case of  Olivetti: working in their own studios in
Milan instead of  the Olivetti headquarters provided Olivetti designers
freedom to pursue their artistic and creative activities.
There are competing rationales at work. Which path is chosen by the
companies in our sample?
The following chart lists the number of  designers and main types of
consultancies utilized in the companies that were surveyed in the research.
Even a quick overview of  the chart reveals the obvious importance of
design consultancies to these companies. The chart is divided in four
columns, each listing the number of  design services in use. The in-house
designers are listed in the first column. The second column gives the
number of  external design consultants for each company. With external
design consultants we mean design offices, not individual designers, who
are then listed in the following third column. The fourth column lists
subcontractors in design, i.e. design consultancies with only occasional
activity and co-operation with the company mentioned.
The reliance on external design services, at least in the investment goods
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manufacturing seems to be all-inclusive. However, there are interesting
exceptions. Firstly, Crown Corporation has a separate design central,
employing an average of  twenty designers. Secondly, Nokia Mobile Phones
has a massive in-house design organization, but also utilizes a large net-
work of  consultancies and subcontractors. Thirdly, Metso Corporation
employs a bunch of  roughly twenty consultant designers. In all three
enterprises, design is considered to be of  strategic importance.
As a family-owned company, Crown has a rich history in design originat-
ing back to the beginning of  the sixties. During the past two decades the
design department has determinedly been developed to exactly corre-
spond to the product development needs. Crown’s internal design organi-
zation is a rare bird among the companies examined; as shown,
consultancies are preferred. However, before internalization, Crown had
a thirty-year-long relationship with RichardsonSmith, one of  the world’s
most respected design consultancies, now called Fitch. During that time
the two companies ”grew together” (Freeze 1991). In the late eighties
Crown’s design went through a major organizational refinement program.
One of  the reforms called for the establishing of  an in-house design
organization. An in-house design group was as being attractive for sev-
eral reasons. The communication between design and engineering de-
partments at Crown was likely to improve, as designers could meet engi-
neering personnel on a daily basis; the consultancy was located 100 miles
away. The in-house team was exptected  to integrate better into product
development process, resulting in an understanding and an in-depth knowl-
edge of  the entire processes as well as in a faster process (Freeze 1991).
Crown had also another advantage, facilitating the decision to internalize
most of  their design activities was existing design culture. Design culture
takes a long time to develop. The thirty-year experience of  doing indus-
trial design in the firm had established a solid ground onto which inter-
nalized design activities were built.
Nokia Mobile Phones (NMP) has a substantial design organization, which
is currently best explained by Keinonen et al. (2000). Because of  the
sheer size of  the enterprise, we are able to present here only a brief
overview how design is organized in the company. There are also limita-
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tions in the availability of  information due to its strategic nature. In indus-
trial design, NMP uses both external design consultancies and subcon-
tractors, and operates a network of  subsidiaries within the company. The
organization is capable of utilizing company-owned know-how resources
as well. This emphasizes specialized know-how is easily distributed inside
the organization. NRC, Nokia Research Center is in a key role when
technological competence is concerned. NRC and its network of
international collaboration ensures that progresses in international tech-
nology and research are carefully utilized. (Korhonen 2000: 183). As an
informant at Nokia says in an interview, reliance on consultancies limits
the possibilities for design because of  the complicated, information-over-
load-ridden environment of  modern industry.
The decision to focus on in-house design was made quite early,
as was the decision to build most of  these functions into the
company... You have to handle a vast amount of  information in
a project, and if  you are not in the house, you don’t have access
to all necessary information, and can’t take a product from the
beginning to the end. Smaller consultancies focus only on the
conceptual side. Outsiders can’t even influence our aesthetic
developments because of  lack of  information, if  they are not
involved in interaction in the house. (Design manager, consumer
products)
The company organization of  the Valmet Corporation (Currently belong-
ing to the industrial concern Metso) is more informal and matrix-like, but
there are certain hierarchies maintained, mainly for practicality reasons,
e.g. as one of  our interviewees at Valmet stated:
The linear organization at Valmet is emphasized so we know
who pays our wages. However, when going operative, there are
no barriers. Yet, an appointment is needed to meet the managing
director. But communication is not difficult otherwise, thru the
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Branch of
Industry;
Companies
In-house
designers
Design
consultancies
External
indiv.
designers
Sub-
contractors
in design
Medical
technology
Datex-
Ohmeda (FI)
Polar Electro
(FI)
Planmeca (FI)
Sirona (D)
Machine
industry
Valmet/Metso
(FI)
Rocla (FI)
PCE (FI)
Other
Nokia (FI)
Woodnotes
(FI)
Deviant
Cases
Alessi (IT)
Crown (US)
TGW (AT)
Kone (FI)
*)Separate design dept. Employs more designers in the U.S.
**) An average of  20 designers (see text)
***) Average, staff  incl. other product development professionals as well
†) Data not available
††) Both internal&external
‡) Currently none
1* 1 none
20 -----
none
2 2 none none
1 1 none none
2 ------ ------**
none 2 none 1
none 1 none none
Ca. 20*** 1 none none
none 1 none none
1
n/a† Ca. 3-4 n/a† several††
1 none n/a‡ none
1 2 none none
n/a† n/a† n/a†
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organization or even upwards. The “designer’s voice” is heard
loud ‘n’clear at Valmet, throughout the concern.
Similarly as in most companies surveyed, also Valmet employs a few in-
house industrial designers while rest of  the design activity is outsourced
to consultants. Valmet is building a design organization structure consist-
ing of  several separate consultancies of  various sizes. For example, while
other consultancies are contributing to the network with only one de-
signer from their senior designer staff, other consultancies commission
the client’s project with several young professionals. The structure is not
rigid, but the variations and number of  designers can depend upon the
projects. In all an average of  twenty designers participate in this design
network. In this model there is one further option. In addition, as there
are several simultaneously working consultants, the design organization
is can be operated on two different levels, thus creating a parallel-line
consultant arrangement. This is a rather clever arrangement, where the
first-line consultants control the work of  the other consultants. However,
at Valmet it is strongly emphasized this is not a matter of  hierarchy, but
the structure is intended to ease the strain of  coordinating the process
from the in-house product development and design. Design management
is seen as a important notion at Valmet: one of  the main tasks for the in-
house designers is to manage the processes between Valmet and their
consultancies. With ca. twenty designers in separate consultancies, all
working together, the planned organization of  design at Valmet would be
substantially large.
Keeping the size of  the enterprise in mind, it is easy to agree on the stress
that is laid on the importance of  networking practices at Valmet. And it is
suggested in a brochure published by Design Forum Finland that “Fin-
nish design consultancies should form networks of  know-how to be able
to have sufficient resources to serve clients of  the size Valmet is.” How-
ever, in comparison, the field of  other R&D at Valmet is notably larger,
divided into ten separate centers worldwide (Färm et. al. 2000: 58).
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This chapter has dealt with the design histories in the companies researched.
We have also examined how design is introduced in the manufacturing
of  investment goods industry. We have seen that in the companies in our
sample, design has not been introduced by a rational decision of  the
management. Building design into the foundations of  the company prac-
tice has been a long process. From initial, often minor beginnings, de-
signers have won the respect of  other parties in the company. Some con-
tingencies were outlined that make such process easier (like crisis situa-
tions and “the silent design phenomenon”), but the key player is top
management. Here, our data corroborates the results of  our literature-
based benchmarks analyzed in Chapters 2 – 3).
As a profession, industrial design is a relatively young profession in the
sphere of  other product development professions. Industrial design in
capital goods production has seen only about fifty years to day, contrary
to engineering design, which actually has its roots in the days of  the
Renaissance. This difference makes it understandable that during the nine-
teen-fifties and sixties industrial design was an almost unknown branch
of  activity among the capital goods producers.
Finally, we learned that outsourcing seems to be the norm in the ways in
which companies utilize design. Typically, companies hire only one or
two designers, who act as design managers. It is their job to maintain an
understanding of  on-going company processes, and hire consultants for
projects. Only two companies in our sample, Crown and Nokia, have a
substantial in-house design organization. This leads us to the central ques-
tion of  the next chapter: how do companies work with consultancies?
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We saw at the end of  the previous chapter that design is largely an
outsourced activity. Only two companies, Nokia and Crown, have a sub-
stantial in-house design department. In addition, Valmet (Metso) has built
a network of  long-term consultancy relations (in a manner reminiscent
of  Olivetti). Still, although only a small number in-house designers are
found in most firms, in the execution of  actual design processes
consultancies are heavily relied on. Self-evidently one or two persons are
not capable of taking care of the massive workload of design require-
ments that new product development processes usually demand. Instead
this suggests the in-house designer(s) participate in the projects, but merely
act as intermediaries or coordinating personnel, controlling the actual work
of  consultancies.
These results support the conclusion (see Chapter 5) that commitment to
design is not on the same level if  a company chooses to work with
consultancies as it is when there is an in-house organization. In this re-
spect, the difference between the literature benchmarks is illustrative. This
state of  affairs probably also explains partly why design is not a strategic
asset in most companies. However, the new economy model (see Vallas
1999; Amin 1997) fits this practice better, as it stresses networking and
outsourcing as typical modes of  organizing in present economy. By and
large, design seems to be organized along the lines of  the new, globalized
economy.
This said, we shift our focus of  questions to another set here. Industrial
design consultants are contracted and these relationships are maintained
for various reasons. There are visual aspects, where the company’s in-
house designer or design team is often prone to become tunnel-visioned,
if  certain repeated design-processes are in constant use. Consultants are
utilized to present fresh visions and points of  view. When business as-
pects are considered, lack of  time, several simultaneous projects with
approaching deadlines, lack of  specific professional skills or lack of  in-
dustrial design professionals inside the company are the most commonly
mentioned reasons. A successful mutual co-operation between a design
consultancy and the company takes time to develop, but often develops
into a lasting one.
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The use of  consultants belongs closely to the organization of  design in
companies as well. When a company is about to assign personnel to work
for industrial design processes there is usually a choice of  two: to con-
tract external consultants or assign the project to the designers working
internally, if  any. Is it necessary to use external consultancies, or should
the firm improve its in-house resources instead? What are the pros and
cons supporting the resulting decision? These are carefully considered by
companies. A combination of  both is used often. But how?
Taking Consultancies into Good Use:
Concept Design and Idea Generation
In general, there are no differences in the skills between trained designers
who work in-house and who work in consultancies. They do product
design, conceptual design, and design management. How and why is de-
sign bought from the market, then?
The main important reasons is a need for fresh perspectives, not the price
of  service. A company with an in-house team or in-house designers can
easily revive or stimulate creativity inside the company by contracting
consultancies to present differing and controversial views to design prob-
lems. Thus consultancies are also used to positively enhance and activate
the mutual competition between the consultancy and the representatives of
different professionals in in-house design teams. This enables the avoid-
ance of  tunnel-visions, easily created in in-house teams when not enough
comparisons are available.
Consultancies are used in the commencing stages of  a new
project, in a way also to enhance internal competition. (Product
development manager, medical equipment manufacturing)
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We use consultancies, and have stable relationships to three or
four companies. We use them because they have developed a
good understanding of  our system over a long time that they are
not totally outsiders any more... Consultancies typically work in
the early stages: they create ideas and concepts, and other things
like that. (Design manager, consumer products)
While it seems that larger consultants contract large company assign-
ments more often, there are exceptions. Thinking design-wise this is ap-
parently coincidental. Or not? As we have mentioned earlier, a consultancy
with less experience is definitively eagerly waiting for the “show-time.”
Some client-companies have taken the risk and indeed made good use of
a newcomer design consultancy. A variety of  different views to a design
problem from a small consultancy is notably better than one view from
one designer working in a larger consultancy. A company in the field of
machine manufacturing was seeking their first design consultancy to real-
ize the planned product concept. An interviewee demonstrates the situa-
tion that prevailed:
We thought that in contracting a large renowned consultancy,
we’ll get only one concept, while contracting this four-man
consultancy we will have a concepts from the entire consultancy
team. In other words, the broadest possible conception. We did
not want a single concept from a single designer. This was ac-
tually our main criterion when selecting a proper consultancy.
Certainly, Tampere is located nearer than Turku when viewed
from us and the consultancy was small, but we thought they
might be more flexible, and so it has been indeed. (Manager,
Technical department; machine manufacturing industry)
This makes the consultant scene interesting. Large consultancies are of-
ten able to assign only one person to realize a certain project. It is pos-
sible that this can stimulate pragmatic attitudes towards the project and
result in concepts delivered “as is,” without adequate possibility for client
to communication and response. With this we mean that a consulting
Networks and Consultancies
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designer starts to make decisions on behalf of the client, perhaps rigidly
gripping to the presented proposals, consequently injuring the two-direc-
tional communication. When there is a constant flow of  concepts from
different consultants, individuals or design firms, each providing the cli-
ent with different angles of  views, this does not so easily happen.
Towards Long-Term Relationships
In many areas of  technology adapting and acquiring in-depth understand-
ing of  the client’s business takes considerable time. In the investment-
goods manufacturing it is economical to maintain longer relationships.
We’ve been quite satisfied with the present concept and consult-
ant we’ve worked with. When the design firm is the same, it is
easy for us to maintain a coherent (product) range. (Managing
Director, machine manufacturing industry)
In consumer production areas where technological levels are equal be-
tween rivals, and the competitor’s response is rapid, similar products can
appear in the markets in a short time. In the times of  industrial espionage
and the ever-present danger of  plagiarism it is safer to deliver critical
information to one consultant only, instead of  distributing a mass of
information or details to several different consultancies. Curiously enough
it seems that it is more economical to put all the eggs in one basket.
Hence, in the industrial areas producing novel, complex and/or specified
applications it is even more economical to create and establish long-term
relationships with only a few suitable industrial design consultants and
designers. And, as expenditures rise design is increasingly to be seen as a
weapon of  precision, exactly targeted to the needs of  the particular pro-
cess in the client company.
When a consultancy has been selected and a suitable and reliable relation-
ship with the consultancy has been established there are various other
influential factors effecting to the durability and span of  the initial rela-
tionship. These range from the consultancy’s professional experience and
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size to credibility matters. Quite obviously while economical aspects are
important, contracting a “star designer” is not a matter of  investments.
Also, consultancies provide useful benchmarks for mirroring a company’s
own skills and ideas.
Which consultancy should be chosen, it depends on the candidate’s
previous history, merits and achievements, previous acquain-
tance; and understandably, price affects also. But price is not
always the only one that matters, at least in the case of  hiring a
renowned designer. (Marketing director, consumer health care
equipment manufacturing)
Also, when needed, we use other consultancies to get a sense of
reference point... we want to measure the quality of  work of  our
long-terms consultancies and, above all, our own work: we need
all the time some kind of mirror to be able to do that. (Design
manager, consumer products)
Flexibility between the two participants is a bipartite affair. As a client to
a design consultancy the company indeed requires the consultancy to
work exactly as they want, while the consultancy prefers to have freedom
to execute these requirements in the best possible way. This is the critical
moment when a new relationship has been established. Especially, if  the
clients have not utilized the services of  the particular designer before.
Both participants need a reciprocal balance in their joint work. Any con-
tradictions leading to a clash between the two in this situation may seri-
ously harm the future relationship.
The ideal is when the external consultant thoroughly under-
stands the design needs of their client. On the other hand, a bad
example of  a design company is a consultancy trying to do
everything according to their own preferences. Any attempt to
place restraints is received with arrogance, saying ‘you don’t have
guidelines for this anyway.’ A design company must be able to
listen to their client, as they’re not certainly aware of  what is
actually needed inside the company. The designer cannot have
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expertise in what the client actually needs. Why produce insignifi-
cant products for the market? Disappointment is surely felt in
the companies if there is no market response for the product.
It is entirely different to make fine arts.” (Industrial designer,
consumer health care equipment manufacturing)
Apparently these contradictions are often activated because of  lack of
appropriate flow of  information. This is avoided, if, during the early stages
the consultancy acts as a “two-way listener” to client’s needs, and rapidly
responds to these needs and opportunities. It should be noted that later
on, the flow of  information must be equally fluid.
Understandably, the consultancy that accomplishes the first project satis-
factorily is more likely to contract a new one, thus climbing one step
towards a long-lasting partnership with the client. This is a twofold mat-
ter. A consultancy with a certain “design handwriting” creates a line of
design that, if successful, it can be obtained only from this consultancy.
Usually in industries, including the investment goods industry, this model
of  action results in long-term partnerships. And especially in the invest-
ment goods producing industry, where models are altered and modified
at a considerably slower pace than in the consumer production, firms are
actually able to benefit from this.
In practice it takes at least two years to learn what is customary
in the company. Today the ‘preferred supplier’ thinking is in-
creasingly popular; we are no more seeking suppliers but endur-
ing partnership, as it is more economical for both. It’s not prof-
itable to change consultants all the time. Run-in periods take
time. (Marketing communication manager, machine manufac-
turing industry)
Long-time co-operation usually transforms a consultancy relationship from
vending design services to a trustworthy partnership. This trustworthi-
ness needs to be nurtured. An usual failure is to assume that the consultancy
is responsible for maintaining the connections to their clients. This often
creates unfavorable results. However, consultancy-client relationships are
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composed of  two equally important parties. It is important to the client
to understand the nature of  the relationship. It is suggested thar the
consultancy should be kept involved, even there are few of nonexistent
projects. A continual flow of  assignments ensures constant interaction
(Hull Faust 2000: 44 – 45).
Networking
The appearance of  the network organization between the product devel-
opment teams and the in-house designer or design consultants and the
clientele is a question of  bipartite nature. Theoretically, designers or ex-
ternal consultants are able to provide their clients with special skills, con-
tacts to sub-contractors or component manufacturing plants, but on what
level these are utilized in the companies? In practice, the evidence sug-
gests that the level of specialization inside the networks is substantially
low (see Table 1 in Chapter 6).
I am not very familiar with the networks our designers (consult-
ants) may have. For the time being we’ve got what we’ve wanted.
Some kind of marketing functions might exist. I don’t know
what they need in their office. I’d guess they are quite independent.
I would imagine they’d have some visions towards marketing
issues, if  possible. (Technical department manager, machine
manufacturing industry)
Is it plausible that the networks described really are, as the ideal would be,
a plexus of  interfacial and reciprocal know-how delivery systems. In the
industries examined, networks are merely a local, either in-house or ex-
ternal “close-support supply” of  tacit knowledge, or of  minor details in
professional knowledge.
In practice, when work is done in the 3-D world, we usually take
care of  subcontracting all the needed stereolitography models
and so on... Generally, we consider it important to act as distribu-
tors of  new material and possibilities... These can be materials,
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new components, for example hinges. An massive amount of
research in done here, as well as actual design; detailed informa-
tion cumulates here and we distribute it further. (Two industrial
designers, consultants)
Most of  the designer and consultancy originated resources or external
company networks mentioned in the interviews (computer 3D-model-
ling, model making etc.) could, at least theoretically, easily be adapted to
work inside company organizations as sub-networks. On the other hand,
incorporating e.g. specific material resource supplies or the like into a
company would cause financial strain on the organization. Furthermore,
several of  the design consultancies surveyed actually maintain sub-con-
tractor-connections to their clientele in the form of  supplying informa-
tion about organizations producing sub-components, detail parts or work-
ing in rapid prototyping, all specified fields of  manufacturing.
Design consultancies that have been operational and in the professional
field for a longer time are able to present and supply their clients with
several external networking contacts and communication, the assortment
of  contacts thus extending outside of  their own range of  skills. Conse-
quently, this arrangement is able to rotate anti-clockwise, as the client
company is also able to feed the consultancy with its own network con-
taining information, skilled subcontractors and the like.
Surely, larger design companies have larger networks of  special-
ists, networks probably grow exponentially in relation to number
of  personnel. We use consultancies with one, two or three per-
sons, this means their networks are rather limited. In practice we
offer them our own network, in other words we distribute to
them our knowledge and contact information about proper
subcontractors, for example in issues concerning production
techniques and the like. (Product development engineer, ma-
chine manufacturing industry)
This kind of  networking might be valuable if  the case is that the
consultancy is a newcomer in the business, a minor one or the area of
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business is exceedingly specific and the data and information commonly
accessible is scarce. However, it must be remembered that the distribu-
tion of  information to the consultant is always somewhat restricted, and
details often dispensed in briefs only an as needed basis. In areas of  a
specific technology, for example, in mobile phones manufacturing it is
conceived impossible the consultancies could handle all the information
needed, even they were delivered such vast amounts of  knowledge.
Theoretically, when the distribution of  information to the design
consultancy further expands, design activities become more easily incor-
porated into the client company itself. If  the amount of  information
needed to brief  the consultant increases and simultaneously design is
considered as the core competence in new product development, inter-
nalizing the complete design process may become more tempting. Natu-
rally this would increase business safety and ensure all-inclusive control
over the process, while making the overall organization heavier.
However, reality seems to be somewhat different. Networks seem to
take on a more restricted role than presumed. There and the reasons for
this are merely practical. A large network of  information and know-how
distribution between companies and designers would be ideal, keeping
the areas of  businesses constantly informed about new special technolo-
gies and expertise. However, agreements between consultants and the
clients often restrict the distribution of  information to any third party.
Perhaps a certain, perhaps massive, amount of know-how resources,
however beneficial these would be to the overall design scene, remain in
the firms and in the confidential archives of  the consultancies.
As a design consultancy, the (company’s) principal “export prod-
uct” is know-how. Know-how is accumulated into the company,
from where it is then forwarded. On the other hand, agreements
often bind the consultancy, thus unable to deliver their know-
how or knowledge to external parties. (Project coordinator, design
consultancy)
Furthermore, the changes and effects in digital technology have been
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rapid. During the eighties and mid-nineties, most designers still had their
own networks of  know-how and specialized skills. These were knowl-
edge of distributors of equipment (materials, presentation techniques etc.)
services (photography, repro studios, printing houses etc.) and subcon-
tractors (model makers and the like). Today, digital technologies have
made many of  these areas of  specialization obsolete. Nowadays when
the possibilities in 3D-design are almost limitless, presentations are quite
often held digitally. Sketching is limited to the early stages of  the project,
and there is decreasing need to make elaborate presentation renderings
by hand. Expensive physical scale models are built, not in the initial, but
only during the last stages of  the project, if  at all. All these developments
in computer technology have decreased the need for designers to have
external know-how networks, however small, as more and more tasks are
possible to be accomplished by the designer themselves.
The Size of Design Consultancies as an Argument
Which factors are involved in the development of  lasting relationship?
How do consultancies actually sell their know-how to the clientele?
Generally, the size of  the consultancy organization often makes the dif-
ference. Less capacity affects the consultancy’s potential in ensuring the
flow of  new assignments. A minor design company with only few people
working has, understandably, relatively more difficulties in marketing their
work and simultaneously working on the already contracted projects.
A major internationally operating design consultancy is able to operate a
separate marketing department. The marketing department is able to brand
their suggested design-work to the clientele. Marketing can survey the
possibilities and threats the client has and establish their business propo-
sitions according to these and other factors. Therefore a major consultancy
is capable of making tailored design project propositions from the brief
the potential client presents. These marketing departments have one more
particular advantage. When the personnel is combined from marketing
professionals who understand the meaning of design there are no histori-
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cal tensions hindering their work. “Selling design” is not a matter of
mythology but business, as is selling anything else. This sounds self-evi-
dent, but in Finland it is not, as there are factors that make the situation
more complex.
Apparently, the small and unexperienced consultants have difficulties in
assuring the potential clients about their abilities. This results easily in a
vicious circle familiar to everyone left without that first proper job, be-
cause of  lacking experience, which is initially impossible to gain without
that first place to work in! Usually due to economical reasons and cau-
tiousness in unnecessary risk-taking, it is felt that consultancies with less
personnel are not suited to realize extensive ground-up projects.
The more finalized we need a certain product, the larger the
consultancy must be, to have the capacity to finish the project.
A one-man consultancy quickly runs out of  capacity, then it’s not
going to be a turn-key delivery any more. (Product development
engineer, machine manufacturing industry)
Let us allow some speculation here. What happens in the long run, if  the
design-markets are saturated with large, though experienced consultancies.
Does this influence these markets in general? If  new, innovative
consultancies with perhaps unprecedented ideas have only restricted ac-
cess to the design business and clients? Does this not hinder the develop-
ment and growth of  the whole business? Utilizing simultaneously the
services of  various consultancies of  differing sizes would prove a good
solution.
The use of  variety of  consultants is largely a matter of  resources. A large
company is able to employ several consultancies. Financial backup en-
sures, that whenever there are opportunities to obtain fresh visions, it is
possible to do so. One interviewee, an industrial designer in a large finnish
company described how they are always interested in using new talents or
novel know-how, parallel to the usual consultancies they work with. There
are no unsurpassed hindrances if  something novel appears in the
consultancy scene.
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Small or mid-sized consultancies frequently contract minor projects, while
ground-up projects are handled by the in-house designers.
When we don’t have enough internal resources we use consult-
ants. Often there are several projects overlapping each other.
Strategically important projects (complete product ranges etc.)
are usually realized by our in-house crew. Separate and minor
projects are assigned to the consultants. (Manager, product de-
velopment, consumer health care equipment manufacturing)
This is not an unexpected diversion but there is merely some ambiguity
to be found. It is customary that also major consultants are contracted to
complete minor or sub-projects, filling the gaps in the project schedules
or doing face-lifts on an existing product or a line of  products.
Marketing Design
Marketing measures in design are nowadays implemented in full, but the
consultant marketing appears to be quite different in Finland. Contacting
a potential client is done more discreetly than in the rest of  Europe. An
interviewee (a Finnish industrial designer) describes, how in Central Eu-
rope marketing the services of  the design consultancy takes more aggres-
sive and consistent forms. Consultancies seeking new assignments pre-
pare the first meetings carefully, having thoroughly examined the back-
ground of  their potential client, and gone through the possibilities and
hindrances. This enables the consultancy to present and specify their pro-
posal in more detail.
Over here (in Finland) it seems that it is customary to first make
a somewhat timid phone call...often some famed designer pays
us a visit and describes the possibilities a bit. In Central Europe,
Britain, Italy and so on, the culture is different. Larger design
companies have their internal marketing, which then first con-
tacts the potential client, taking also care of pre-planning and
background work. When designers then visit us they have a
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good deal of  information...that’s quite professional, branding
their services towards us! (Industrial designer, machine manu-
facturing industry)
A preferred consultancy is reputable, trustworthy and experienced. Previ-
ous experiences in co-operation are considered as well. The data col-
lected shows how the larger and thus usually more experienced consultancy
gets the contract more often than a new, unexperienced one.
Consultants, design offices or freelance designers are chosen
according their previous experience in the particular business,
i.e. those who have previous experience from designing medical
equipment. (Industrial designer, medical technology industry)
Also individual or small groups of  designers can take an advantage from
the situation. There are several examples in Finland from the early eight-
ies when professionals from large consultancies have started a versatile
spin-off design business of their own, thus successfully utilizing the experi-
ence and knowledge in the area gained from their previous practices
when working for the large consultancy.
Conclusions
Analysis in this chapter shows that although design, with few notable
exceptions, is bought from the market mainly for fresh ideas and con-
cepts, designers’ networks are fairly limited. Long-term relationships pre-
vail because building the trust and knowledge base for one takes time.
We also saw that a key decision criterion in hiring a consultant is the size
of  the consultancy.
This situation represents something of  a paradox. If  design is a strategic
asset, it ought to be internalized, which provides further evidence that
design is not a strategic force in most companies. If  design is in fact in
the core of  a corporation, then literature on post-fordism (Amin 1997)
argues that it ought to be internalized. Several companies in consumer
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electronics have done this. Perhaps in the future when its strategic value
increases, design will increasingly become an in-house phenomenon.
So far, however, the model is decentralized and networked. This does not
mean that relationships exists in an anarchy. Rather, in addition to the
typical juridical contracts that stabilize interfirm transactions, there are
other, design-specific ties as well. For example, investments into technol-
ogy and software are heavy investments from consultancies signaling com-
mitment to the principal (the client of  the consultancy, or the agent).
Similarly, learning the ways of  the company may take time, but it im-
proves the performance of  the consultancy. Long-term consultancies know
the technology and the practices of  the firm, as well as its social land-
scape. Some ties grow from interorganizational learning. At best, such
long-term relationships allow companies to completely rely on outsourcing,
at least if  design is not defined to be at the very heart of  the corporation.
A possible future for design may grow from not just control, but also the
limitations inherent in outsourcing. As developing technology and aes-
thetics becomes more demanding, outsourcing becomes increasingly dif-
ficult, as decisions concerning these aspects of  products become so com-
plex that only in-house staff  can have an access to all such information.
Globalizing markets have a similar effect. Product design processes for
global products are complex, and without multidisciplinary design re-
sources in expertise even large consultancies cannot understand them
simply because of  access to too many critical areas of  technology.
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Industrial design is exploited and used in many fields of  manufacturing
and technology to improve the usability, ergonomics, safety, quality and
finally, also aesthetical visual appearance of  products. The analysis of
this chapter is based on DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) notion of  “mi-
metic isomorphism.” In the context of  design, this concept describes a
historical process in which design becomes a competitive advantage on
an industry-wide basis. When one company within an industry has gained
advantage from design, others have responded. At some point, design
becomes a established tradition in the industry. This is the situation in
some areas of  glassware and porcelain industries, as well as fashion in-
dustry. To some extent, this also described car industry. Companies re-
spond to competitors’ design innovations by more design; if  they do not
follow suit, then their value may drop. Price competition becomes the
main tool in such situation.
This chapter asks whether there is evidence of  such historical process in
industries studied in this research. In particular, we focus on differences
between three industries.
- In consumer products, consumers’ emotions, experiences, as well as
fads and fashions play a crucial role in decisions concerning what is deemed
desirable and what is not (see Simmel 1990; Sassen 1991; Soja 2000;
Knuuti 2000, quoted in Chapter 1). The nearer the product is to con-
sumer products, the more importance aesthetic design features achieve.
- In contrast, in business-to-business sectors, professional buyers stress
features such as reliability, performance, cost-effectiveness, and main-
tainability. Professional buyers, well equipped conceptually and in terms
of  research, often use large sums of  money to buy systems rather than
isolated items.
- The health care/medical industry is located between these two indus-
tries. Its products are typically bought and used by professionals, but they
are used in situations in which lay public is present. Lay public brings its
aesthetic and moral judgements with it. The service environment may be
a key component in establishing a reputation in such semi-professional
industries.
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Design for these markets has to be different, just as design processes. In
the following we will examine why consumer goods manufacturing stress
design more than in the, say, machinery manufacturing industry. Later we
present some examples how designers and design take position in some
enterprises that were examined in the research.
Designing for Capital Goods Production: Product Design and Er-
gonomics
The competitive edge of  the design materialized in the product is af-
fected by the typical characteristics of  the context of  use. It is at least
partially affected by the physical measures of  the actual end product also.
We demonstrate this with two examples: paper mill machinery and heart
rate monitors, almost opposite extremes in terms of  intended use.
It is doubtful whether a manufacturer of  a paper mill machinery would
claim that products are foremost sold because of  their design, even there
would be some positive customer feedback supporting this conclusion.
Benefits achieved in productivity, rather than beautiful design are the client’s
reason for the acquisition. Design is one among various other conse-
quential factors, all components forming the product to the client’s satis-
faction. Beauty in machinery design is not the ultimate aim, but above all,
an additional advantage. As Richard Buchanan, citing George Nelson,
writes:
The creation of  beauty cannot be the aim. Beauty is one of  the
aspects of  appropriateness, and it still lies pretty much in the eye
of  the beholder, which makes it a by-product rather than a goal.
(Buchanan 1995: 54)
This rhetoric comment might very well also apply to aesthetics in the
machine industry. And, as we were told by one interviewee in the paper
machinery industry, claiming that design is the main factor affecting pa-
per machinery sales is to be doubted. This is a fitting hypothesis even
design is acknowledged as a competitive factor in capital goods manufac-
turing.
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Keeping the previous in mind, it can be suggested that in physically large
products such as paper machines design is divided into two components:
styling design (aesthetical aspects) and industrial design. Styling contributes
to the overall appearance of  the machine, whereas the more functionally
oriented industrial design improves usability in minor details and facili-
tates service on operation panels and other interfaces. For example, when
Valmet was developing a new user interface for their winder machine, the
design specification for the product development process was divided
into five sub-requirements that should be fulfilled in the final outcome:
-reliability
-usability
-easiness of projecting
-safety
-design
(Färm, Lehmusvaara, Keinonen 2000: 61)
These requirements could well include the word “design” in brackets
after each requirement. This shows how specific areas of  design are closely
contributing to the first four aspects mentioned, but that aesthetic factors
still provide the final touch. Design has a twofold position here: on the
one hand it is making the whole concept work, on the other hand it is
identified as giving the produced outcome its aesthetic appereance also.
The interface requires knowledge in ergonomics and usability (design),
but the physical design and its associated features require industrial de-
sign. Moreover, the user interface is a single component of  the machin-
ery, whereas the machinery could be left un-designed, if  desired.
The investment goods industry benefits from design as added value in
the product. The long-lived production commodities are always acquired
after careful consideration. A paper mill machinery is built to a definite
order to fulfil defined requirements to last decades and more. Trucks are
ordered and redeemed to solve material handling problems, enhance trans-
portation and logistics in warehouses and storages, but nothing else. In-
dustrial design in the machine manufacturing is not decisive if  it does not
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create also beneficial functional values. Paper machinery looks good if
the designer has managed to encase otherwise cluttered mechanical de-
tails, but this design improves nothing, if  these design panels hinder ser-
vice operations. Designed material handling systems in storages or ware-
houses are visually impressive, but their design must help their operators
to do their work more safely and effectively. Designed cockpits, opera-
tion levers and controls in a truck are a definite sales argument, as long as
the solutions are also ergonomically correct and functioning. The balance
between usability and design is accentuated in capital goods. As said, bad
design can spoil any product, but good design is not able to save an
otherwise bad product.
Designing for Businesses When Consumers Are in Contact with
the Product
When medical equipment and machine industry products are compared
from the design philosophy point of  view, there are notable similarities.
Intensive care monitors, defibrillator devices and dental units are not only
designed but also marketed using features such as functionality, usability
and hygiene as competitive arguments. This is quite natural. In intensive
care rooms or in first aid stations, where the ergonomically positioned
switches, easily usable cord, tube and lead connections and displays read-
able instantly often equal the question between life and death, ergonomic
design is indeed important. Cleaning and hygiene are essential in medical
technology, so design must facilitate them. This must be taken into con-
sideration during the design process by reducing the amount of  joints,
seams and separate panels.
While perhaps not so critical, dental units are everyday tooling for den-
tists, so the unit must be easy, effective, hygienic and safe to operate. As
in intensive care equipment, also dental stations are subject to constant
cleaning and disinfection and surface design must facilitate this. External
dental consultants can help in defining the product requirements. Dentist’s
work requires bending and standing in various positions so these must be
taken in consideration in the design process. Design must facilitate the
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possibility for the dentist to work without an assistant. Differences be-
tween cultural environments must be taken into consideration also. In
some countries it is conceived indecent for the dentist to work too close
to the assisting nurse. Furthermore, it is preferrable in some environ-
ments to place the equipment trays out of  sight,  especially from a timid
patient’s point of  view. The positioning of  instrument trays outside the
patient’s field of  vision, comfortable seating, and an uncluttered appear-
ance all enhance confidence, which is always an important factor when
medical treatment is in question. Computer tomography equipment re-
quires even more careful and considerate designs, as patients are already
under great stress and concerned about the possible findings. Clients evalu-
ate service not just by how professionals act, but also by the environment
of  the clinic.
Design has not been a particularly important factor in this line
of  business. However, its importance is growing. In America
and in Europe, people in hospitals have in no uncertain terms
told that equipment should “look nice.” One of  our competitors
has products that are popular because users say they “look cool,”
and even populistic, even though their measured performance
on paper is not so great. On the other hand, clients do not always
dare to say that aesthetics is important... in practice, they appre-
ciate design aesthetics in equipment. (Chief  engineer, medical
technology industry)
However while for example smooth and seamless surfaces contribute to
hygiene and cleaning, colors may contribute the patient is feeling of  com-
fort. Further aesthetic oriented designed features, such as colored panels,
surface treatment or decorative materials and graphics are usually sec-
ondary aspects in the medical equipment business. They may have their
effect in case there are several products on offer, all having equal perfor-
mances features or auxiliary equipment. As stated previously, for example
some dentists prefer to choose the dental unit’s colors to match the colors
of  their office, but foremost these are personal choices. There is no deci-
sive evidence that these requirements are taken into serious consider-
ation, or that they are standard procedures in public health service. It is
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more apparent that apart from the mentioned cases they seldom have
actual effect in the initial go/no-go purchase decision.
Aesthetic Value and Design in Consumer Goods Production
In consumer goods manufacture aesthetic design gains more foothold.
There are various articles where the aim of  design is to enhance function-
ality in addition to the advantages gained from visually attractive design.
Many everyday household appliances incorporate design mainly to attract
the potential customer casually browsing in the shops.
Among the researched products are wrist-worn heart rate monitors. Con-
taining state-of-the-art technology, these are interesting examples of  both
consumer and not-so-consumer products. A wrist-worn heart rate moni-
tor is probably sold on the basis of  its purpose and functions, while
purely aesthetical or fashion oriented aspects of its design affect the
customer’s decisions too. Today, there are many manufacturers and brands
available.
Previously, heart rate monitors were merely intended as information-pro-
viding tools for accurately controlling and analyzing a professionally in-
clined workout program. Today these have become an article of  fashion
and indicator of  certain lifestyle as well. Heart rate monitors are sold in
sporting equipment shops selling also constantly changing fashionable
clothing and sporting articles (see Kotro and Pantzar 2001). Consequently
in the consumer’s mind, designed equipment is quite automatically linked
to fashion issues.
There is nothing new about this, as the sales in most consumer goods and
products are largely dependent on the trends in fashion and the fluctua-
tions in the markets. Moreover, for heart rate monitors the future looks
good, as a healthy lifestyle is an growing trend. Competition between
firms is increasing and a functionally attractive design is needed to differ
products from rival ones.
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When there is nothing to follow, consumer tastes can be created. The best
examples are found in the fashion world, but other product lines can be
utilized for this as well. In these processes industrial design and especially
styling gains increased importance. The Sony Walkman is a good ex-
ample of  how top management innovation and effective product devel-
opment processes together build successful products. When Sony intro-
duced the Walkman in 1979, actually only four months after the creation
of  the initial concept idea of  a small portable cassette player with head-
phones instead of  loudspeakers, and it became an instant market hit.
Similarly, as Caterpillar has come to mean all tracked bulldozers in gen-
eral, the name Walkman become synonymous with portable personal au-
dio - it has become a design “icon” (or, alternatively, “dominant design”).
Sony had managed to create an entire taste, later broadening into several
varieties, actually transforming to a lifestyle culture (Kunkel 2000: 42). In
the Sony Walkman story it is notable, how the managemental influence to
the actual process was especially important. The Walkman’s primary idea
was developed in the top management level (Kunkel 2000: 42).
Changing Markets and the Role of  Design in the Process: Two
Case Studies
As we have seen in the three previous chapters, design is conceived dif-
ferently in the medical and machine industry than in consumer products.
The design of  instruments and machines is largely evaluated according
to the benefits it brings to the user, may these be economical, ergonomical
or work safety issues. In the consumer market, fun is a new dimension of
diffrentiation. Designers of  consumer products are more often involved
in strategic design related issues such as marketing. In the business-to-
business production they participate in the design process, but seldom in
the basic engineering, or marketing decisions, either. The more strictly
the company is in the business-to-business context, the more designers
work mainly on product design.
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In the following part, two cases are presented as examples of what hap-
pens when companies reorient themselves from a focus on technology to
a more customer-oriented market. Design has gone through a series of
changes simultaneously.
Kone Corporation: From Machinery to Service Production
“In the 1970s, the products of  Kone were traditional machine
shop products, in which there was virtually no design involved.”
Kone Corporation is, according to the company’s official website, one of
the three leading companies in the global elevator and escalator business.
The use of  industrial design at Kone began in the eighties. We were told
that one reason for utilizing the services of  designers was to create more
coherent product lines: before the eighties elevators were more or less
“tailored” to meet  the building requirements at a given time. Technologi-
cal innovation is ranked high at Kone. Today the company is positioning
itself  much more among service enterprises than machine manufacturer.
Excluding special assignments, elevators are often designed on a plat-
form basis.
The organization of  industrial design inside the company is reduced to
the minimum: they use consultancies. There are not many financial re-
straints for using design, and this practice is mostly maintained because
of  other profitability reasons. External consultancies fit the practice of
industrial design at Kone.
In the vertical transport business industrial designers have more restricted
possibilities when compared to architects and architecture, another sig-
nificant factor defining the visual outcome of  the design process. Since
elevators are always components of  larger complexes, buildings etc. the
visual relationship between the work architects and designers do is al-
most inseparable. Whereas architects evaluate the wholeness and the
aesthetical fit between elevator and building, industrial designers are left
with less possibilities. Many laws and regulations dictate the product out-
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come and the possibility to execute design in its aesthetic form is always
somewhat limited. The available space in elevator, with floor area often
totalling only a few square meters, restraits the more exotic design pro-
posals. At Kone it is also conceived, that  architects are often better at
understanding and controlling the restricted entity of  space available.
Architects often design the elevator chassis interiors. Moreover, famous
architects can be used as references in marketing.
When architects are involved in the elevator chassis design process in a
holistic way, industrial designers working in the same projects, concen-
trate on usability and ergonomics in the user interface area and other
control components: lighting, fixtures and the like. As in many other forms
of  capital goods manufacturing, also in elevators successful design often
remains quite invisible, even inside the chassis, while shortcomings in
design are easily detected by one being transported.
Polar Electro: From Hi-Tech to Fashionable Consumer Products
Polar Electro manufactures heart rate monitors and other high-tech equip-
ment for personal training purposes. Design is considered as core com-
petence at Polar. In Polar’s philosophy their products are seen as tools for
training rather than decorative objects. The heart rate monitor markets is
highly competitive, and design is seen as part of  the product, not an
absolute value, but it must be incorporated in otherwise meticulous prod-
uct design. This makes an interesting comparison, as the value of  design
at Polar is somewhat similarly conceived as in the machine industry, where
plain decorative design is seen unfavorable as it does not enhance the
product’s overall functionality.
However, the situation has changed. International competitors such as
Nike and Reebok have entered the market, and sports have gone through
a change. In the 1970s and 1980s, the market was adequately served with
products for heart rate monitoring, today the scene has changed, and
product appereance has become more important:
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Our advantage has been technological. Competitors have cho-
sen either design or price, or both as their strategy. However, we
have to be careful that products look good... People are adamant
what comes to this type of  product. Previously, our products
were seen by customers as devices for physical workout, but the
sports market has changed as a whole. Today, sports shops are
largely clothing shops in which you sell fashion that changes
several times a year. You have to be able to react to that market...
Product appereance are not the only important factor, technical
quality has to be there as well. Still, you look for a certain trendiness.
It is nice to have a product that communicates to a person that
it is nice to wear the monitor on his arm. Today, heart rate
monitor acts as a wrist watch outside practice. Previously, prac-
tice was all that mattered. Surely, it is the aim of  design that
people wear products also outside practice settings. (Marketing
manager, Polar Electro)
Designers are brought into the product development processes in the
quite early stages. Consumer surveys and focus groups research are often
conducted prior to this. Design and product development departments
are physically positioned close to each other and informal communica-
tion and meetings are encouraged. Clashes between personnel in differ-
ent departments are understood, and these are primarily taken as a con-
structive part of  the process. Principally, decision making in product de-
velopment processes takes place at the marketing management level, but
designers are able to do decisions concerning design issues. At Polar, we
were told, design activities are externalized and much of  the design-work
is performed by consultancies. It is noteworthy that consultancies are
used when there are not enough internal resources. As with decision
making, the in-house designers do not usually participate in other process
activities than design, but they act as coordinators between Polar’s inter-
nal design activities and consultancies. However, the two in-house de-
signers are mainly used in major or ground-up product development pro-
cesses,.
Polar products are communicated effectively with visually coherent ad-
vertising and marketing. It is desired that packages and products together
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communicate a similar message. In advertising, matching commercial
material with the products is seen as a natural continuum to the initial
product development process.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have explored the hypothesis that design process and
outcome are considerably different depending on whether they take place
in the consumer product or in business-to-business industry. We have
studied how consumer production, often dependent on rapidly changing
fashion attributes, emphasizes shorter product life cycles. Finally we have
examined, how design has been positioned in some of  our research sub-
ject companies.
While much work is done for improved usability and quality, in many
areas of  consumer production e.g. household appliances, designers work
also with superficial styling and additions. In the business-to-business
products area, design contributes to the overall performance of  the prod-
uct. It can be claimed that design often gains more reasonability in the
investment goods production. Such important issues as operation, func-
tionality, usability and safety actually hinder excessive designs. If  design
does not first fulfil these requirements, it is considered more insignifi-
cant. Aesthetic refinement is important today, but only after other prob-
lems in the product development process have been solved. Nowadays,
companies are interested in investing in designed equipment. While a
uniform design in production lines or in production tools altogether not
only looks good and benefits the overall tidiness, it has its effects in in-
creased pride of  work and productivity. The warehouse workers, “at the
start of  the shift, sprinting to be the one to spend the day aboard a Crown
truck,” are a good indicator of  this.
This is not the whole story. While the overall consciousness of  the ben-
efits of  industrial design is rapidly expanding also inside the capital goods
industry, there are still some opposite views to be found. In these views
the primary emphasis is on the engineering of the product instead of on
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incorporating design and styling in a holistic way into the process. To
some extent this seems to be apparently due to pure skepticism about the
value of  design. However, the marketing value in design is marked, and
in certain cases it can be the decisive factor if  several products of  similar
technological properties are available.
Is there, then, evidence of  design becoming an institutionalized means
of  competition in industries studied here (DiMaggio and Powell 1983)?
Apparently, this is not the case in machinery. We purposefully selected
companies with an established design reputation, but found that indus-
trial design in these companies is still mainly limited to product design. In
consumer goods, design is utilized more widely, but still there are few
companies in which design is involved not just in early product develop-
ment and in product family development, but also in strategic decision-
making. Industrial design, then, is not an institutionalized means of  com-
petition in the industries studied here. Instead, industrial design is
underutilized as a competitive means in many key industries. Even in
more design mature industries, there are still gains to be obtained from
more intensive and systematic use of  design.
Chapter 9 shows how a company works in an industry in which high
quality of  design is not just a competitive advantage, but also a necessity,
if  the company wants to be successful.
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Design does not evolve in isolation from the rest of  society. Occasionally,
designers are also involved in shaping society and culture at large. For
example, Olivetti designers were active in the academic world and the art
world of  Milan, and they created not only design, but also concepts and
theories for understanding design. Similarly, Peter Behrens was an influ-
ential figure in the art world and through his architecture, also in the
German government. Louis Kalff  was actively involved in setting up a
professional body for Dutch designers. Even today, prominent designers
lead professional associations, and influence the environment through
their practical, artistic, and professional activities in many ways. They are
also involved in policy formulation in those countries in which the gov-
ernment is actively involved in design.
Through their designs and activities, designers create an understanding of
what design has to offer. The ideas and arguments formulated by the
design world influences the economy indirectly. As noted in Chapter 3,
one good way to understand this reflexive loop is provided by the institu-
tional perspective proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). This per-
spective focuses on how generalized perspectives such as government
policies and professional activities guide activities across the economy. They
call these perspectives isomorphic forces, and classify these into coercive,
mimetic, and normative forces.
- coercive isomorphism (mainly government policy): With few historical
examples (see Korvenmaa 2001), governments have pushed design into
national agendas in the 1990s (Korea, Norway, Denmark, Finland, U.K.)
- mimetic isomorphism (companies react to each other). With proceeding
globalization, markets for investment goods and consumer tastes have
become increasingly global from the late 1980s onwards although some
countries and industries have been trailblazers before that
- normative isomorphism (professionalization) goes back several decades.
Industrial designers have organized themselves mainly since the 1960s.
In some industrial countries this process has taken place earlier and this
process still continues. At least one feature of  this process is evident in
previous chapters: the skills of  industrial designers are fairly standard-
ized, ranging from product design through ergonomics and usability to
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concept design and, today, increasingly to business skills associated with
strategic management.
For complex professionalized areas of  economy, DiMaggio and Powell’s
model provides us with a suitable framework conceptually rich enough
for understanding design. In particular, it does not offer only an eco-
nomic explanation of design. Economic explanations focus only on mi-
metic isomorphism: companies react to each other, and copy models from
each other. Of  course, this view is partially true. Some companies have
differentiated themselves from competitors with high quality and design,
and others respond to that by investing in design, which creates others
possibilities to compete with price, and so forth.
However, it is important to note that design does not evolve merely within
companies as a response to the market place, but that it also responds to
other societal pressures such as policy and professional structures and
activities. As policy and mass media publicize design, it becomes a thing
to be considered in company decision-making. The result of  these vari-
ous pressures is an organizational field that is interdependent, though not
isomorphic, as DiMaggio and Powell argue, although some isomorphisms
flow from professional activities. Rather, these fields have isomorphic
islands that differ from each other, but are interlinked into a system, no
matter how loosely coupled it may be.
This chapter elaborates the analysis presented in Chapter 8 by tracing
some of  the tensions between organizational rationalities and these dis-
cursive openings. It was in the 1990s that all the various isomorphic forces
worked simultaneously to push design into the forefront in several indus-
trialized countries. This should be seen in our data as well: more compa-
nies should have decided to choose a design-oriented strategy instead of
a technology-based or a price-based strategy. How have companies taken
action in response to this renewed discursive environment?
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The Changing Faces of  Design after the Eighties
According to our data, a watershed in understanding industrial design is
a fairly recent phenomenon. The important line is between the 1980’s and
the 1990’s. During and before the eighties design in machine manufactur-
ing was mainly considered a secondary artistic activity with little or no
commercial benefit for the industry. It was commonly believed that de-
sign is something merely suitable for artistic craftsmen making pots, pans
and one-off  products.
Considering the traditional imagery of  design and designers during the
1960’s and 1970’s is considered this is no surprise. For example, Finnish
Design was crafts-oriented and construed as such in the public (Takala-
Schreib 2000; Kalha 2000). It produced often unique, quality goods for
household use. Thus, as a notion, as well as in practice, industrial design
was relatively unknown, at least from the point of  view of  the heavy
industry. In Finland, for instance, the first “real” industrial designer (and
lecturer in industrial design), who worked in heavy industry was Börje
Rajalin, who designed electric motor casings for Strömberg Oy (now ABB
Finland) in the late fifties (Hoffman 1989: 392).
Meanwhile, in the more design-aware companies, understanding the op-
portunities of  industrial design was still an interpretation of  the tradi-
tional or basic linear product development model., The simplified role of
design in the process is as follows: instead of  participating in the product
development from the initial beginning, designers, perhaps called “the
company artists,” were, in the finals stages of  the concept, often requested
to “curve the edges” and give the new product an attractive color.
We were willing to change our previous practice, in which the
process and mechanical engineering was accomplished first and
only after that the designers were allowed to curve edges and add
color. Changing the long-established practice resulted in good
deal of  opposition; it was not understood what it was all about.
Only after a while we began to understand design. (Senior Vice
President, machine manufacturing industry)
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In practice, these tasks were realized by the designers when it was found
necessary to do so. In the meantime, designers were asked to work on
whatever other development projects and design they were assigned into.
This was rather easy, as most designers had more or less a mixed-bag-
type of  education at the time. These stories quite equally cover also the
other areas surveyed in this research, including medical equipment indus-
tries. During the era, industrial design was somewhat alienated from the
general product development scene. This affected the consultant busi-
ness also. As a result contacts between the “newly-born” design consulta-
tion professionals and companies producing investment goods were made
only occasionally.
However, the progress in establishing national design education programs
and especially the ideas of the benefits of highly rationalized design,
distinctive to the 1970’s, brought also ergonomics into the game. The
famous West-German HfG Ulm, considered as one of  the most impor-
tant design schools since Bauhaus had been closed in 1933, had a signifi-
cant role in this. The focus of  the Ulm design was a way of  introducing
a collection of  scientific methods and techniques into design (Buchanan
1995: 41). The result was rational, socially acceptable design where “in-
dustry is (was) the central agency shaping culture” (Buchanan 1995: 40).
The German influence in design with its revolutionary principles, gained
strong foothold in other European countries, also in the Finnish design
environment. Exporting rational, ergonomical issues into the Finnish in-
dustry began largely in medical equipment area. Ergonomical design was
more or less one of the first aspects of industrial design to surface into
the business. But it would take another decade before the machine indus-
try would make acquaintance with industrial designers.
The Growing Importance of  Design in the Nineties
The beginning of  the 1990s brought a rapid expansion in design. The
medical equipment business had at least casually exploited the benefits
of  industrial design in the 1980s, but design in the machine industry had
been scarce and aesthetic aspects were allowed to enter the industry only
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a decade later. The most obvious reasons for the growing importance of
design in the 1990s is government policy: several industrial nations
launched a design policy almost simultaneously. These countries include
U.K., Denmark, (South) Korea, Sweden, Norway, and Finland.
This reaction has taken place across industries and countries. According
to our data, the main reasons for this change are mimetic in DiMaggio
and Powell’s (1983) terms. Stakeholders in companies see that since little
competitive advantage can be won by technical improvements in a cost-
effective manner, other means of  competition have to be sought. Design
offers one possible strategy for such differentiation.
The meaning of  design to the business has been intensifying
after the mid-nineties. Previously, products only had to fulfil
certain technical specs while in design angularity equalled design
policy. Today soft contours are favored. Along with the co-
operation we’ve found proper functionality to our products, but
good looks have been accentuated as well. A product needs to
be good-looking. Because of  our clients and competition design
has progressed in this area of  business. (Director, Customer
services, machine manufacturing industry)
In principle, it is still possible to gain advantage from technol-
ogy... However, we are approaching a situation in which prod-
ucts are technologically on par with those of  our competitors.
Traditionally, it is design that differentiates products then. (De-
sign manager, Consumer products)
According to this construction, previously there had been no need to
build strategies on design: only few competitors were utilizing design in
their products. Designers were still merely considered as color stylists.
Deciding color schemes was the refinement, if  there were any “artistic”
requirements present. On the other hand there was a certain unfamiliarity
with design issues among designers altogether.
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Not surprisingly, the phenomenon of  rather sudden transition was appar-
ently being a direct derivative from the growth of  the general acceptance
in the benefits of  industrial design in Finland. First, there was resistance
to do so, as design has been generally considered as something artistic,
carrying non-rational, engineering-hostile, non-measurable elements. In
some occasions design was thought to be not belonging in the industry
environment at all and hence its acceptance into the business has been
slow, resulting in a traditional design process. Design was surrounded by
unsolved mysticism.
It used to be that design created a mystique, a magic... while
design is today becoming a commodity... that is traditional de-
sign, in which the client describes a new product idea to a de-
signer, who then makes the product look nice by giving it a visual
design. (Vossoughi 2000: 51)
Gradually, when the manufacturing organizations in the machine-manu-
facturing industry competing for same market shares had technically
reached same levels with each other, it was necessary to differentiate the
products. And when the notion design became “fashionable” in the ma-
chine-manufacturing industry, the door was wide open. Having said this,
however, it must be stated, it is only surprisingly late, in the mid – 1990’s
that design has been understood as a valuable competitive advantage. But
still while design is considered a strategic asset in many companies, is de-
sign really strategic? Perhaps the strategic meaning of  design actually
means it is important, ensuring the product is attractive to consumers, but
this kind of  design is unlikely to be strategic, as Wynn (2000) suggests.
There is indeed scepticism around.
Companies are beginning to understand that design can affect
decision making on a strategic level. However, although you
hear  a lot of  talk from design firms about strategy, dig deeper,
and you discover their strategy is nothing more than placing
information on a chart, or adding pictures to a piece of  card-
board. They may be step further from traditional design but they
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are not on the path the design industry is following as a whole.
(Vossoughi 2000: 51)
This problem was also present in our research interviews. In many com-
panies design has been valued and understood, but the actual utilization
has often been minor. One problem is that the understanding what de-
sign is for, gets sometimes stuck in certain levels of  organization. It is not
enough that the managers stress design if  their subordinates do not think
so. Once again, the fluent flow of  information plays a distinctive role
here. These have been common problems in the Finnish industry until
recently.
Design was actually a minor component up until the late nine-
ties. We did employ some designers... on the other hand, foreign
contacts intensified due to our global activities... in fact, the
majority of  this growth has happened during last two-and-a half
years. (Industrial Designer, consumer electronics manufactur-
ing)
Among the reasons for this change of  attitude, our interviewees offered
several examples. In particular, these were prevalent in consumer elec-
tronics which leads the way towards more design in our sample. Design
may be the only way to communicate the key values of  the product to the
customer:
Designers have put their heads on the line in arguing that if  you
put a little more money for design, the consumer understands it.
If  you have hi-tech products, expensive technology inside, de-
sign has to support that. In our research we found out that
previously our products looked cheap: “how can you pay so
much for this product, which looks so cheap!” Our designers
have tried to communicate the idea that the product has to be
balanced with its package. The consumer is willing to pay be-
cause of  design, which also convinces him of  the hi-tech quality
of  the product... Previously, heart rate monitors have been a tool
Design, Isomorphism, and Variations between Industries
138
for those who work out - today, our strategy has changed, based
on how the product is experienced by customers. (Designer,
Consumer products)
Design also supports marketing, which finds it easier to focus on cus-
tomers. These values are in demand in markets driven by consumers in-
terested in fashion and emotional aspects of  products. As the marketing
manager of  Polar Electro says (Quoted more extensively in Chapter 8),
The sports market has changed... sports shops are largely cloth-
ing shops in which you sell fashion that changes several times a
year. You have to be able to react to that market [and] you look
for certain trendiness.
This is no news to sociologists and art historians who have been studying
consumption in the post-modern era in where products have become a
key for building identities and building distinctions between people (for
example, see Featherstone 1991: 86; Dormer 1998: 160 – 161, quoted in
Chapter 1). The work done by designers has become more diverse with
this development: some designers focus on technology, product design
and styling, while some are more involved in marketing and trendwatching.
As one of  our interviewees explained, there is increasing demand for
conceptual design. An ordinary user has to be able to use a product. “It is
not always important to think about only what technical qualities it is
possible to build into the product. Thinking in product development is
changing: products and design are understood in a more holistic way
today than previously” (Designer, Consumer products).
Isomorphic Pressures and Clashing Rationalities in Business-to-
business Industries
When we focus on consumer products alone, the message is clear: there
exists a trend towards a wider appreciation for design. The actual reasons
for such trend are unclear, although our data suggests for “mimetic”
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Companies react to their com-
Chapter 9
139
petitors’ design efforts, and increase their own design efforts in order not
to lose markets. However, there are no reliable comparative studies on
“coercive isomorphism,” although various governments have introduced
policies to enhance design over the past decades (for an overview of  the
Finnish situation, see Korvenmaa 2001). Also, it is difficult to evaluate
the importance of  “normative isomorphism” from our data: it is appar-
ent that managers follow trends in their line of  business, and get an idea
of  what is going on through their hobbies (see Kotro, forthcoming). It is
also apparent that the design world is important in producing frames and
promoting design in public. Finally, the role of  schools in managerial
education should not be underestimated. (see Joziasse 2000, and com-
pare this to the IDBM program at work in Helsinki).
Although it is impossible to evaluate the importance of  these various
sources of  isomorphism, it is still possible to pose a question: there exists
an understanding of  the importance of  design, and this understanding
has been grabbed by at least some companies in our sample. However,
our focus has been on consumer products that lead the way according to
all indications. How about other industries? As we saw in Chapter 8,
economic rationalities and histories in industries like machine are in many
ways different from consumer products. In the rest of  this chapter, we
focus on this question. We will study whether and how design discourse
affects these industries, despite their different economic basis and social
organization.
Design in Machine Manufacturing Industry
There is a notable difference in the usage of  design between the heavy
machine manufacturing industry and the production of  other investment
goods. While the machine manufacturing industry is utilizing industrial
design only partially in the form of  aestheticization, and in a lesser scale
in other aspects, the industry producing investment goods exploits de-
sign in full, using it to facilitate the realization of  such elements as usabil-
ity, ergonomics or functionality. Hence, the heavy machine´industry merely
uses design to add further value to its products, whereas the production
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of other investment goods exploits the “other” possibilities of industrial
design in depth.
However, machine is not separated from other economy. When the im-
portance of  design is articulated in public in the context of  consumer
products, how does the machine industry define the relevance of  design?
The answer to this question is a mixture of  stressing traditional hard
values such as ergonomics with new values such as usability and market-
ing.
Industrial design is not an absolute value in machine, but merely seen as
means of  achieving the values, usability or other functional aspects. In
addition, often the operators (end-users) are not aware or interested in the
possible advantages a design. They are “not that much interested” whether
a feature is actually designed or not, but are merely absorbed in the mat-
ter whether the product is practical enough. Furthermore, there are some
operators that are less interested in design matters altogether, as long as
the product fulfills the requirements for effective operation.
Do your customers require design?
No, not actually, our customers want to buy a good truck. Design
comes from ergonomics and usability.
Does the customer recognize a good-looking product is or not?
It depends, beauty is in the eye of  the beholder! Some are not
attracted by certain products, however all customers accept func-
tional and practical products. There are customers preferring
more traditional-looking equipment, they want that a machine
looks like a machine. For them this looks too futuristic. (Direc-
tor, Customer Services, machine manufacturing industry)
However, this is not the whole picture. When publicity is considered (see
Chapters 2 – 3 for publicity brought by Behrens for AEG), design is of
course appreciated and welcomed, both in the producing companies and
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among the operators. It is beneficial for the public image of  the company,
if  the equipment are attractive and modern. This understandably enhances
the company’s image as a credible supplier. An investment good in the
form of  a machine with good overall design and impressive visual ap-
pearance or designed features also easily attracts potential customers at
e.g. a trade fair.
What our customers want is proper machine that fulfills their
requirements in the manufacturing process. They are not
necessarily willing to pay much for design, but as a  whole, it does
affect indeed. Of course, if technical requirements are in order,
they take the design that is more attractive.
However, we do not have the capacity to cut prices because of
design. Design comes only after the proper engineering solu-
tions. Design helps us to differentiate: when we have good and
impressive machine it attracts customers at fairs to take a closer
look. So designed machine can be an eye-catcher as well. Our
worst competitors do not invest in design. We’ve been in the
business with designed products for twelve years now, but our
competitors have remained inactive. They aren’t following us.
When our competitor sees our machine, they probably think, it
is complicated and expensive to manufacture, and these thoughts
keep them from using design. As our rivals haven’t reacted at all,
design remains as a quite unique approach in this area of  busi-
ness. (Both quotations from the interview of  a Managing direc-
tor in the machine manufacturing industry)
The importance of  design has increased in the latter half  of  the
nineties... We do not focus solely on functionality, but also on
that the product looks good. Because of  customers, and because
of  competition, industrial design has been progressing even in
this industry... Design helps marketing. It is used – in a cold way
– as a bait in marketing. (Marketing executive, machine manu-
facturing)
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In one interview it was described how operators in a factory, proud of
their new casting machine, were taking snapshots of  the machine and
presenting the photographs to friends in a pub. Even if  this quotation is
of  anecdotal value, the more interesting point in the story is the evident
added value design creates. As the interviewee said, similar, but ordinary
looking machine was often “treated with a sledge hammer,” whereas
new, designed machine was a matter of  pride to the operators. In other
words, design had enhanced motivation, the professional pride of the
operators and thus, apparently productivity.
Customers have noticed (our design). For us, design has acted as
means of  differentiation from our rival companies. Afterwards
we have received positive feedback from our customers: it ap-
pears that designed machine and equipment is treated better
than standard machine. (Marketing manager, machine manufac-
turing industry)
While this accentuates a welcome progress in design knowledge in gen-
eral, the overall effects are still minor. It is doubtful if  this is anything else
but using design in a machine as a flagship element to conceal the fact
that the other products still would need to be re-designed.
As most of the customers do not recognize design, they do not
require design itself... but instead they want more comfort, ergo-
nomic features, quality, in all: solutions where design can fix the
problem. (Industrial Designer, machine manufacturing indus-
try)
In all, a certain segment of  the clientele in the machine industry are not
conscious of  design itself, but see the value of  design in improved ergo-
nomics, usability, publicity and marketing instead. The better usability,
enhanced by design is percolated thru their own professional experience
during operation of  the machinery. In such case successful design, easing
strain from work, remains otherwise “invisible.”
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Design Characteristics in the Medical Technology Industry
The machine manufacturing and medical high-technology equipment in-
dustries are similar when the overall philosophy of  producing long-term
investment goods is considered. Otherwise, the similarities are less easily
defined.
In the medical high-technology equipment industry, design is
first of  all harnessed to serve ergonomics, hygiene, usability, cost
reduction in production, and life-cycle costs. This is understand-
able, as design is always applied in environments where the user
needs of  both patient and medical staff  are specific. These
impose stringent responsibilities on designers and manufactur-
ers (Heskett 1989: 67).
It should be kept in mind that while the designed solution may incorpo-
rate aesthetics, in the design process plain aesthetical issues are treated
only after the former issues have been considered. This merges the ways
of  understanding design in both medical technology with machine manu-
facturing industry.
Design has not been a particularly important factor in this line
of  business. However, its importance is growing. In America
and in Europe, people in hospitals have in no uncertain terms
told that equipment should “look nice.” One of  our competitors
has products that are popular because users say they “look cool,”
and even populistic, even though their measured performance
on paper is not so great. (Chief  engineer, Medical equipment)
However, the customers are often hesitant to accept aesthetical
design as an important factor. “It is said: It is all the same how
they look like as long as they work well. And still, in practice all
customers appreciate design.” (Engineer, Medical technology
manufacturing)
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In the previous quotes our interviewee admitted styling-oriented design
possibly affects the go/no go decisions.  However, there is no distinct
evidence on how much plain aesthetics in design affect any purchase
decision in the medical technology, so it is difficult to determine if  this
really is the case. However, there are exceptions. Colors are nowadays
considered more closely. For example, as we were told in one interview
(in medical technology industry) the clientele has been more or less di-
vided in two groups, those, who prefer more technical-looking equip-
ment, and those, who prefer  aesthetically pleasing units with only “few
buttons.” Especially female dentists are nowadays fashion-conscious, and
prefer choosing attractive color combinations to their new dental unit.
This is interesting, as the majority of  all medical equipment have previ-
ously  been painted or moulded in white, a color facilitating hygiene and
symbolizing cleanness.
In the past it was customary to discuss only what would be the
utmost practical and functional environment in the dentist’s
clinic.” Nowadays, the aesthetical side of  design has gained
more importance. “The dentist’s room (clinic environment)
should look clean and tidy in a fresh manner. All instruments
should be designed to be compatible in this environment. (In-
dustrial designer, consultancy)
Furthermore, the aesthetically pleasing appearance benefits the patient.
The feeling of  discomfort during some medical examinations (e.g. during
dental care) can be reduced with a carefully designed, reassuring environ-
ment containing also aesthetically designed equipment. The quality of
design enhances the patient-practitioner relationship. Furthermore, the
excellence in ergonomic design mitigates the apprehension of  patients,
eases operation and thus helps to create an atmosphere of  confidence.
(Heskett 1989: 69) This kind of  design requires consulting of  profes-
sional personnel during the development stages to be succesful.
Where usability, comfort, and effectiveness of  operation are a
major concern, operator/user feedback in the early stages of  the
development process is important information. Consulting the
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operators and gathering first-hand information of  the pros and
cons is essential. For example, when Philips was developing the
MTCSS, Motorway Tunnel Control and Signalling System, a unit
consisting of  several control interfaces, the intended operators
of  the system were contacted early in the project to enhance the
development process and avoid mistakes in the earliest possible
stages. Furthermore, the project showed also the important role
of  industrial design in the user interface aspect. (Heskett 1989:
117)
While professionals are frequently consulted during the medical equip-
ment design processes, the experience feedback from medical equipment
operators should be considered important as well. However, there are
problems. If  the finished product functions well, feedback is apparently
difficult to obtain.  We were told that e.g. anesthesiologists are merely
interested in the functions the equipment provides, while it is the end-
users, for example nurses, who are interested how the actual design, over-
all usability, positioning of  switches, regulators and displays is realized. A
further complication to this is that various medical equipment, intensive
care unit monitors, defibrillators, X-ray equipment and the like are oper-
ated by the nursing staff, while equipment acquisitions are decided in the
health care managemental level, where all persons are perhaps not famil-
iar with medical issues at all.
In the personal health care section design understandably matters more,
as product marketing is supported with trends. Fashion aspects and at-
tractive design are increasingly important to the consumers.
We have to be discerning in order to make sure our products
look good. The real challenge for design is to fit the required
electronics inside the casing. People are quite critical when deal-
ing with these products (wrist-worn heart rate monitors): previ-
ously these were  merely seen as tools for training, but nowadays
sports markets have changed altogether. Today sporting equip-
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ment stores are constantly changing fashion outlets as well. We
must be able to react.” (Manager in marketing, consumer health
care medical equipment manufacturing)
The imagery of  wrist-worn heart rate monitors as tools to assist effective
training has changed and these are more and more used as everyday ob-
jects. Many have substituted ordinary watches with their wrist-worn heart
rate monitor. As it is with watches, also the monitors should make a
perfect match with one’s style. Hence, for the manufacturer, the impor-
tance of  design increases substantially.
Conclusions
Due to the intensifying competition, improvements in both education
and knowledge about design, and to the professionalization of  the field,
companies having operational activities then also began experimenting
with design and employing consulting designers in larger scale in the
1980s and the 1990s.
In terms of  DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) terminology, we find that
before the 1990s, industrial design had gone a long way towards norma-
tive isomorphism. In some industries - mostly traditional arts and crafts
industries - design had also become a means of competition: mimetic
processes had been at work. In addition, there had been isolated policy
efforts. The nineties saw increase in coercive isomorphism in several coun-
tries. Several industrialized countries have established design programmes
(see Korvenmaa 2001), and have thus started to compete with each other
with design. Simultaneously, new consumer industries have found that
design is increasingly important for their customers. Today, all three types
of  isomorphic processes are at work simultaneously for the first time,
pushing design into industry and policy agendas.
As this rough sketch shows, the importance of  design has grown towards
the new millennium because of  several partly overlapping tendencies.
However, there are industries in which tradition and prevailing economic
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rationalities hamper design. In particular, there are industries in which
customer perceptions are not driven by aesthetics and fashion, but by
economic investment thinking. Still, even in these industries, design has
gained a foothold, although stress is on skills such as ergonomics and
usability design rather than on aesthetics. Also, some limitations to our
conclusion stem from our research design. Ours was a benchmarking
data, which means that our deductions apply only to the design-intensive
end of  the market. Should we study small and medium-sized companies
(SMEs), our results would in all likelihood show more variation in the
uses of  design, and a generally low level of  usage. In any case, our data
shows that there is room for increasing the uses of  industrial design in
almost all industries.
Still, despite increasing education, the knowledge of  the meaning of  de-
sign and the position of industrial design especially in the Finnish ma-
chine-industry SME’s is still quite unclear. The majority of  machine-manu-
facturing companies in Finland are in the mid-size category, and in that
area of  business there are only relatively few examples to indicate how
successful design can promote and develop business. Without good ex-
amples of  good design to observe, these companies will continually re-
main the blind spot of design.
This affects and makes it difficult for the knowledge about design advan-
tages to circulate. It effectively prevents the chances of  successfully as-
suring the companies about the benefits design can bring into the busi-
ness. Furthermore, if  there is lack of  knowledge about design it can also
affect the investments made in design. However, if  the position of  de-
sign in the capital goods industries is vacillating, the overall situation is
not this grim. In this chapter we have discussed how well-adopted design
has been beneficial and used in various business patterns. But there are
differences in the ways design is understood and valued in the respective
industries. As industrial environments, capital goods production differs
and, where design is used to enhance usability and safety factors and
productivity, there are few indicators for plain aestheticization and styl-
ing.
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Styling can be considered belonging to the superficial elements added
only after designing the object has been benefited otherwise via design.
We are not saying that reasonable and functional design should equal
visually ugly semblance, on the contrary, but we suggest, that design has
various forms of  manifestation and these are accentuated differently, de-
pending of  the branch of  industry and the products in question.
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In previous chapters, we have studied the use of  design in two industries,
manufacturing and medical equipment and health care. We have seen that
with few exceptions, design does not play a major strategic role in them.
We have explored those differences and suggested a series of  explana-
tions for them. The main finding is that the central role of  design usually
derives from close interactions of  company management with designers.
What about when there is no doubt about the importance of  design,
design is seen as a central part of  the strategy of  the company, and it is
seen in many ways as an end as such? How is design organized then?
This chapter provides some preliminary remarks on this issue with a case
study of  a renowned designer company. The Italian design and manufac-
turing company Alessi is a successful case in design management for its
ability to time and again generate interest and to attract customers. Alessi
is also an exceptional case compared to the Finnish design context be-
cause of  its organization and the communication of  design. In this article
I analyze how the design organization works and discuss the understand-
ing of design within Alessi.
Company in brief
Alessi’s products are design products for the kitchen and table, the bath-
room, office and house. The roots of  their production are in the metal
tableware manufacturing at  Alessi’s own factory in Crusinallo, about 100
kilometers north-west of  Milan where their headquarters are located.
Together with stainless steel products Alessi has since the beginning of
1990’s designed and produced a range of  plastic products that have be-
come widely known. Their products are sold in Europe, USA, Japan and
Australia in Alessi’s own flag-ship shops, shop-in-shops and specialized
shops for kitchenware and gifts. The company’s turnover is 190 thousand
million liras (year 1999) which is equivalent to about 120 million Euros.
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Organization of Design
The Alessi company turned into a design factory in the 1950s, in the
period of  Carlo Alessi, the father of  the present managing directors Alberto
Alessi and Michele Alessi. Carlo Alessi was trained as an industrial de-
signer and before taking the responsibility for the firm in the fifties he
designed many of  the company’s products. As head of  the technical de-
partment, Ettore Alessi, the brother of  Carlo Alessi, started to collabo-
rate with external designers in 1955, which enhanced the design identity
of  the technical department.
During the same period an important innovation occurred in the materi-
als’ and stainless steel began to replace brass and nickel silver. Stainless
steel has since then been the basis for company’s design and manufactur-
ing competence. Fruit baskets and other stainless steel objects for hotel
and catering and trade made in collaboration with architects Mazzeri,
Massoni and Vitale commenced the design orientation of  Alessi. The
external designers of  the 1950s were yet not as celebrated as in the Alessi
brand nowadays. The first Alessi maestro was the famous Italian architect
Ettore Sottsass, who designed trays and condiment sets for Alessi in 1972.
Since then the Alessi brand has been associated with famous designers.
Alessi has no in-house designers. Alessandro Mendini has acted as a cen-
tral design consultant for the company since 1979. Alessi directly em-
ploys around five hundred people who work within manufacturing, ad-
ministration, sales, research and development. Office is the resource for
different phases in the product development. It is divided into different
sections as most companies, including a commercial department, com-
munications, export, administration, finance, design assistance, and ex-
ternal production and purchasing direction.
Designers are accepted to design for Alessi. In most cases it is decided in
the company that a new product within a category (for example coffee
makers) will be launched. As it sometimes happens, for example in the
case of  the famous lemon squeezer by Philippe Starck, designers come
up with a different object than was originally planned (according to the
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story, Starck was asked to design a tray when he sketched the squeezer
during a dinner in a restaurant). A product development process within
the company can take from two to six years, which is a fairly long time
compared for example to fashion business. New products, 250 items, are
launched twice a year.
Alessi has produced objects by over two hundred designers. Most of  the
designers are world famous: Ettore Sottsass, Richard Sapper, Achille
Castiglioni, Aldo Rossi, Michael Graves, Massimo Morozzi, Philippe
Starck, Stefano Giovannoni, Guido Venturini, Enzo Mari and Alessandro
Mendini.
Alessi has since 1970 enhanced its position as a company that combines
design and mass production successfully. Alberto Alessi’s role has since
then been to be “responsible for encouraging and harnessing the vast
body of  talent... as catalyst and conductor for the orchestra of  designer-
performers” (Sweet 1998:9).’ The ideas and explorations of  designers are
put before technical and economical restrictions.
The Design Philosophy – Business Based on Art and Poetry
Alessi’s design ideology has been built on two poles: on the one hand
through famous designers and on the other hand the key design concepts
that link products across various categories. These concepts are stated
philosophically: the aim is to discover the “panness” of  the pan, the
“oilcruetness” of  the oil cruet and the “coffeepotness” of  the coffee pot
(Meneguzzo 1996, 29). The aims of  a good design are set in enhancing
the well-being of  people by addressing their dreams, memories and sen-
sorial experiences (Alessi 2000). In the company’s design philosophy there
exists the “SMI” parameter, which stands for “Sensoriality-Memory-Imagi-
nation” (Alessi 1993). The other parameters in the  “formula of  success
are” (Sweet 1998: 11 – 12) price, function and communication.
Some of  the business failures are considered important experiments: for
example Philippe Starck’s Hot Bertaa, a kettle that does not work properly.
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These failures are turned into success in the way that shows where the
fine line between art and business currently lies: it is somewhere between
interesting new design and dysfunctional objects that no-one would buy.
This is the theory of  the borderline in Alessi (Sweet 1998: 11). The com-
pany has worked successfully within the fine line between art and busi-
ness. In that sense Alessi is not a traditional manufacturing organization.
Alberto Alessi’s policy is that the company works as a mediator:
Alessi is not a normal factory. I think it is an applied arts research
laboratory. We have devised a unique system of  harnessing the
talent of  the world’s most interesting designers, we call them
maestros, and encouraging them to make use of  and stretch our
technical expertise. We want  them to push our knowledge to the
extreme. Alessi’s role is to mediate between the most interesting
expressions of  creativity of  our times, and the dreams of  the
consumer. (Sweet 1998: 7)
Alessi’s ideology is built on the idea of  rethinking and redesigning daily
objects. Alberto Alessi (2000: 19) himself  explains his manifesto to be
“offering the consuming masses veritable artistic items at low prices”.
Daily objects are designed in exceptional ways either so that the design is
architectonic (stainless steel products) or so that the objects remind of
cartoon characters and toys (plastic products). The articulated core of  the
policy is to reconcile industrial needs in terms of  operations and prod-
ucts with the tendency to consider the company more as a ‘research labo-
ratory in the field of  the applied arts’ than an industry in the conventional
sense (see e.g. http://www.alessi.com).
During the 1990’s the company rejuvenated its design policy
partly by creating new product lines with young designers and
new materials. Prompted by a number of  consultants as well as
by our own curiosity, we felt the urgent need for an operation
that would attempt to balance the authoritativeness, expressive
impact and culturalization of  the projects developed for us by
the “great masters” in the 1980s. This would be done by intro-
ducing a more empathic, affective and confidential note into our
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catalogue. Of  course, it was not my intention to stand in any way
aloof  from those designs of  the ‘80s – indeed we are still work-
ing with great passion in that direction, which is central to Alessi’s
identity. Nor did I intend to look at any cost for novelty for
novelty’s sake. I simply wanted to make our catalogue a richer
and more balanced thing. My intention therefore was to explore
more explicitly and directly a number of  expressive keys, such
as play, memory and emotive involvement, that were in any case
certainly already present, though in a more hidden form, in the
works of  those designers. (Alessi 1993, 32.)
Recently, Alessi has been related in the media more to plastic production
than to steel that has for a long time been the company’s core compe-
tence. This is partly because the media brings plastic products in are col-
orful and therefore eye-catching illustrations and partly because plastic
products are comparatively inexpensive and their number of  sale is rela-
tively high. This however can be considered a problem for the company’s
image, since the company’s stainless steel production is based partly on
values contrary compared to the plastic production. Stainless steel is con-
sidered ecological because of its durability while plastic is considered
disposable material. Design of the stainless steel products is of high-
culture tradition while plastic products have their roots and reference in
popular culture. To hold the different categories and associations of  the
brand together is indeed the current challenge for Alessi design as well as
communication. In the next section I analyze how the Alessi brand has
been created, what are the key elements and continuities of  the brand that
hold “Alessi” together.
How “Alessi” is Created – Conceptualization and Communication
of Design
Not only products themselves communicate design concepts. Product
categories and names enhance the general idea of  design. The company’s
production usede to be divided into four sub-units. 1) Mass produced
industrial products made of  stainless steel and plastic were marketed un-
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der the label ‘Alessi’. 2) ‘Officina Alessi’ referrred to research and experi-
mentation and products that are made of metal, stainless steel and pre-
cious metals. 3) ‘Twergi’ covered wooden products and 4) ‘Tendenze’
porcelain and glass products.
A new product classification was introduced in the year 1999 when all
the products were produced under the name ‘Alessi’. The major classifi-
cation groups are now 1) The Years 50 – 60, 2) Authors’ Families (e.g.
Sottsass, Castiglioni, Graves etc.), 3) The Other Authors (eg. Arad,
Morrison, Newson etc.), 4) Historical Re-edition 5) Family Follows Fic-
tion and 6) Memory Containers. These categorizations appear e.g. in The
Dream Factory, a review of  the company’s history and production by
Alberto Alessi.
Alessi has created an ideology of  design that is expressed consistently in
every medium of  communication from books to package cavaliers (the
leaflets that support objects in packages). Members of  the organization
respect and share the definitions of the company policy that originate
from stories of  the past and are enhanced through the charisma of  its
current leaders.
I would argue that together with the products themselves the main ele-
ments which constitute what “Alessi” is, are therefore the designers, mae-
stros, history (tradition), family and the character of  Alberto Alessi. These
elements are consciously and constantly communicated in products, books
and in shops that sell the company’s products.
Their marketing strategy is interesting. Alessi has a reasonable amount of
advertisements in design and architecture magazines as well as in travel-
lers’ magazines, for example airlines magazines. What is notable is that
advertising is not the main function of  communication. Instead of  that
Alessi products attract a lot of  publicity in life style magazines columns.
Alessi gives away a lot of  material on new products and their own publi-
cations are made to high quality standards. Launching new products is
news for the design and architecture scenes as well as it is news for con-
sumers.
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The Italian Tradition – History, Family and maestros
History is told and retold in the same manner in different occasions: in
books and in interviews and seminars. History is a story, which builds the
identity and culture of  the company members and consequently commu-
nicates company values to the public.
The company was founded 1921 by Giovanni Alessi. During the nine-
teen-twenties and thirties copper, brass, and nickel silver tableware, and
household objects were the main products.
Grandpa Giovanni was a talented sheet-metal worker. In 1921
he bought a plot of land at Omegna and founded Alessi. He
started handmaking objects for the table and for the home in
copper, brass, and nickel silver, which were then either nickel-,
chrome- or silver-plated. Grandpa was a real stickler for quality
and for work well done: the things he made quickly won acclaim
for their workmanship and perfect finish. (Alessi 2000:8.)
One of  the central characters of  the company is early history as well as
of  the start for design-orientation in the company history, was Carlo Alessi,
Giovanni Alessi’s eldest son who was trained as industrial designer. He
designed the majority of  new products from the mid-thirties up until the
mid 1940s. In the fifties, he became Chief  Executive of  the company and
together with his brother Ettore he began to call in free-lance designers.
During the war years Alessi produced stars for uniforms and mechanical
parts for aeroplanes. After the war, Alessi’s mass production was enhanced,
partly because of  the demand for brass ladles for the U.S. army and hence
the decision to double the number of  machine tools. In the Year 1970
Alberto Alessi, Carlo Alessi’s eldest son was given responsibility for de-
sign management. His brother Michele – nowadays managing director
together with Alberto – and the third brother Alessio Alessi, is the com-
mercial director. Their cousin Stefano Alessi also works in the company
as the chief  of  the department for external production and purchasing
direction.
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The company’s history is a history of  a family. This should be understood
as part of  the Italian cultural context where family bonds have been and
still remains close and important (Kicherer 1990: 77; see also the case of
Olivetti in this report).
Along with the family and the managing directors, great emphasis is placed
on the designers who are brought to the front in the production as well in
the public material:
“I prefer... to work with the most cultivated, experimental – and
let’s face it – perhaps the most difficult designers. Nevertheless,
on analyzing the story of  Alessi designs, I must admit that our
best quality designs have also been the ones most appreciated by
the public, that have been understood and welcomed by largest
numbers of  people.”(Alessi 1993:34)
There is a mutual respect between the company management, especially
Alberto Alessi, and the designers. As the French designer Philippe Starck
(1989), one of  the most successful designers who has worked with Alessi,
describes, the cooperation is dependent on the character of  Alberto Alessi:
Je ne travaille pas avec Alessi, je travaille avec Alberto Alessi. Je
ne travaille pas avec des sociétes, je travaille avec des humains.
Seul le fait de jouer au projet m’intéresse et le résultat n’est
qu’accessoire. Alberto Alessi est un grand joueur et cela me
suffit.
I do not work with Alessi, but with Alberto Alessi. I do not work
with a company, I work with humans. The only thing that inter-
ests me in a project is to take part in it, not the result. Alberto
Alessi is a great gambler and that is enough for me. (-TK)
Alessi relies on the designers’ capacity to tell stories through in the prod-
ucts, to give something that customers want. In this sense Alessi is a
traditional company offering products to markets. But it has also been
visionary with the conception of  role of  the designer. The ideas that have
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been trendy in business books around the turn of  the century were present
ten years earlier in the design policy of  the company. The creative author
telling stories appealing to memories and feelings were the findings among
business consultants all over the world, but they are also the main themes
in Alessi publications from the early 1990’s.
Alberto Alessi’s visions both inside and outside the organization hold the
Alessi brand together for their part. Alberto Alessi is a design manager an
sich even though he is trained as a lawyer. His interest is in the same
subjects and texts that are discussed within universities in semiotics, phi-
losophy, sociology and organizational studies. His texts continuously aim
to discuss the socio-cultural contexts of  the company’s production and
the philosophy behind the objects. Brand-wise the problem with this is
again the communication of  abstract and intangible elements of  the com-
pany. Some of  the intended meanings are communicated to the public by
products themselves, and the character of  Alberto Alessi. However, a
very marginal public is familiar with the texts and books published by the
company or Centro Studi Alessi. The company has tried to articulate
diverse standpoints in production through launching experimental projects,
the metaprojects, through which new products have been developed and
marketed.
Other Strategies for Articulating Design Policy – The Metaproject
An important mediator of  the Alessi identity and philosophy have been
the metaprojects. These are implemented for the most part through the
Centro Studi Alessi, The Alessi Research center. Centro Studi Alessi, Family
Follows Fiction (F.F.F.) and a project called 100% Make Up have main-
tained, reformulated and communicated the Alessi corporate brand iden-
tity.
Centro Studi Alessi, The Alessi Research Center, was established in 1990.
Nowadays the actual Center does not exist anymore, but the director of
the Center still works as a consultant for the company.
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The main purposes of  the Center were to publish theoretical papers on
topics that are connected with objects and to coordinate collaboration
with young designers, who approach the company with new design ideas.
The Center was run by Laura Polinoro, with her background in semiotics
and sociology. The research center explored questions similar to ques-
tions often raised among culture studies: What is the role of  an object? What
is it that changes its form, in the perception we have of  it and in its use? How does an
object become a cultural subject? (Polinoro 1991: 12) The activity of  cultural
research is not easily communicated to wider audience. However it seems
to be an important resource for the Alessi identity within the firm, and is
clearly expressed in the interviews with company members who referred
to the interest of  Alessi to do research not only on materials but also on
the semantic and poetic aspects of  products. Even though the Centro
Studi Alessi does not physically exist any more, the ideas developed to-
gether with managers and the center still live within the company through
publications and the consultant role of  the former director of  Centro
Studi Alessi.
Workshops organized by the research center had the main function of
communicating with young designers. Workshops have been held with
students in numerous countries, including Finland.
Memory Containers was another metaproject coordinated by Centro Studi
Alessi. The idea was to bring women designers to the male tradition of
design at Alessi. 200 young women designers from different countries
were asked to design objects and the aim of  the project was to answer the
questions such as how objects change when they are moved from one
culture into another and how an object becomes cultural. “This was an
exploration into the archetypes of  presentation and the ‘offering’ of  food
and its rituals, with inspiration coming from the memory of  a culture or
a personal experience” (Alessi 2000: 104).
Metaprojects are not always directed at changing or adding new ideas to
production, as was the case of  the metaproject Family Follows Fiction
that started plastic production in the beginning of  1990’s. One metaproject
that did not have clear connection to production was 100% Make Up,
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which clearly articulates the role of  the designers as artists within Alessi.
One hundred “authors” were asked to decorate identically shaped vases
and these vases with the signatures of  the designers are presented in the
showroom of  the head office communicating the art and the author be-
hind the business.
These projects can be considered cultural activities that have enhanced
and rejuvenated the design policy of  the company through research of
cultural phenomena and theoretical approach and through working with
young design students from different cultures. Metaprojects have there-
fore been important for the reflexivity and also cultural responsiveness
of  the Alessi organization. Metaprojects have had their effect on manu-
facturing as they started for their part new product categories that still
form a great share of  Alessi’s production.
Art and Business – Together with Markets
However, the communication of  “Alessi” is not a one way process from
the designers through the company to the consumers. What I therefore
wish to argue here, is that the thorough knowledge of  different cultural
landscapes and responsiveness to changing environments has been the
cornerstone for the company’s success. The term cultural landscape of  a
product refers here to the totality of  cultural interpretations and mean-
ings that are related to a specific product and the tradition that it comes
from (see Kotro & Pantzar 2001).
Alessi succeeds in binding art and business because it is done in a clever
and credible manner. Under one brand there are at least three attracting
cultural landscapes that are well understood by the company. First there
is the Italian tradition of  handwork and taste appealing to customers
which appreciate the value of  the product both in the material and se-
mantic sense. These customers purchase Alessi products because they
are familiar with and appreciate Italian culture and Alessi represents con-
tinuity of  tradition and high culture. A sip of  espresso made with Aldo
Rossi’s La Cupola stands for the wondrous landscape of  Italian Alps and
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the traditional Italian kitchen. These customers can afford to buy the
most expensive Alessi products, cutlery, pots and pans made of  stainless
steel. They value the exceptional aesthetics, cultural specifity and the du-
rability of  the products.
At the other end of  customers are those who do not know so much about
Alessi but who sometimes buy objects of  the Family Follows Fiction collec-
tion because the products are colourful and funny. They agree to pay the
price that is asked for Firebird, Venturini’s lighter for gas stoves or for
Giovannoni’s Merdolino lavatory brush made to look like a flower because
these objects are usually bought as gifts.
Between these two ends are the “design victims”. They are familiar with
the names and products of Alessi designers and they buy both stainless
steel products as well as plastic ones – depending on their current money
situation. For themselves they buy maybe one or two of  the more expen-
sive Alessi kitchen ware, maybe Achille Castiglioni’s Oil and vinegar cruet,
but for a stylish little present they buy Alessandro Mendini’s Anna G., the
colourful doll-shaped corkscrew.
Even though marketing and communication is arranged in the Alessi
organization in the manner that is common in business organizations in
the industry, it is an interesting exception as a company in which design is
the heart and soul of  the business. In a market analysis for example, not
only business factors are tested. The feelings about a new product are
inquired within the company from those employees that have not taken
part in the product development process in question.
An object could be awarded one of  five grades, from ‘out’ (for
the obsolete or kitsch) to ‘illuminating’ (for products with cult
status). A further two components were added: price and func-
tion. Some items might score well as sensual communication
tools and perform less well on price and function. (Sweet 1998:
12).
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Design policy and corporate image are thus embedded within all activi-
ties of  the company rather than having a separate department dealing
with corporate image. The designers are different from each other and
the designs vary but what holds everything together is the Alessi brand as
a sign and a story arousing associations. It is interesting to see how Alessi
will develop its policy concerning the diversity of  these associations dis-
cussed above.
Conclusion and Discussion
In many ways, Alessi is a parallel case to Olivetti (Kitcherer 1990; see
Chapters 2 and 3 in this report). Family, family history and the Italian
tradition of  manufacturing form an important frame for the corporate
identity and image. This crystallizes in figures like Adriano Olivetti and
Alberto Alessi, whose interaction with the designers can be considered to
be a basis for credible and continuing design activity.
Continuity of  design is what is characteristic for Alessi. Design activity is
not restricted to a department of  design within the company, but it is
rather a ubiquitous set of  parameters that are considered to be important
in the different phases of  the product development and manufacturing.
Continuity comes from the history. In the case of  Alessi this means three
generations and over half  a century of  family business to become a lead-
ing design company. As we have seen here, Alessi did not start as a design
oriented company in the sense that we understand design nowadays. It
started as a manufacturer of  coffee pots and trays of  good quality. Carlo
Alessi, the son of  the founder, was the first designer in the sense that he
had training as an industrial designer and designed tea and coffee sets
that are still in production today. External designers were introduced to
Alessi in the 1950s when Ettore Alessi was the head of  the technical
department and started collaboration with some of  the interesting archi-
tects of  that time. During the 1970s the role of  external designers grew:
Culture, Design and Business- Alessi on a Fine Line
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Franco Sargiani and Eija Helander were the first designers that Alberto
Alessi brought into the firm. And after that came the world leading de-
signers and architects to design for Alessi.
Cultural values and activities have continued within Alessi. The sense for
cultural shifts and changes has been part of  the success. Early 1990s
Alessi rejuvenated itself  by launching new product lines coordinated by
Centro Studi Alessi – a good example of  the reflexivity and responsive-
ness of  the company management and culture. This is explicable through
the role of  Alberto Alessi who is reflexive towards Alessi’s development
and has a delicate sense for cultural developments as well as ability to
accomplish change. This together with the designs by the world leading
maestro’s has lead to a situation were designers and manufacturers the
world over follow and sometimes copy Alessi’s products.
In many ways, Olivetti under Adriano Olivetti and Alessi of  today are
parallel cases in this report. They together are exceptional compared to
other companies described here in two ways. First of  all, they are design-
intensive, and have managed to combine large scale manufacturing with
an exceptional quality of  design. Secondly, both have a decentralized de-
sign organization, which distinguishes them from companies such as
Philips, in which design is integrated into company activities by explicit
organizational arrangements. In contrast, design at Olivetti and Alessi is
based on close personal contacts of  management with desigers and other
creative professions. This provides designers an edge in production in
competition for power with other professions: their visions are given a
chance to structure the frame that defines the direction of  the company.
Alessi provides an important example of  the way that design can be em-
bedded in the organization not as an external activity but rather as a
ubiquitous philosophy.
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This book has been a study on how design is organized in Finnish com-
panies. To that end, it has sough benchmarks from literature as well as
from a set of  international comparison cases. We have studied two indus-
tries: machinery and medical equipment (and health care technology). In
addition, we have studied a set of  companies from consumer electronics,
and two designer-led firms.
As we have seen in this study, organizations can both enhance and inter-
fere with design. As one of  the creative professions, designers can be
important cultural innovators who translate cultural values into products,
be these material or immaterial, and thus enrich our lives. They are among
those actors who are able to see and formulate culture into design pro-
posals through visualizations, sketches, renderings, and models, among
other things (see Gedenryd 1998; Henderson 1999). At best, they may be
cultural innovators who creatively interpret events in their surroundings,
and articulate these interpretations in products and the way in which we
use products (see Kelley 2001).
Of  course, several types of  knowledge and culture are involved in this
process. At one extreme, designers utilize skills from applied sciences
such as ergonomics, software ergonomics, and psychology and sociology
(see Korhonen 2000). In particular, this is the case in technology-inten-
sive industries, while working in business-to-business areas this role is
less important. In the case of  design management, these disciplines in-
clude marketing research and other disciplines in business economics. In
consumer product manufacturing, designers often draw on a wide variety
of  sources, ranging from popular culture to street fashions, not just the
art world. Finally, in some cases, the line design and the art world is fine.
This is especially the case with star designers’ compositions. Take the
case of  Alessi’s Tea and coffee piazzas, where Alessi commissioned eleven
designers to produce tea and coffee sets. Only 99 editions of  each of
these supremely designed and crafted sets were produced. These sets
were launched in galleries in New York and Milan simultaneously in 1983
at the staggering price of  £12,000 per set. Products such as these are
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made for but a small minority of  consumers; in this, they function in
essence like art, even though these objects do have a function. This func-
tion, however, is secondary to the symbolics embedded in the product.
Design, then, is one of  the creative professions. How is design organized
as an activity in companies so that designers are able to articulate their
understanding of  applied science, art and culture in products that inhabit
our material culture?
Benchmarking Design: The Main Results of  the Study
For benchmarking purposes, we have developed a model of  strategic
design. This stratification model of  design, developed in Chapter 2, dis-
plays design as a process consisting of  at least three types of  activities:
product design, concept design, and strategic design. Our interest has
been in how design is organized in companies, and our main hypothesis
has been that at the more advanced end, design works at these three
levels simultaneously. We have assumed that only if  design affects the
strategic level in companies, it can affect the main framing processes of
organizations, and designers are able to control their conceptual and prod-
uct design environments.
Chapter 2 elaborated this notion of  design, and showed that it is possible
for design to be a strategic activity even if  it is largely a tacit process
rather than an explicit company policy. Design can consist of  a network,
which is coordinated by individual designers, and still be strategic. Based
on historical literature, Chapter 3 elaborated the process through which
designers may become key players in company framing. The main result
that arose from this examination was that the fate of  design centrally
depends on its relationship with the management, and the way in which
designers seize the opportunities created by the management.
Against this model, the main result of  this study can be stated in a simple
way. Design is a strategic activity in a few companies only. In our data, it
seems that design is involved in strategic framing processes mainly in
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consumer products such as Sony and Nokia. In these companies, design-
ers work at many fronts simultaneously: they improve the usability and
ergonomics of  products, and their skills in the artistic side of  products
gives them an edge over other professions. Making design as one of  the
activities in strategy framing is a strategic decision, though: in some con-
sumer product companies, design is not among the strategy-formulating
processes, and thus not among those activities that provide decision pre-
mises for the company. For example, this is the case at Polar Electro, a
sports equipment manufacturer. On the other hand, there are companies
that work on investment goods in which design is a strategic activity, as
the cases of  Valmet and Crown Equipment show.
What characterizes all these companies in which design is a strategic ac-
tivity is that in these firms, designers continuously interact with top man-
agement of  the company. It is with and through top management that
design becomes influential in the framing processes of  these companies.
Also, a few other reasons are typically involved.
- In particular, design has had important and powerful sponsors in the
company. Typically, these sponsors have been owners, the CEO, or a pow-
erful engineer who has been interacting with designers earlier in his ca-
reer.
- Also, design has established itself  into the company way of  thinking
over a long time that typically extends over several decades. Even when a
company starts to develop a design orientation, it takes a long time to get
it integrated into strategic processes.
 Interestingly, and this is well in line with the literature on the new economy,
companies in which design is strategically important have internalized
design into their organization. Some companies have done so, as the cases
of  Philips, Nokia, and Crown Equipment show. Even in these compa-
nies, the services of  design consultancies are utilized for various reasons
in varying circumstances.
However, in a few other cases, design is largely a networked, or even
outsourced activity, and still can be strategically important. In particular,
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this is the case with Alessi and Woodnotes, which are designer-led com-
panies. Two large corporations, he paper machine manufacturer Valmet
and Olivetti also have a network-based design organization. We did not
get enough detail to evaluate the economic reasons for this organiza-
tional solution. However, there seem to be design-specific reasons for
this model. In the case of  Olivetti, a network model of  design made it
possible for designers to pursue their cultural interests in the Milan art
world while still working for Olivetti. Also, the case of  Valmet illustrates
another kind of  logic. Valmet can externalize its design to a large extent
for a simple reason: it relies on a sophisticated and very expensive digital
design technology. Consultancies that are able and willing to update their
technology so that it is on par with Valmet, place their stakes on working
with Valmet for a long time in the future. In such situations, investments
bind the company and consultancy together, and create a trust relation-
ship between them. What other issues there may be were not revealed in
this analysis.
There are interesting variations in the ways in which design is organized
in companies. Some companies have built an in-house design organiza-
tion that improves the position of  design in several ways (esp. Philips). It
helps to pool resources for design, communicate the importance of  de-
sign, and its mere existence makes it possible to develop organizational
processes in which design is a part. However, these kinds of  organiza-
tions are rare. As we have repeatedly noted, in most of  our cases, design
works as a network rather than an in-house organization (esp. Olivetti).
In both cases, top management support is more essential for the increas-
ingly important role of  design than the form of  the organization. Also, in
both cases, there are means for maintaining design consciousness in the
company. Typically, internal publicity maintains the idea of  excellence
and the importance of  design through internal newsletters and other means
of  communication.
Alessi provides an interesting variant of  the traditional network model of
design. Alessi organizes its design activities not only trough projects and
continuous development, but also trough “metaprojects” aimed at pro-
ducing new ideas and concepts. These concepts sometimes lead to fur-
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ther development. Sometimes, they are just published in books that circu-
late internally. Apparently, Alessi has innovated here. Perhaps a part of
Alessi’s success is based on a systematic method of  thinking products
anew.
Interestingly, the way in which design evolves into a prominent role in
companies (see Chapters 6 and 7) displays characteristics typical to inno-
vations generally as well. The notion that design typically has almost co-
incidental roots fits well to what Miettinen et al. (1999) have argued in
another context for technical innovations. These typically emerge from
almost coincidental interactions and surprising combinations.  Success
changes the way design is understood from being an artistic activity to a
more comprehensive understanding of  the skills of  designers. However,
in every company in which design has become a central framing activity,
it has been powerful members of  the management that have been in-
volved in these early interactions. Their support has given the new activ-
ity a chance, which has been utilized by designers, who have gradually
been able to extend their influence to framing activities. It is the interplay
of  management and the profession that produces the momentum design
needs to be recognized.
Finally, our final research question explored the differences between in-
dustries. Generally speaking, the basic hypothesis concerning the relative
importance of  design in various industries is valid: in consumer product
manufacturing, design is more important than in business-to-business
production (see Chapter 8). More interestingly, the skills required from
designers vary according to the industry.
- In machine and process industries, design largely consists of  product
design peppered with conceptual and research skills in ergonomics and
usability research.
- In medical equipment, where products interact with a dyad of  lay cus-
tomers and professionals, design is more important and conceptual in
nature. Key skills in this area include not just those skills typical to design
in machinery, but also skills in designing the appearance of  products.
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- Finally, in consumer products, designers’ skills are increasingly more
complex. In addition to product design skills, they need skills in ergo-
nomics and usability, aesthetics and other cultural aspects of  products
and, increasingly, future studies.
In all advanced companies, designers not only work in product design, or
even in new product development, although this is their primary area.
They also work on a variety of  design management tasks such as graph-
ics, packaging, logos, typefaces. In current parlance, these activities are
collected underneath the rubric “design management” (see Poikolainen
et al. 1994). As we have seen, in some historical cases (AEG and Behrens;
Olivetti under Adriano Olivetti’s early reign), designers’ skills are called
even more widely for building and interior design, and for devising plans
for streets, yards, and even city neighborhoods.
Finally, an obvious exception to this scheme is design in design-intensive
industries (Chapter 10). In these industries, some companies compete not
so much with functionality, but with pure design. In particular, customers
may be design-conscious, and judge new products not just in terms of
the qualities of  products, but also in terms of  design. This seems to be
the case in some consumer products such as mobile phones and - per-
haps - cars. Design is an indispensable part of  production, which re-
sembles fashion in its social form. In extreme cases wild, playful, and
fantasy-like images and materials in existing design products can become
a source of  new design, which comments upon existing design. In this
Baudrillardian world, design comments on other designs, and designers
as well as customers (and other professionals) play an integral part in this
reflexive game. Design may even become a pure activity, done for the
sake of  design only.
Policy Implications –
The Present Condition in the National Design Policy
The  essential  document of  the Finnish national design policy,  Muotoilu
2005! – called Design2005! Government Decision-in-Principle on Finn-
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ish Design Policy in English, was approved by the government 15.6.2000.
This principal document was fortified in Fall 2000 when a  treaty of
intention to make the document operative was signed by representatives
from Ministry of  Education and Ministry of  Trade and Commerce to-
gether with representatives from the  main organisation of  the industry,
Teollisuus ja Työnantajat TT (The Confederation of  Finnish Industry
and Employers). Today, in the world scale, Finland has one of  the most
far-reaching and consensus-based design policies. In comparison with
similar efforts in eg. Denmark and Sweden the Finnish policy is unique in
stressing the industry as a driving force behind  the furthering of  indus-
trial design – although the public sector is seen as a vital client for design
services, too.  Globally taken perhaps only some Far East countries such
as Korea  have in a similar manner amplified the role of  design in indus-
try and international economic competition.
This point has been reached successively through goal-driven efforts spon-
sored by several actors. These are SITRA, the educational sector at the
University of  Art and Design as the main player, together with the gov-
ernment,  the leaders of  industry with their major spokesmen and at this
stage also Tekes (the National Technology Agency) and the Academy of
Finland.
SITRA took in 1996 design  into consideration as one element of na-
tional excellence and as a part of  the national innovation system. After an
informal discussion forum SITRA financed a survey on the condition
and future challenges of  Finnish design in1997 – 98. The two-volume
report  Muotoiltu Etu I – II (The Designed Advantage) was launched in
Fall 1998 and gained  wide media coverage and became topical reading
for the design community and its partners. The timing was right – also
regarding the role of  the state. The government set  up their own work-
ing group to formalise the national design policy paper basically on the
ground set up by the SITRA report. In conjunction with the Design 2005!
report a Round Table of  Design was initiated as forum for discussion
and innovation  incubation consisting of  major actors of  the design con-
text, both public and private.
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National policy papers issued by the government are not often very suc-
cessful in becoming strategic tools, let alone operative. The design policy
appears to be an exception. At this stage Tekes  has already made the
decision of funding a R&D programme in design 2002 – 2005. The
Academy of Finland has a national, multidisciplinary research program in
design for 2002 – 2005 on its agenda; the  final decisions of launching the
program will be made Spring 2001.  Tekes and the Academy  work
collaboratively in shaping these programs which also is a  feature worth
of  interest. So far not a single Western country has made similar  plans
for the furthering of the knowledge base of design through r&d and
research.
In Winter 2001 we  are in a situation where the national framework for
furthering design also in industry is in existence. The main actors are
basically aware of  their respective roles. The Ministries of  Education and
Trade and Commerce are informed and have directed responsibilities to
respective departments and officials. The industry voices its opinion via
the Round Table as well as through the Design Forum Finland, the main
state-sponsored organ for promoting Finnish industrial design and the
companies using it.  A network of  regional centers of  design education,
knowledge-base and promotion is active and is currently joining the
operationalisation of  the  national agenda. The last action of  national
importance has been establishing of  Designium – The New Centre of
Innovation in Design at University of  Art and Design in Fall 2000.
Designium acts as a portal for design innovation transfer to industry not
only regarding the university but also in co-operation with other actors
including the regional centers.
Following from the previous we can state that many of  the issues that
engendered the inclusion of  design into SITRA’s innovation research pro-
gram have been if  not resolved  but at least included in a national frame-
work of  policy and  decision-making. But some utmostly vital areas re-
garding future policies remain to solved.
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Areas in Need of Immediate Development
In terms of  the immediate near future, the promotion of  design requires
several actions from a few main actors, both from the public and the
private sector. The conceptual background for the following recommen-
dations is based on the notion of strategic design outlined in Chapter 2.
- Design does not work in the industry on a strategic level up to its full
potential
- Finnish design consultancies do not operate in a mode vital for present
conditions regarding domestic need or international competition.  Their
capital of  expertise does not generally exceed the limits of  the design
work itself  – that often of  high level – and thus their service palette is
limited. Their economic structure is weak and cash flow less than could
be expected in comparison  with the value they create for their customers.
- Design consultancies  are not international actors – thus vulnerable for
external competition.
- The leading design consultancies have reached the limits of  their growth
on the traditional basis of   the services they offer – to reach the next
stage certain interventions and  external investment may be needed. If
this is not done also the Finnish industry remains without a deeper, stra-
tegic design expertise they need in their development and international
competition. Or, they buy it from abroad.
- The division of  responsibilities on the national scale has to sharpened
even further. In a small country we can not waste any expertise, allow
overlaps or tolerate  gaps.
- Research into the nature and uses of  design has to grow in order to
generate a  research-driven, knowledge-accumulating design practice both
in the industry and in the consultancies.
Finally, design education has to be even to a higher degree than now
organized cost-effectively, regionally and  content-wise in a manner which
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produces professionals mastering all levels of design skills from the tech-
nical to the strategic-conceptual. If only conceptual skills are emphasized
nation-wide a loss is felt on the technical sector and vice versa: the MA
education in design has give future professionals tools for complex, broad-
scale problem solving.
Implications for the Role of  SITRA in Developing Finnish Indus-
trial Design.
SITRA  could use the financial instruments in their possession to  help
Finnish design consultancies  in their efforts to reach  a new stage and
scope of  operations. This may include launching an internal mode of
operation but certainly the development of  knowledge and expertise capital
of  the consultancies. This means the inclusion of   knowledge areas into
their operations already  at work within their international competitors.
From  point a  follows that SITRA now has a possibility to continue its
ground-breaking role as the developer of  Finnish design by launching a
project where the knowledge-capital of  Finnish design comes under scru-
tiny. The overwhelmingly tacit knowledge embedded in design has to be
explicated and new, research-based  areas  brought in. This knowledge
and expertise has to be made a strategic tool in the business of  design
consultancies. Because of  the small inner market of  Finland it may be
hard to use the international model of  outsourcing the knowledge-cre-
ation to specialised consultancies. Instead, a  portal may be created serv-
ing the business as whole.
In general, SITRA could  strenghten the  role it  already has given design
in projects such as Divan and Taitotieto. Small, design-driven SMEs might
be a target area for  engendering return to design investment in the pre-
carious stage of  establishing these enterprises.
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Appendix 1.
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE COMPANY
1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND
- Could you briefly describe your training and professional background?
- How are you involved with the design?
2. DESIGN IN THE COMPANY
a) What is the design history of  your company?
b) The role of  design in the company
- Which processes are the designers involved in? (Product development, research, mar-
keting, advertising, leadership…)
- How is the design process organized?
c) Does the company have a design policy?
d) How are the designers involved in the decision making process in the company?
- Which professional categories are the designers mostly involved with? Who else?
- Is the voice of  the designer heard in the organization? How are the relationships be-
tween the different professional categories within the organization?
e) What kind of  special skills can the designers bring into the company?
f) Is the company willing to invest in design, e.g. in the form of  new equipment, exposi-
tions, communications, IT, participation in the design competitions etc.?
3. ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT
a) What is the organizational structure of  the company (hierarchical, informal, matrix,
network…)?
b) Is the role of design accentuated in the company documentation and symbols (leg-
ends, advertising and such…)?
c) Design Management –wise, does the designer participate in the overall communication of
the company or coordinate the different design and company image related functions?
4. USE OF CONSULTANTS
- Does the company use design consultants?
- For what kind of  reasons does the company use the services of  an outside consultant
rather than an in-house designer?
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5. NETWORKING
- In your view, do the designers combine expertise within the company in a way that other
professional groups cannot? Which kind of  expertise?
- For example do the designers bring any other particular expertise from the outside of
the company? What kinds of  networks if  any do they bring into the company?
6. AREA OF BUSINESS
- Is the design an important competitive advantage in the field of  business of  the com-
pany?
- Do the customers require the design?
- Do the economical cycles have an influence in the investments made in the design?
Fluctuations according to high/ low season? How to balance the fluctuations?
7. COMPETITORS AND DESIGN
- Which companies are the major competitors of  your company? And design-wise?
- Do your competitors invest in design, how? E.g. functionality, ergonomics, impressive
visual design, other…
- Has the company had to change its tactics due to the design of  the competitors?
- Which company is the market leader design-wise in your field of  business?
8. CLOSING
- How could we get some additional information concerning the design in the company?
- Who would you recommend for further interviews? E.g. are there in product develop-
ment any key-persons that we should interview?
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Appendix 2.
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DESIGNERS AND CONSULTANTS
9. PERSONAL BACKGROUND
- Could you briefly describe your training and professional background?
- What kind of  companies have you worked for? Do you have some other experience
from the fields which interest us (high technology medical equipment/ metal manufac-
turing/ process technology)?
10. RELATIONSHIP TO THE CUSTOMER
a) Could you briefly describe your relationship to the Client Company?
b) Does the company have a design policy? What is your evaluation of  it?
c) The role of  design in the company:
- Which processes are the designers involved in? (Product development, research, mar-
keting, advertising, leadership…)
- How is the design process organized?
e) Decision process
- Which professional categories are the designers mostly involved with? Who else?
- Is the voice of  the designer heard in the organization? How are the relationships be-
tween the different professional categories within the organization?
f) What kind of  special skills can the designers bring into the company?
g) Is the client company willing to invest in design, e.g. in the form of  new equipment,
expositions, communications, IT etc.?
h) What factors are considered in the account? How do you influence in the outcome of
the account?
11. ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT
d) What is the organizational structure of  the client company (hierarchical, informal,
network…)? Does the organizational structure facilitate your work or make it more diffi-
cult?
e) Is the role of  design accentuated in the company documentation and symbols (legends,
advertising and such…)?
f) Design Management –wise, does the designer participate in the overall communication of
the company or coordinate the different design and company image related functions?
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12. USE OF CONSULTANTS
- For what kind of  reasons do the companies use the services of  an outside consultant
rather than hire an in-house designer?
13. NETWORKING
- In your view, do the designers combine expertise within the company in a way that other
professional groups cannot? Which kind of  expertise? What kinds of  networks if  any do
you bring into the company?
14. AREA OF BUSINESS
- Is the design an important competitive advantage in the field of  business of  your client?
- Do the customers require the design?
- Do the economical cycles have an influence in the investments made in the design?
Fluctuations according to high/ low season?
15. COMPETITORS AND DESIGN
- Which companies are the major competitors of  your client company design-wise?
- How? E.g. functionality, ergonomics, impressive visual design, other…
- How do you take into account the design of  your client’s competitors in your own work?
- Which company is the market leader design-wise in the field of  business of  your client?
16. CONCLUSION
- How could we get some additional information concerning the design in your client
company?
Who would you recommend for further interviews?
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